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ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT IN THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
AN UNHURRIED HISTORICAL 
REVIEW 
WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1940, the American Association of University Professors (" AAUP") and 
the Association of American Colleges ("AAC") put forth their 1940 Statement 
of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure. 1 In the half century since its 
original issuance, the 1940 Statement has become well known in higher 
education in the United States, and its principles of academic freedom are 
widely observed. It has been incorporated expressly or by reference into 
many faculty handbooks in American colleges and universities, endorsed by 
more than one hundred national learned and professional associations, and 
relied upon in a number of state and federal courts. It is, overall, the general 
norm of academic practice in the United States. 
As a general legal proposition, however, the 1940 Statement is an example 
of very soft law. Generally speaking, the 1940 Statement is not policed by 
courts. Rather, it is policed principally by Committee A of the AAUP2 and by 
publication of AAUP's ad hoc committee investigation case reports in the 
AAUP's professional journal. And while this may understate the 1940 
Statement's influence in some respects (for example, as when a university has 
adopted it and made it part of the faculty's contractual guarantee), the 1940 
Statement is certainly not hard law in the ultimate sense one differently 
associates, say, with the first amendment to the Constitution with its general 
protection of free speech. That fixed constitutional provision, even if limited 
Copyright © 1990 by Law and Contemporary Problems 
• William R. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law; Past President and 
General Counsel, American Association of University Professors. 
I. 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure ("1940 Statement") in Policy 
Documents and Reports 3 (AAUP, 1984) ("1984 Red Book"); see Appendix B, 53 L & Contemp Probs 
407 (Summer 1990). 
2. For an explanation of the function of Committee A, see generally Louis Joughin, ed, 
Academic Freedom and Tenure: .4 Handbook of the American Association of University Professors (Univ of Wis 
Press, 1967). 
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to acts of government, as it is,3 is at the opposite end of the legal order from 
the precatory law of the AAUP and AAC. In comparison with the soft law of 
the 1940 Statement, the first amendment is hard law indeed. The 1940 
Statement instructs institutions of higher education respecting the kind of 
disposition they ought, in the opinion of the Statement's sponsoring and 
endorsing learned societies, to take toward academic freedom. As already 
noted, however, the 1940 Statement generally requires affirmative 
institutional action of some sort to carry its provisions into legal effect (for 
example, incorporation by reference into college or university bylaws, into 
letters of faculty appointment, or collective bargaining agreements). No such 
step is required in respect to the first amendment, of course. The Bill of 
Rights, including the first amendment, is quite different from the 1940 
Statement. The first amendment is, after all, part of our fundamental law. 
Compliance, therefore, is not optional; its protections are enforceable in 
every court in the United States. 
Even so, the first amendment is in its own way very much like the 1940 
Statement: the first amendment's immediate use value is in large measure 
derived from the case law that has grown up around it, as has happened also 
with the 1940 Joint Statement and Committee A. What the courts understand 
the first amendment to say, rather than what one may otherwise suppose it 
provides, tends necessarily to occupy the main ground in working through its 
various applications and use. Given the role courts have occupied in the 
American constitutional order at least since Marbury v. Madison 4 was decided 
in 1803, the case law of the first amendment provides the basic, though not 
exclusive, road map in tending to guide first amendment disputes. The 
AAUP's Committee A case law (that is, the very large body of published case 
3. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion. or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; 
or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances." As suggested by its language, the first amendment is not addressed to the states. The 
Supreme Court confirmed that impression in 1833. Barron v Mayor and City Council, 32 US (7 Pet) 
243, 24 7-51 (1833) (The Bill of Rights was proposed and ratified as a set of affirmative restrictions on 
the national government only; it has no application to the states.). With the ratification of the 14th 
amendment m 1868, arguments came to be advanced that the 14th amendment incorporated some 
of the protections the Bill of Rights had furnished against the national government as restraints 
equally binding thereafter on the states. (For one recent and elaborate review of this subject, see 
Michael K. Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights (Duke Univ 
Press, 2d ed 1987)). In 1925, the Supreme Court accepted that view in respect to the first 
amendment, in dicta. Gitlow v New York, 268 US 652,666 (1925). In 1931, the identification of the 
full free speech and free press clause to the due process clause of the 14th amendment was employed 
by the Court to hold invalid a state law. See Near v Minnesota, 283 US 697, 701-33 (1931). See also 
Dejonge v Oregon, 299 US 353, 356-66 (1937). Since that date, the 14th and first amendments have 
been treated by the Supreme Court as framing parallel, binding restrictions on the national and state 
governments, although neither by itself applies to private entities not operating as agencies of the 
state. 
4. 5 US (I Cranch) 137 (1803). Marbury· affirmed the Supreme Court's pivotal role in applying 
the Constitution, much as Bishop Hoadley had addressed the pivotal role of judges in England in his 
sermon preached before the King in 1717 ("Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any 
written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the lawgiver, to all intents and purposes, and not the 
person who first spoke or wrote them."). See William B. Lockhart, et al, Constitutional Law: Cases-
Comments-Questions 1 (West, 6th ed 1986). 
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reports that used to appear in the AA UP Bulletin and that now appear in the 
AAUP's publication Academe) has functioned informally in an equivalent 
fashion in respect to the 1940 Statement. This informal case law has provided 
specific clarification and application of that fifty-year-old, two-page 
declaration. Roughly speaking, albeit of course at a much softer level of 
authority, Committee A has provided the guiding case law of academic 
freedom identified with the 1940 Statement comparable to that provided by 
the Supreme Court. 
However, there is no reason a priori to expect these two bodies of case law 
to share any substantial common ground. Rather, the more reasonable 
assumption would be that the Supreme Court case law of the first amendment 
and the informal Committee A case law of the 1940 Statement would move 
along separate, even if roughly parallel, paths: the first dealing with large 
matters of free speech, government censorship, and government power to 
punish what people say, the second dealing with academic freedom as a tight 
bundle of interests distinct unto itself. In fact, however, this is not quite true. 
Rather, while the first amendment and the 1940 Statement are indeed 
differently grounded, their case law has tended very substantially to overlap. 
In fact, a large portion of the previously purely soft law of academic freedom 
has found a niche in the hard law of the Constitution through the usages of 
academic freedom in the Supreme Court. It is this process we shall shortly 
follow in an unhurried review. 
Beyond this major, largely post-World War II development, moreover, the 
Supreme Court has also taken some of the values narrowly represented in the 
1940 Statement and expanded upon them in a variety of ways. For example, 
the 1940 Statement addressed itself to academic freedom as an imperative in 
higher education. Consistent with some trends in first amendment case law, 
however, academic freedom has secured some purchase for public school 
teachers as well. As a different example, whereas "academic freedom" is 
defined in the 1940 Statement as the "[f]reedom of teaching" (and of faculty 
research and faculty extramural activities of certain kinds), 5 some Court 
decisions speak of academic freedom in respect to students, and not solely 
those who teach. As still a third example, although academic freedom is 
usually treated (in the 1940 Statement) as a matter of individual freedom, 
usually that of individual teachers to address matters of professional interest 
without threat to their jobs,6 some Court decisions apply a first amendment 
notion of academic freedom much more corporately, that is, to the university 
or the college as an entity. The university, it is thought, may claim a certain 
corporate academic freedom to set its own institutional course-in 
5. Of which more mention will be made later on. See, for example, note 112 and 
accompanying text. 
6. The standard dictionary definition is of this sort. See, for example, American Heritage 
Dictionary• 70 (Houghton-Mifflin, 1985) ("academic freedom'' defined as: "Liberty to pursue and 
teach relevant knowledge and to discuss it freely without restriction from school or public officials or 
from other sources of influence"). 
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curriculum, in admissions, in appointments-sheltered from government to 
some degree as a matter of constitutional (academic freedom) right. 
Conversely, however, even in respect to these examples, the pathway of 
academic freedom's definitional development has tended to be a two-way 
street; in some measure these developments have taken place equally within 
the AAUP as within the doctrines of the Supreme Court. So, for instance, 
while the AAUP has not attempted to police its newer Joint Statement in the 
same case law investigating-and-reporting manner Committee A employs for 
the 1940 Statement (its resources are too limited to do so), the AAUP 
nonetheless did help fashion a Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of 
Students in 1967.7 So, too, the AAUP has involved itself in matters of 
institutional academic freedom and diversity, and has appeared a substantial 
number of times to support the claims of first amendment academic freedom 
by public school teachers. The AAUP's own notions of the varieties of 
academic freedom, like the notions of the Supreme Court, have become more 
complex over time. Indeed, the AAUP's Policy Documents and Reports, the "Red 
Book" (its collection of basic policy statements and documents), addresses a 
far broader range of subjects than those just touched upon. The Red Book 
currently collects 179 pages of policy statements and documents: 177 pages 
more, that is, than the original two-page 1940 Statement presumed to do. 
The phrase "academic freedom" has thus become one of extended usage for 
the AAUP as well as for courts interpreting and applying the first amendment 
during the past half century or so. 
Nonetheless, it is principally the latter-the usages of academic freedom in 
the Supreme Court-we mean to trace, rather than the formulations of the 
AAUP. To do that most usefully, however, we do not begin with the Supreme 
Court's modern decisions, but with its past decisions. Not by chance, they are 
linked to the origins of the AAUP. 
II 
LINKING AcADEMIC FREEDOM TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A SHORT, 
HISTORICAL SKETCH 
A 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the first amendment was virtually in a 
state of pre-history so far as academic freedom was concerned. Indeed, 
academic freedom to one side, the first amendment had no real immediate 
significance for free speech in general, never mind anything more specialized 
or arcane as Lehrfreiheit ("freedom to teach") or Lernfreiheit ("freedom to 
learn"), in the United States. 
The first amendment had no general bite in 1900 because of the American 
judiciary's extremely cramped view of the amendment's scope. Despite its 
unqualifiedly strong language ("Congress shall make no law abridging the 
7. AAUP et al,joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, in Policy Documents and Reports 153 
(AAUP, 1990) ("1967 Statement"); see Appendix C. 53 L & Contemp Probs 411 (Summer 1990). 
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freedom of speech or of the press"8 ), the amendment was deemed to furnish 
no more than fig leaf protection from anything other than certain kinds of 
governmentally imposed licensing or permit systems. In a word, the 
amendment applied almost solely to some few forms of prior restraint. 
The prevailing Supreme Court jurisprudence of the first amendment 
amounted to little more than a restatement of William Blackstone's 
eighteenth century Commentaries on the Laws of England,9 predating the 
Constitution and the first amendment. Blackstone, summarizing the common 
law of the eighteenth century, reported approvingly that restrictions on 
speech having any bad tendency in the view of public authority were quite 
commonplace. Other than restrictions involving some sort of press licensing 
system of the sort abandoned in England in 1691, Blackstone noted, it was 
thought to be pretty much up to Parliament and the customs of England to 
decide what kinds of speech might or might not be allowed. In a word, the 
freedom of the press (and so, too, of speech) was its freedom from having to 
satisfy crown censors. It was not a freedom from criminal or civil sanctions, 
imposed after the fact in light of the scandal of one's actual remarks. 
Most judicial interpretations of the first amendment adhered sedulously to 
Blackstone-they enacted Blackstone's Commentaries into constitutional law. 
The usual judicial assumption was that the freedom of speech and of the press 
that the first amendment protected from abridgments by Congress was merely 
that freedom familiarly allowed at common law and nothing more. This view 
is accurately captured in a much-quoted dictum by Justice Holmes, writing for 
the Supreme Court in 1907: "[T]he main purpose of such constitutional 
provisions is 'to prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had 
been practiced by other governments,' and they do not prevent the subsequent 
punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare.'' 10 This extremely 
narrow interpretation of the first amendment (and, incidentally, equally of the 
fourteenth amendment-it is the latter that is applicable to the states), left the 
amendment practically useless. And so far as academic freedom might be an 
issue as a subset of freedom of speech, there was even more to be discouraged 
about. 
The additional source of discouragement developed separately from a 
strand of constitutional analysis specially applicable to employment 
relationships, including public employment (that is, employment by the state). 
All employers were deemed to be unconstrained by the Constitution insofar 
as they might require that one suspend one's freedom of speech as a 
8. Compare, for example, US Const, 4th amend (forbidding only unreasonable searches and 
seizures). In most constitutions that contain free speech and free press clauses, the rights are heavily 
qualified. See, for example, article 100 of the Norwegian Constitution (second oldest after the 
United States Constitution, adopted in 1814) (freedom of publication protected unless it expresses 
"contempt of religion [or] morality," in which case it is not). 
9. See Edward Christian, ed, Blackstone's Commentaries, Book 4 (Of Public Wrongs) 150-53 
(Robert H. Small, 1825). 
10. Patterson v Colorado, 205 US 454, 462 (1907) (first emphasis in original; second emphasis 
added). 
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condition of holding an appointment or job. The law (that is, the body of 
constitutional law applicable to this subject) was only too clear: when a 
speech restriction limiting what one might say or write was set forth in 
advance as a condition of one's employment, it was not thought to raise a first 
amendment question at all. One was free to accept the position or not, on the 
terms offered; if one accepted, one was accordingly bound. 
This view, too, is reflected in a case decided by Holmes in 1892, while he 
was still serving on the Massachusetts Supreme Court. Dismissing the appeal 
of a New Bedford policeman who had been fired following some public 
remarks critical of how the department was run, Holmes drew a distinction 
that was to have a lasting effect: 
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no 
constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire in which 
the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional right of free speech, as well as 
of idleness, by the implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain, as he 
takes the employment on the terms which are offered him. 1 1 
Holmes hedged only trivially on the distinction. In dicta, he suggested 
that if the conditions thus imposed incidentally to public employment were 
unreasonable in some extreme sense (that is, that the conditions seemed 
utterly gratuitous), the courts might intervene on substantive due process 
grounds. Seldom, however, would that extreme instance be deemed to have 
occurred; indeed, Holmes gave no example of what he had in mind. 
Plainly, these views and precedents would leave any claim of mere 
academic freedom stranded as a constitutional matter; indeed, they left 
freedom of speech stranded at large. And, in fact, these views of the first and 
fourteenth amendments carried over for decades into the twentieth century, 
as a large number of cases would show. 
Blackstone's bad tendency test held sway under the first amendment until 
well after World War 1. 12 The add-on employment waiver rationale was 
applied by the courts until well after World War 11. 13 It will serve our 
purpose here to note one famous case particularly on point-the original 
Scopes Monkey Trial case 14 in which Clarence Darrow and Arthur Garfield 
Hayes argued quite vainly on the constitutional issue in the Tennessee 
Supreme Court in 1927. 
At issue in Scopes was whether John Scopes, a Tennessee public high school 
teacher, could be fined or jailed for teaching "any theory that denie[d] the 
story of the divine creation of man as taught in the Bible," in violation of a 
state statute governing his conduct as a teacher in the Tennessee public 
schools. 15 Could he discuss the theory that man may have developed not all 
II. McAulilfv Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass 216, 220, 29 NE 517, 518 (1892). 
12. For a useful review, see generally David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 
90 Yale LJ 514 (1981). 
13. See, for example, Bailey v Richardson, 182 F2d 46 (DC Cir 1950), aff'd by an equally divided 
Court, 341 US 918 (1951). 
14. Scopes v State, 154 Tenn 105, 289 SW 363 (1927). 
15. 154 Tenn at 108, 289 SWat 364. The statute, incidentally, was not limited to public school 
teachers. Rather, it applied to "all the Universities, Normals and all other public schools supported in 
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at once in perfect form, as a creation of God, but over time, from earlier life 
forms through the cumulative effects of mutation, reproduction, and natural 
selection, as Darwin had proposed? The statute gave fair warning that he 
could not. Violations, moreover, were punishable as a crime (apart from 
providing grounds for dismissal). Scopes was duly convicted and fined 
following a full jury trial. 
Scopes' criminal conviction was in fact reversed in the state supreme court 
because of a technical sentencing error committed in the trial court; since 
Scopes agreed to leave the state, there was no subsequent reprosecution or 
appeal. But in reversing, the Tennessee Supreme Court left no doubt about 
the futility of arguing any constitutional objections to the act, whether as 
applied to a public school teacher or to a state university professor: 
[Scopes] was under contract with the State to work in an institution of the State. He 
had no right or privilege to serve the State except upon such terms as the State 
prescribed. His liberty, his privilege, his immunity to teach and proclaim the theory of 
evolution, elsewhere than in the service of the State, was in no wise touched by this 
law. 
The Statute before us is not an exercise of the police power of the State 
undertaking to regulate the conduct and contracts of individuals in their dealings with 
each other.[ 16] On the other hand it is an Act of the State as a corporation, a 
proprietor, an employer. It is a declaration of a master as to the character of work the 
master's servant shall, or rather shall not, perform. In dealing with its own employees 
engaged upon its own work, the state is not hampered by the limitations of ... the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 17 
Between the general bad tendency test on the one hand, and the 
additional doctrine represented by Scopes (that the state is not hampered by 
the fourteenth amendment in directing the work of its appointees and staff), 
very little by way of protected free speech was left unaccounted for, to say 
nothing of academic freedom as such. To be sure, as we have noted, private 
schools and private universities (that is, those not receiving public monies) 
could choose to provide for something roughly called "academic freedom," if 
they wished. That would be up to them. 18 But even insofar as it was up to 
them, obviously the issue would tum on trustee tolerance-to control or not 
control what its faculty might do-and nothing else. It was not a matter of 
first amendment law. 
whole or in part" by public funds. Tennessee Ami-Evolution Act, 1925 Tenn Pub Acts 27 (emphasis 
added). 
16. If the statute had been extended to reach teachers in private schools and private colleges, 
however, it is not clear they would have fared any better than Scopes in a free speech claim. 
Remember that at this time the first amendment standard of judicial review would require the court 
to examine the restrictive state law solely under the prevailing bad tendency test. Under that test the 
state would need to show only that some not unreasonable view of public welfare would be advanced 
by forbidding such teaching, whether or not it was acceptable to the private school or college. But 
see Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923), and Bartels v Iowa, 262 US 404 (1923) (further discussed in 
notes 24-33 and accompanying text). 
17. Scopes, 154 Tenn at 109-12, 289 SWat 364-65 (emphasis and brackets added). 
18. Under the prevailing bad tendency first amendment test, however, and despite the dicta of 
the Tennessee Supreme Court, even this statement may be too broad. See the brief discussion in 
note 16. 
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Throughout this period, however, significant developments in shaping 
academic freedom nonetheless took place. What academic freedom required 
was some compelling justification, at least as a strongly defensible 
professional imperative in higher education, even if (perhaps especially if) 
there was no immediate prospect of finding support in hard law. 
Part of that case had already been made over decades, indeed over 
centuries, of course; in some measure academic freedom was already reflected 
in the practices of a number of institutions in the United States. Part of it was 
developed with a new spirit from the impact of writings such as John Stuart 
Mill's already classic Essay on Liberty 19 published in 1859, whose chapter on 
"Liberty of Thought and Discussion" would eventually also influence the 
Supreme Court. Part could be (and was) adapted from earlier sources (for 
example, "The Areopagitica,"20 Milton's essay of 1643, urging the usefulness 
of permitting "truth and falsehood" to grapple without press censorship), and 
even earlier discourses on the freedom of the mind as well. 
But freedom of the mind and freedom of speech had always had their 
limits, as Milton as well as Blackstone noted (and approved), including limits 
public bodies enacted for reasons they deemed socially worthwhile. If 
writings such as Mill's were felt to be interesting and provocative, many also 
thought them naive and oblivious to other interests that might more dearly 
matter. To many, moreover, there seemed little reason to grant academics 
more latitude than anyone else. As Glenn Morrow was to explain years later: 
The justification of academic freedom cannot be based merely on the right to freedom 
of thought and expression enjoyed by all citizens of a liberal society, for academic 
freedom implies immunity to some natural consequences of free speech that the 
ordinary citizen does not enjoy .... The justification of academic freedom must 
therefore be sought in the peculiar character and function of the university scholar [if 
it is to be found at all]. 21 
In the general view of freedom of speech, one will recall, the bad tendency 
test was applied. Insofar as trustees, philanthropists, and others concerned 
with colleges and universities-whether private or public-might feel a duty 
to disallow teaching, research, or publication contrary to common notions of 
truth, faith, order, and good taste, nothing in general legal philosophy or first 
amendment jurisprudence provided any reason for self-restraint. There was, 
that is, very little reason to accept any self-denying ordinance of 
noninterference, whether one was a legislator or a trustee. To stand aloof in 
either role might merely imply an effete indifference to the public good. 
Viewed this way, noninterference would constitute the irresponsible stance. 
An answering rationale needed to come, as Morrow suggested, from an 
enlarged notion of what one deems to be the public good of a university, 
19. See Philip Wheelwright, ed,jeremy Bentham, james Mill.j.S. Mill: Selected Writings (Doubleday, 
1935). 
20. See Don W. Wolfe, ed, 2 Complete Prose Works (Yale Univ Press, 1982). 
21. Glenn R. Morrow, Academic Freedom, in David L. Sills, ed, International Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences 4, 6 (MacMillan & Free Press, 1968). 
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whether public or private: that is, of what a university should be doing, and 
what defines the duties (never mind the rights) of its faculty. Borrowed only 
partly from English universities, the developments being shaped gained 
ground in the United States more substantially from the example of particular 
German research institutes, in which a number of American scholars received 
their graduate education and in which Lehrfreiheit was already an established 
and familiar term.22 
A faculty, especially a research faculty, is employed professionally to test 
and propose revisions in the prevailing wisdom, not to inculcate the 
prevailing wisdom in others, store it as monks might do, or rewrite it in 
elegant detail. Its function is primarily one of critical review: to check 
conventional truth, to reexamine ("re-search") what may currently be thought 
sound but may be more or less unsound. Its purpose is likewise to train 
others to the same critical skills. Such a faculty inquires-as an obvious sort 
of example-whether original and seemingly authoritative sources have been 
mistranslated or misunderstood. Such a faculty likewise labors to enlarge the 
field of experimental data and to make itself useful by publishing the results. 
It seeks through its own sets of disciplines and conventions to examine its own 
culture's characteristics as well as those of other societies, past and present, 
even as an outsider would be prepared to examine them, that is, without 
special affection or predisposition of the sort likely to cloud the integrity of 
the work. Its successes in these endeavors are the measure of its chief work, 
and also of its most important social assignment. This is what a professional 
faculty is meant to do. Much like the office of devil's advocate within a church 
(that, while faithful, desires also not to confer sainthood unrigorously and so 
charges someone to check itself from error), universities are licensed truth-
hunters defined and bound by academic freedom. As Arthur Lovejoy (a 
founder of the AAUP in 1913) observed in the 1930 edition of the 
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, the ultimate social good of a university "is 
rendered impossible if the work of the investigator is shackled by the 
requirement that his conclusions shall never seriously deviate from generally 
accepted beliefs or from those accepted by the persons, private or official, 
through whom society provides the means for the maintenance of 
universities.' '23 
22. See Richard Hofstadter & Walter P. Metzger, The Development of Academic Freedom in the United 
States 377-407 (Columbia Univ Press, 1955); Charles Franklin Thwing, The American and the German 
University: One Hundred Years of History ch 3 (Macmillan, 1928); Leo Rockwell, Academic Freedom: 
German Origin and American Development, 36 AAUP Bull 225-36 (1950). " 'Lehrfreiheit' meant that 
associate and full professors. who were salaried government officials working in universities 
supported by the state ... could determine the contents of their courses and impart the findings of 
their inquiries without seeking ministerial approval or fearing ministerial reproof." Matthew W. 
Finkin, On "Institutional" Academic Freedom, 61 Tex L Rev 817, 822 (1983), quoting Walter P. Metzger. 
23. More than a half century later, in the spring of 1988, the House of Lords adopted a bill 
defining academic freedom in a manner closely fitting Lovejoy's rationale ("academic freedom" 
proposed for the protection of teachers as "freedom within the law to question and test received wisdom, 
and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions, without placing themselves in 
jeopardy of losing thei1'jobs or privileges") (emphasis added). David Walker, In a Rare Rebellion. British 
Lords Demand .-lcademic-Freedom Law, in Chron Higher Educ AI, A43, col 3 (June I, 1988). Compare 
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Before this claim of vocational freedom could be coupled with the first and 
fourteenth amendments, however, a number of things needed to change. For 
one thing, the flaccidness of the prevailing first amendment bad tendency test 
would require overhaul, as would the master/servant metaphor. These 
changes eventually did occur (we shall shortly note how and when), but before 
they did, a separate development in constitutional case law took hold. We 
turn first to this sidebar development before resuming the tracery of first 
amendment doctrine in the Supreme Court. We do so because the first serious 
Supreme Court protection of what one might now consider academic freedom 
did not arise out of the first amendment at all. Rather, it came from the 
judicial application of pre-existing legal doctrines. The partial deliverance of 
academic freedom came at the hands of an activist, conservative Supreme 
Court defending private options against the state. 
In 1920, a number of midwestern state legislatures moved to stem what 
they regarded as the regrettable tendency of youngsters from immigrant 
families to learn and speak only a foreign language rather than English. Iowa 
and Nebraska were among these states, and each by general statute in 1919 
forbade any school instruction in any language other than English before the 
eighth grade. 
The two cases reaching the Supreme Court testing these laws differed 
from Scopes, however, in that the Iowa and Nebraska laws did not limit the 
teaching restriction solely to the public schools; rather, they mandated 
English-only instruction in all private schools as well. Both cases in fact 
involved criminal conviction of men who taught reading German in private 
Lutheran schools: Robert Myer in Nebraska and August Bartels in Iowa.24 
The Scopes rationale, dismissing Scopes as a mere employee confined to do the 
state's work on such terms as the state might decide (as master to servant), did 
not apply. Rather, the cases were as Scopes might have been had Scopes been 
a teacher in a private school, proceeding exactly as the school employed him 
to do, though not as the state legislature wished. 
The Nebraska and Iowa statutes were not impugned on grounds of 
interfering with Meyer's or Bartels' first or fourteenth amendment freedom of 
speech, however. Nor is it easy to see how they might have been cast as free 
spt:ech claims, since neither Meyer nor Bartels was affected other than as a 
teacher, that is, as a person for hire, furnishing foreign language instruction, 
Lovejoy's definition in Edwin R. A. Seligman, ed, 1 Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences 384 (Macmillan, 
1930): 
Academic freedom is the freedom of the teacher or research worker in higher institutions of 
learning to investigate and discuss the problems of his science and to express his 
conclusions, whether through publication or in the instruction of students, without 
interference from political or ecclesiastical authority, or from the administrative officials of 
the institution in which he is employed, unless his methods are found by qualified bodies of 
his own profession to be clearly incompetent or contrary to professional ethics. 
24. See Teaching of Foreign Languages in the State of Nebraska, 1919 Neb Laws 249; Iowa 
Language Act, 1919 Iowa Acts 198; 1VIeyer, 262 US at 397; Bartels, 262 US at 409. 
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albeit in a privately operated school. As of the date of these cases, moreover, 
the Supreme Court had not even held that the first amendment necessarily 
applied to the states as distinct from its application to acts of Congress. That 
decision, identifying freedom of speech as a specific liberty equally protected 
against state action by the fourteenth amendment, did not come until 1925, 
incidental to a political sedition prosecution, Gitlow v. New York. 25 Even after 
Gitlow, the Court still continued to apply the mere bad tendency test.26 
The free speech clause was not relied upon in either case; neither did 
Meyer or Bartels successfully challenge the statutes on the ground that they 
interfered with the free exercise of religion, even though the laws dictated 
instructional practices of religious (Lutheran) schools. In the particular 
circumstances, however, it was difficult to make a free exercise claim, for in 
neither case was it alleged that giving or receiving instruction in German was 
a requirement of Lutheran faith. 27 
The emphasis in both Meyer and Bartels was, rather, on substantive due 
process principles generally. 28 The Court summed up the collective effects of 
the Iowa and Nebraska statutes: their restriction against any private school 
offering any program of foreign language instruction to any student prior to 
the eighth grade; their antivocational restriction of teachers like Meyer and 
Bartels, now cut off from fulfilling teaching contracts willingly entered into by 
the private schools; their effective foreclosure of families from choosing any 
school able to teach their children anything in their own language before the 
eighth grade. And to what end? Certainly not as a necessary means of 
assuring an adequate facility in English, since that might be done by less 
draconian means.29 The unnecessary excess of the states' laws, merely in 
order to assure basic English literacy,30 was deemed to be unwarranted by any 
25. 268 us 652 (1925). 
26. In brief, in Gitlow the Court did make the connection firming up the equivalence of 14th and 
first amendment protection; but the majority nonetheless affirmed the particular defendant's 
criminal conviction (by applying the first amendment's mere bad tendency test). 
27. As a matter of historical interest, the first case presenting such an additional and successful 
claim of "free exercise" of religion did arise a few years later in Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510 
( 1925), where the Court relied partly on the religious freedom clause to invalidate the particular state 
law. In Pierce, the Court held that parents cannot be compelled to enroll their children in public, 
rather than parochial, schools providing additional religious instruction-assuming only that the 
parochial school meets reasonable minimum state educational and safety standards. 
28. See also Farrington v Tokushige. 273 US 284, 298-99 (1927) (Meyer and Bartels applied in 
behalf of private schools similarly restricted in a federal territory, Hawaii, citing the due process 
clause of the fifth amendment and treating it substantively the same as the due process clause of the 
14th amendment, in .Heyer.). 
29. Note that the laws altogether closed off an entire area of learning freedom (Lernfreiheil) at a 
single stroke. The statutes did not seek their objective affirmatively. for example, by providing that 
children be suitably tested for English and given remedial instruction if found deficient. Rather, they 
operated by forbidding any foreign language instruction prior to the eighth grade, period, whether 
one already was well versed in English or not. See 1919 Neb Laws 249; 1919 Iowa Acts 198 (cited in 
note 24). 
30. Following so shortly on World War I, these laws were also very possibly driven in part by an 
anti-German animus and not solely by an unalloyed solicitude for the educational welfare of 
immigrant family children. 
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proper police power interest. The Court reversed the criminal convictions of 
Meyer and Bartels. 
Meyer and Bartels mark an important first boundary in our review of 
academic freedom. They do so by distinguishing between what the state may 
decide to do in its own financing (that is, its administration of public, tax-
furnished educational resources) and what it may not necessarily forbid at 
large. The foundation of the decision was not the first amendment, but the 
cases are still vital to the autonomy (and academic freedom) of private 
universities and schools.3 1 
Principally, the Court relied upon the 1905 case of Lochner v. New York, 32 in 
which it had likewise intervened against police power claims of the welfare 
state. Lochner was a decision that many regarded as both infamous and wrong 
(Holmes dissented in Lochner, but then he also dissented in Meyer and in 
Bartels). Perhaps it was, yet its standard of judicial review is critical in Meyer 
and well worth taking into account. 
In Lochner, the Supreme Court invalidated a New York law forbidding 
employment of persons in private commercial bakeries for more than ten 
hours each day. The Court struck down the law as a violation of the right of 
employees and employers to decide such matters for themselves At the time 
it was decided, Lochner was widely condemned as a judicial embrace of social 
Darwinism. In subsequent decades, moreover, judges practically vied with 
one another in denouncing its allegedly procapitalist view of the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 33 What is relevant about the Lochner 
reference in Meyer, however, is the strong view it reflects respecting the role of 
the judiciary in applying the fourteenth amendment to protect private choice 
and personal liberty from the general tendency of the public welfare state. 
Absent that strong view of the Court's role in protecting private liberty under 
the fourteenth amendment, neither Meyer nor Bartels would have been decided 
as they were. Rather, the criminal convictions of Meyer and Bartels would 
have been sustained, exactly as Justice Holmes voted to do. 
Although the measure of judicial review in Meyer ("activist" or 
"interventionist" review, as it is sometimes dismissively described) was drawn 
from Lochner, it would be a mistake to consider Meyer merely as of a piece with 
Lochner, that is, as an example of the social Darwinist thought that had already 
31. See also the interesting thesis of Robert Bork in his book, The Tempting of America: The 
Political Seduction of the Law 4 7-49 (Free Press, 1990) (proposing a first amendment perspective for 
Meyer v Nebraska insofar as the state law may have sought "to prevent the teaching of ideas not 
officially approved"). A noted conservative nominee to the Suprem~ Court, Judge Bork was opposed 
because his professional views of correct constitutional interpretation would repudiate the Supreme 
Court's jurisprudence of "substantive due process," and therefore presumably leave state 
governments unimpeded in enacting laws of the sort held invalid in Meyer. As his brief comments on 
Meyer may suggest (in this lengthy book replying to his critics), depending on the perspective one 
brings to the first amendment as a separate and sometimes subtle constraint on government power to 
induce academic conformity, the assumption may have been quite unsound. 
32. 198 us 45 (1905). 
33. See generally Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation 
and Reburial, 1962 Sup Ct Rev 34. 
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led the Court to invalidate a large number of economic and social regulations 
in general. Aspects of Meyer have endured long after the demise of Lochner. 
They have developed separately, as a major element in academic freedom 
cases in the United States, though the Lochner profile of judicial review (in 
second-guessing economic regulations) under the fourteenth amendment has 
generally been abandoned by the Court. 
The continuing issue foreshadowed in Meyer is the issue we noted earlier: 
what useful constitutional limitations are there, if any, that constrain 
government from superimposing its will on educational institutions to 
prescribe who shall (or shall not) be admitted, what shall (and shall not) be 
studied, and who may (and may not) teach in private as well as in public 
institutions? Meyer by no means settled that large question. It did, however, 
take the question seriously, that is, the Court submitted it to active, 
toughminded, substantive due process review. Moreover, at one place in its 
brief opinion, the Meyer majority turned to the point directly. It noticed the 
similarity of the laws at issue to the authoritarianism laid down in Plato's 
Republic: classifying the young, removing each from any family preference 
respecting their education, and rearing them in the image of (that is, for the 
best needs of) the state. In terms of academic freedom, Meyer v. Nebraska is 
even today a front-line constitutional case. 
Indeed, Meyer is worthy of immediate juxtaposition with an earlier case in 
which its strong reasoning was not applied, Berea College v. Kentucky, decided by 
the Supreme Court in 1908.34 The decision affecting Berea College reflected 
no Court "activism." The state was allowed to have its way. 
In the legislation that precipitated Berea College, the State of Kentucky 
asserted a police power interest "to preserve race identity" (the words are the 
state's own; I quote from the summary of its argument before the Court}.35 It 
legislated that interest, first, by providing for racially separate public schools, 
then, as to private schools and colleges, by providing that each could admit 
either white or negro students, but not both. 
As in Meyer, counsel for Berea College did not address the state law as 
applied to the public schools. What the state might do in structuring public 
education was not at issue (nor could it have been at the time, given the state 
of equal protection law prior to Brown v. Board of Education,36 still nearly a half 
century away). Rather, the college stressed its separate claims as an 
educational institution: to determine its own policies, unprepossessingly, as it 
wished. It likewise stressed the claims of the teachers who chose to teach 
there, and of its students, who evidently preferred to enroll there, not despite 
but because of what it was. In short, in all salient respects, the college's 
position was strikingly similar to the position later (and successfully) advanced 
in Meyer. In modern terms, it would be called a strong institutional academic 
freedom claim: an institutional freedom to provide such standards of 
34. 211 us 45 (1908). 
35. ld at 51. 
36. 349 us 294 (1954). 
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admission, curriculum, and instruction as the faculty and college feel most 
worthy to offer those willing to seek its education, notwithstanding the state's 
wish to compel it to conform. 
In Berea College, unlike Meyer, the Supreme Court gave the college's 
fourteenth amendment appeal short shrift. It sustained the state law, 
requiring Berea College to admit student only on the terms the state 
suggested, or to close its doors. As in his dissent in Meyer, Justice Holmes 
agreed, altogether consistently with his dour general view that neither the first 
nor the fourteenth amendment meant very much. 
Berea College did, however, yield a dissent that is worth quoting. Justice 
Harlan (with Justice Day concurring in his dissent) took strong exception to 
the majority's weak view of the fourteenth amendment. His dissent in Berea 
College reads this way: "I am under the opinion that in its essential parts the 
statute is an arbitrary invasion of the rights of liberty and property guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment against hostile state action and is, therefore, 
void. " 37 Harlan then went on to say: 
The capacity to impart instruction to others is given by the Almighty for beneficent 
purposes and its use may not be forbidden or interfered with by Government-
certainly not, unless such instruction is, in its nature, harmful to the public morals or 
imperils the public safety. . . . If pupils, of whatever race-certainly, if they be 
citizens-choose with the consent of their parents, or voluntarily, to sit together in a 
private institution of learning while receiving instruction which is not in its nature 
harmful or dangerous to the public, no government, whether Federal or state, can 
legally forbid their coming together, or being together temporarily, for such an 
innocent purpose.38 
At the same time,Justice Harlan distinguished the difference of public schools 
on the then conventional rationale: "Of course what I have said has no 
reference to regulations prescribed, for public schools, established at the 
pleasure of the State and maintained at the public expense."39 
Even given its date (and the general state of fourteenth amendment law of 
that time), Berea College was a devastating decision. What the state insisted on 
in respect to admission and educational practice in public schools and 
colleges, the Court held, it could impose on others, foreclosing them from 
pursuing their own educational principles and ethical norms. This was not 
the judicial philosophy reflected in Meyer. Indeed, between the very different 
attitudes toward state power reflected by Meyer and by Berea College, there is no 
common principle obviously at work. Meyer provided an outpost of 
professional and institutional academic freedom Berea College was altogether 
denied. We shall have occasion to return to the general theme of Meyer. In 
the meantime, we need to pick up where we were. 
37. 211 US at 67. 
38. ld at 67-68. 
39. Id at 69. 
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D 
To recapitulate briefly, we had noted, first, that successful academic 
freedom claims did not develop naturally or easily as an incident of early 
twentieth century first amendment doctrine. Rather, they developed largely 
without benefit of the first amendment, generally under private auspices and 
in response to the vacuum of doctrine associated with the first amendment as 
hard law. Second, we noted that beginning in 1913, the AAUP sought to gain 
some purchase against the law by pressing forward with the idea of the 
university as an institution necessarily characterized by academic freedom, in 
other words, in which academic freedom is inseparable from academic work. 
From then on, the AAUP sought to advance this characterization of higher 
education in the United States. And in significant measure, that effort 
succeeded, even while the law of the Constitution tended to lag behind. 
Nevertheless, even in the 1920s, two constitutional developments 
(additional to Meyer) did take place in the Supreme Court, each of which was 
to have major effects we will trace to the present. The first was the 
development of the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions"; the second was 
the defection ofJustice Holmes (andJustice Brandeis) from the bad tendency 
test in favor of a more robust view of the first amendment. 
1. The Collateral Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions. The basic doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions is straightforward. Professor Tribe states it 
succinctly: 'The . . . doctrine of 'unconstitutional conditions' holds that 
government may not condition the receipt of its benefits upon the 
nonassertion of constitutional rights even if receipt of such benefits is in all other 
respects a 'mere privilege'. " 40 The doctrine appears full-blown originally in a 
1926 Supreme Court opinion by Justice Sutherland, Frost & Frost Trucking Co. 
v. Railroad Commission: 
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation which, by 
words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by the 
federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same result is accomplished 
under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the 
state threatens otherwise to withhold. . . . It is inconceivable that guaranties 
embedded in the Constitution of the United States may be thus manipulated out of 
existence.41 
The doctrine thus holds that government may not exploit its leverage with 
citizens or other persons with whom it comes into contact; it may not trade off 
waivers for scarce opportunities or goods it happens to control. In a word, 
government may not act to buy an estoppel of constitutional rights. 
On its face, the doctrine strongly counters the employment waiver 
rationale Justice Holmes relied upon in the New Bedford policeman's case in 
40. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 681 (Foundation Press, 2d ed 1988) (emphasis 
added). 
41. 271 US 583, 593-94 ( 1926). The phrase appears in a number of earlier cases, including 
Doyle v Continental ins. Co., 94 US 535, 543 (1876) (Bradley dissenting) ("[T]hough a State may have 
the power ... of prohibiting all foreign corporations from transacting business within its jurisdiction, 
it has no power to impose unconstitutional conditions upon their doing so."). 
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which Holmes suggested the policeman could take the job on the terms 
offered or turn it down, but not have it both ways.42 Sutherland's position 
puts an end to that view, basically once and for all. The doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions simply cuts through the policeman's agreement. 
It relieves him of all inappropriate terms. It does so by superintending the 
bargain directly; it voids any and all unconstitutional terms of the 
government's deal. One cannot be discharged for failing to honor a condition 
that should not have been presented in the first place. The doctrine frees the 
individual to test the substantive validity of the terms themselves; it puts the 
government to the test of justification and disallows the defense of contract 
per se. 
The Frost case was more of a piece with Lochner than with academic 
freedom or first amendment rights: it dealt purely with business interests and 
an effort by a state to impose conditions of public service in exchange for a 
valuable advantage the state threatened otherwise to withhold (the use of 
state highways and roads).43 But Frost has had a modern career more 
significantly associated with the first amendment, and its rationale bears 
directly on public teachers and state university personnel. Thus, although not 
itself an academic freedom case, Frost assuredly supplies an important link in 
this unhurried review. 
An excellent example of the application of Frost, though not one involving 
academic freedom in any strict professional usage, is provided by Pickering v. 
Board of Education, a unanimous 1968 Supreme Court decision.44 The contrast 
Pickering provides with New Bedford and Scopes 45 is instructive of the change 
that dates from the Frost case, decided in 1926. 
The case was brought by Marvin Pickering, a high school teacher in Will 
County, Illinois. In 1964, he had sent a signed personal letter to a local 
newspaper. The letter was highly critical of the way the Board of Education 
and the district superintendent of schools had handled proposals to raise new 
revenue for the schools. The Board then reviewed Pickering's continuing 
suitability in light of his letter, in a due process hearing, and concluded that 
his publication of the letter was " 'detrimental to the efficient operation and 
administration of the schools of the district.' " It directed that he be 
dismissed.46 The case was thus similar to the New Bedford case. The outcome 
in the Supreme Court was not. 
The Supreme Court rejected the New Bedford rationale. Insofar as the state 
supreme court's affirmance of Pickering's dismissal seemed partly to turn on 
the notion that Pickering's teaching position could be circumscribed by the 
42. See note 11 and accompanying text. 
43. Frost. 271 US at 589; see also notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
44. Pickering v Board of Educ. of Township High School Dis/., 391 US 563 ( 1968). See also Perry v 
Sinderman, 408 US 593 (1972); Givhan v Western Line Consolidated School Dist., 439 US 410 (1979); Mt. 
Healthy City School Dist. Board of Educ. v Doyle, 429 US 274 (1977); Rankin v McPherson, 483 US 378 
(1987). But see Connick v Myers, 461 US 138 (1983). 
45. See notes 11, 14 and accompanying text. 
46. Pickering, 391 US at 564-65. 
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requirement that he refrain from adverse public comment on the local public 
school administration, the Supreme Court simply demurred: 
To the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion may be read to suggest that 
teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights 
they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in 
connection with the operation of the public schools in which they work, it proceeds on 
a premise that has been unequivocally rejected in numerous prior decisions of this 
Court.47 
The Court thus enabled Marvin Pickering to object that such a compelled 
agreement was void as an "unconstitutional condition." The case fits neatly 
within the analysis we have previously derived from Justice Sutherland's 
opinion in Frost. 
Nevertheless, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, helpful as it is 
and significant as it has been, has also been misunderstood even in 
subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court. The confusions that have grown 
up around it result partly, though not entirely, from the wishful belief that it 
solves more problems than it does. Its limitation is simply a variation on the 
maxim that water rises no higher than its original source. Concretely, the 
doctrine does not instruct one in understanding whether a specific condition 
is unconstitutional; rather, it requires the government to show adequate 
justification for what it presumes to do, and to make that showing "on the 
merits." In brief, the doctrine declares that any answer of the sort that the 
petitioner (whoever the petitioner is) agreed to or at least had notice of the 
restriction, is never sufficient to carry the government's case. The 
government must defend the constitutionality of the condition on its merits, 
and not on the ground that it bought the right to impose the restriction. 
To restate the doctrine slightly differently, it means that government 
cannot exempt itself from the constitutional restraints that otherwise apply to 
its actions merely because, were one to treat the same matter as one of private 
party contractual agreement, a private party would be relieved of any further 
obligation to continue to furnish work or pay if the other party willfully failed 
to observe the conditions openly attached in advance. The main point of the 
doctrine is that government is never a private party. Its arrangements, 
whatever they are, are always circumscribed by restrictions in the 
Constitution. These restrictions apply irrespective of the form in which the 
government acts, whether it acts as an employer, or as a seller or buyer of 
goods. They apply when it acts as administering agency of a public university, 
or as a provider of state or federal funds. They apply when it determines who 
can teach and who cannot. 
In part, moreover, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is also a 
variant of two other closely related doctrines in American constitutional law 
regarding unconstitutional purpose in the actions of government. The point 
often appears in the form of a judicial statement that "what government is 
forbidden to do directly, it is equally forbidden to do by indirection." 
47. Id at 568. 
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Sometimes it is put in terms of "the purpose and (intended) effect" of the 
government's act. And sometimes it is put, even as Sutherland suggested in 
Frost, that the government has acted to do one thing "under the guise" of 
doing something else.48 In the end, it comes to the same point. 
Specifically, the word "guise" in the Sutherland quotation does suggest 
that the government is in fact acting by indirection (by some manipulative 
means-to adopt contract terms, waivers, contractual submission and the like) 
in order to achieve an end it is not entitled to seek. The very idea is thus one 
of overreaching for a degree of control over others the government is not 
otherwise permitted to assert consistent with the first amendment, but which 
overreaching, incorrigibly, it continues to pursue. 
But this valuable point to the doctrine is also subject to its own 
misunderstanding if one inflates it to mean that whenever the government 
acts, it is always deemed to act solely for some ulterior end and never from 
any bona fide concern linked to the position one holds that might be sufficient 
to sustain the conditions attached. Such a conclusive presumption of 
improper purpose cannot be and in fact is not maintained in the courts. To 
the contrary, if the government can show a bona fide concern fairly linked to 
the position and the condition in question, the condition may not be a guise 
for anything else and may not be unconstitutional at all. Rather, if shown to 
be warranted by the circumstances, the condition will be sustained. Such a 
condition is not an unconstitutional condition. If it needs a name, moreover, 
there is an obvious one: call it a constitutional condition, instead.49 
Under these circumstances, whatever the conditions are (and, to be sure 
we have not as yet said what they may be in any particular case), it will 
necessarily follow that one must comply with the condition or be prepared to 
go elsewhere. Moreover, that such conditions may have been nonnegotiable 
from the outset may itself make no difference at all. Obviously the 
government is not required to trade what it need not yield; so its 
48. 271 US at 593. 
49. Consider the following example. Suppose that the Supreme Court holds that mere 
membership in the Communist Party or the American Nazi Party (or any other party) cannot be 
outlawed. Suppose a state legislature, unimpressed by the Court's view that one's choice of political 
affiliation is protected by the first amendment, and determined to make such affiliation as difficult as 
it possibly can, adopts an act making ineligible for any employment by the state-including as a state 
university or public school teacher-any person holding membership in the proscribed parties. The 
statute fits Sutherland's description of a guise in the Frost case and should be held invalid. According 
to our stipulation of its purpose, the legislature seeks the destruction of political parties it considers a 
social menace. Forbidden to act directly, it has proceeded toward the same end indirectly, by 
withholding "a valuable privilege" from anyone not "surrendering" his or her constitutional righL 
The statute is invalid under the Frost doctrine. 
Suppose, however, one stipulates a different objective, namely, a concern solely for national 
security in respect to highly classified secrets. And suppose one substitutes a statute narrowly drawn 
to that end. It is not obvious that a restriction on some such kinds of access determined in part by 
one's political affiliations would necessarily be held unconstitutional. Of course it is possible that this 
statute, too, is but a guise, that is, that the claim of national security concern is a legislative fraud. 
Nevertheless, absent very strong evidence to that effect, it is not likely to be presumed so and, if not 
presumed so, such an act, narrowly drawn, may be constitutional despite its marginal effect in 
discouraging certain political affiliations that are otherwise a matter of first amendment "righl." 
Compare United States v Robel, 389 US 258 (1967); Wieman v Updegraff, 344 US 183 (1952). 
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unwillingness to bargain over such matters (whatever they are) is neither here 
nor there. The matter is, indeed, at an end. 
In substance, then, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions helps 
police government actions without necessarily dictating how any particular 
case will come out. It does so, first, by enabling the petitioner to attack the 
condition, rather than being treated as having waived any objection to it; and 
second, by then putting the government to a suitable burden of having to 
prove a bona fide-constitutional-objective sufficient to sustain the 
condition as applied to the petitioner in the manner the government 
proposes, or otherwise give it up. But while these are crucial benefits of the 
doctrine (otherwise, government could simply buy up every constitutional 
right by estoppel), they are ultimately inconclusive in deciding real cases. The 
government may be able to carry its burden of justification for the condition. 
The question returns us to the first amendment. What justifications are 
sufficient to sustain restrictions on one's speech against first amendment 
objections, in one's relations with government? What is the basic first 
amendment test? What must government show? And how does that 
requirement of a showing finally bear on academic freedom? 
2. From "Bad Tendency" to New York Times v. Sullivan via the Dissenting 
Opinions of Holmes and Brandeis: The Emergence of "The Central Meaning" of Free 
Speech. Mr. Justice Holmes, who served on the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts for twenty years and then served on the United States Supreme 
Court for thirty more, has been brought into this essay at every turn of the 
discussion. Always, until now, however, he appears as judicial bete noir, 
always he votes against each constitutional claim, personifying in each 
instance the most skeptical, narrow view of constitutional rights. In each case 
we have looked at thus far-Frost and Berea College as well as Patterson, New 
Bedford, Lochner, and Meyer-Holmes voted to sustain the state's regulation 
against every constitutional claim. And, quite obviously, he seems never to 
have championed first amendment rights. 
How can it be, then, that Holmes nonetheless came to be canonized as one 
of the greatest Justices ever to have served on the Supreme Court? Partly, 
indeed perhaps largely, because his view of the first amendment-and of the 
central meaning of freedom of speech-fundamentally and finally changed. 50 
Holmes was almost certainly the most philosophically inclined judge ever to 
occupy a seat on the Supreme Court. And, after two decades on the Court, he 
began to write altogether different kinds of epigrams than the sort he had 
authored in 1892; new epigrams very much like these: "The United States 
may give up the Post Office when it sees fit, but while it carries it on the use of 
the mails is almost as much a part of free speech as the right to use our 
50. See David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U Chi L Rev 1205, 
1303-20 ( 1983); David S. Bogen, The Free Speech Metamorphosis of l\4r. justice Holmes, II Hofstra L Rev 
97 (1982). 
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tongues." 51 How different this sounds from the earlier, dismissive talk of 
"privileges" that government may subject to such conditions it sees fit to 
impose. Just so, here is another paragraph from a similar Holmes dissent 
written near the end of the same decade, in 1928: "[I]f there is any principle 
of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other 
it is the principle of free thought-not free thought for those who agree with 
us but freedom for the thought that we hate."5 2 Th~re is obviously a stronger 
commitment to free speech in this passage than in Holmes' earlier, somewhat 
disdainful, remarks. 
Here is Holmes again in his most famous dissent in 1919, in Abrams v. 
United States: 
[T]he best test of truth is the power of [a] thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market. ... That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is 
an experiment, as all life is an experiment. . . . While that experiment is part of our 
system I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the 
expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they 
so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes 
of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country. I wholly disagree 
with the argument ... that the First Amendment left the common law as to seditious 
libel in force. 53 
And here is Holmes dissenting (still again with Brandeis) in 1925: "If in the 
long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be 
accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free 
speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way."54 One 
even reasonably attentive to Holmes will see something new in passages such 
as these. In significant ways they will eventually lend strong support to 
academic freedom as well. But, more generally, Holmes suggests that any 
idea (including one that would reorganize the government as a proletarian 
dictatorship and terminate the Constitution itself) is as fully protected as any 
other. The first amendment itself does not take sides. 
Holmes now philosophically resigns himself to the obvious in a larger 
sense: life must settle for proxies of truth. Indeed, life can only provide 
proxies as truth, each in turn being perpetually subject to displacement by 
other ideas that become more compelling proxies of truth, each proxy simply 
being whatever seems most correct to each of us, tested in comparison with 
alternatives equally unrestricted in their availability to us-an availability it is 
one function of freedom of speech to assure. The notion ofbad tendency as a 
justification to restrict the availability of an idea threatening the status of 
51. Milwaukee Publishing Co. v Burleson, 255 US 407, 437 (1920) (Holmes dissenting). Compare 
Lamont v Postmaster General, 381 US 301 (1965). (Lamont is an important case that takes Holmes' 
suggestion seriously; it holds that an Act of Congress burdening certain political mail violates the 
first amendment, despite the plenary power vested in Congress. Incidentally, Lamont is worthy of 
special remembrance; it is the first case ever to strike down an Act of Congress on first amendment 
grounds. Id at 305.) 
52. United States v Schwimmer, 279 US 644, 654-55 (1928) (Holmes dissenting). 
53. 250 US 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes dissenting). Surely Holmes' position has moved from his 
1908 view that the first amendment did little more than enact the common law whole. 
54. Cit/ow, 468 US at 673 (Holmes dissenting). 
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institutions, groups, established wisdom, or values through speech cannot 
survive this view of the first amendment. The status quo must always defend 
itself. The notion of bad tendency as a justification to restrict the availability 
of an idea is gone. 
Within this central vision of the first amendment, the bad tendency test 
gives way under the Holmes rationale. The matter is further explained 
sharply in a later dissenting opinion by Justice Rutledge in 1944: 
It is axiomatic that a democratic state may not deny its citizens the right to criticize 
existing laws and to urge that they be changed. And yet, in order to succeed in an 
effort to legalize polygamy[, for example,] it is obviously necessary to convince a 
substantial number of people that such conduct is desirable. But conviction that the 
practice is desirable has a natural tendency to induce the practice itself. Thus, 
depending upon where the circular reasoning is started, the advocacy of polygamy 
may either be unlawful as inducing a violation of law, or be constitutionally protected 
as essential to the proper functioning of the democratic process. 55 
The net of it is, then, that the natural tendency of one's freedom to present 
what is currently thought hateful and wrong as actually quite desirable and 
right, to induce breaches of law by those to whom the appeal is 
communicated-some of whom may then break the law as it is-is not enough 
to enable the state to chill or to punish the person making the case. Under 
this very strong view, even predictable increases in violations of existing laws, 
traceable to the efficacy of the criticism of the law, cannot be expensed to the 
critic of the existing law or of the prevailing social ethic, even though the 
lawbreakers themselves may still be punished. It is a social cost of free speech 
in a democratic state. 
In so suggesting, moreover, Justice Rutledge was but elaborating usefully 
on an abrupt point made eighteen years earlier, in Whitney v. California, by 
Brandeis (who joined Holmes in the various dissents quoted above): "The 
fact [alone] that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of 
property is not enough to justify its suppression."56 This, indeed, is very 
strong stuff. It is also, however, the meaning of free speech in the United 
States. From this point and this principle, all modern doctrines descend. It 
is, moreover, not necessary to review a lengthy series of subsequent cases to 
illustrate the principle. One case most especially, New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 57 decided by the Court in 1964, shows in a single decision how 
greatly results have changed. 
Sullivan was an ordinary civil libel proceeding brought in the Alabama state 
courts. False statements referable to Mr. Sullivan as a city commissioner in 
Montgomery, Alabama, had appeared in a political advertisement published 
by the New York Times (the advertisement solicited funds for a political cause). 
The text of the advertisement contained factual exaggerations about 
Sullivan's actions as city commissioner and about the extent of his 
participation in certain civil rights confrontations in Montgomery. The 
55. Musser v Utah, 333 US 95, 101-02 (1948) (Rutledge dissenting) (citations omitted). 
56. 274 US 357, 378 (1926) (Brandeis concurring). 
57. 376 us 254 ( 1964). 
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statements were deemed defamatory per se under the Alabama common law 
of libel, consistent with the state judge's instructions, and the jury awarded 
$500,000 in general damages in favor of Sullivan and against the Times. 
Sullivan might have been reversed under the Supreme Court's then-
existing first amendment doctrine. 58 But the Supreme Court by-passed 
alternative grounds for reversing the judgment and proceeded to rewrite libel 
law in the United States. Directing its attention to the centrality of free speech 
and political issues in the United States, the Supreme Court held that, up to a 
certain point, even false press reports that may damage the public standing of 
a public official may be immune from civil or criminal redress. Indeed, the 
Court went on to hold, neither factual falsehood, nor actual harm (loss of job, 
shunning by the community), nor even lack of reasonable care in ascertaining 
the actual facts prior to publication, nor all in combination will necessarily be 
sufficient for a successful libel action. The first amendment, the Court held, 
not only disallows criminal prosecution of the publisher,59 but also bars a law 
providing for personal, civil redress. To overcome that bar, according to the 
Court's opinion in Sullivan, the plaintiff must meet a new (first amendment) 
standard of scienter. Specifically, as determined in a later case, St. Amant v. 
Thompson, the plaintiff must establish by evidence of convincing clarity that the 
defendant actually. knew the factual statements were false and published them 
despite that knowledge or, at a minimum, published them as true even though 
the defendant "in fact entertained serious doubts as to the[ir] truth .... " 60 
Negligent failure to check for falsehood is not enough. Sullivan grants a first 
amendment immunity to standards journalists themselves would regard as 
professional malpractice. In this respect most especially, it is a remarkable 
case. Moreover, the first amendment rule Sullivan announced has since been 
extended to other figures who attract political interest and its implicit risks of 
parody and of withering, sometimes cruel, ridicule, as well as of defamation.61 
Sullivan has cut a wide first amendment swath through the law of torts, 
particularly libel and defamation. 
58. There were several grounds on which the Supreme Coun might have reversed without 
announcing the rule it did. Specifically, for example, the amount awarded by the jury bore no 
relationship to any evidence of actual damage to Sullivan's public standing in Montgomery, nor was 
there evidence of mental anguish or community shunning (no such specific evidence was required in 
cases alleging libel per se). Moreover, Sullivan was not mentioned by name in the advertisement, no.-
did the Times itself do anything other than publish the advertisement, that is, it had no direct hand in 
the advertisement's original preparation, nor did it represent anything on its own behalf as a source 
of news. Any award beyond purely nominal damages under these circumstances might well have 
been regarded as foreclosed by the first amendment. No broader issue need have been reached. 
59. The first amendment assuredly does apply to bar such prosecutions. See, for example, 
Garrison v Louisiana, 379 US 64 (1964). 
60. St. Amant v Thompson, 390 US 727, 731 (1968) (decided subsequent to Sullivan and adding to 
its reasoning). 
61. For its most recent extension and application, see Hustler Magazine, Inc. v Falwell, 485 US 46, 
56 ( 1988) (political advertisement parody depicting televangelist fictitiously as a drunken and 
incestuous hypocrite, held absolutely protected by first amendment regardless of emotional distress 
publisher may have meant to cause and was determined in fact to have caused). Hustler holds that the 
first amendment protects a right of political ridicule virtually absolutely. Hustler is also a highly 
important terminal case in a very long historical line; it ends the last possible vestige of any valid law 
of seditious libel in the United States. 
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Underneath, however, Sullivan is of a first amendment piece with the 
Holmes-Brandeis-Rutledge quotations we have abstracted from cases going 
back to the 1920s. The overall lesson is that neither the bad tendency, nor the 
"clear and present danger," nor yet the actual fact of some proximately 
resulting harms-even harms foreseeable to the author, the parodist, or the 
speaker as of the moment he or she looses her words on paper or sends them 
out into some public or private audience-will necessarily bring the utterer 
athwart of the law. Whether it will do so depends on what one sees to be the 
resulting cost to free speech. In Musser, Justice Rutledge's insightful dissent 
explored this concept of cost in a general way through the compelling 
example of speech advocating polygamy.62 In Sullivan, the Court likewise 
pursued the concept of costs to free speech and developed still an additional 
step: "That erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must 
be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' 
that they 'need ... to survive' [seems obvious]."63 Thus, in the Court's view, 
even factual misstatements, including some that may be quite damaging to 
public officials or to other public figures, nonetheless receive a qualified first 
amendment immunity. Without extending our case law examples much 
further, perhaps we can now see where these first amendment trends will lead. 
In the 1950s, Judge Learned Hand proposed a first amendment formula 
that tried to catch some of the developments we have rather casually 
reviewed. His formulation is useful as a general statement, and far removed 
from the original, bad tendency test. Even so, it needs careful reading; it is 
often misunderstood. Here is the general formulation Hand suggested: "In 
each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its 
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the 
danger. " 64 
Judge Hand's formulation is usually read as though it were a simple tort 
law formula for judges to apply. It is taken to say that if (but only if) one has 
fairly discounted the gravity of the evil to be avoided by the improbability of 
its likely happening as a result of someone's speech, so as not to exaggerate 
the need for the restraint on speech and so as not needlessly to interfere with 
speech, one may then invade free speech, albeit only to the extent necessary 
to avoid the danger.65 
62. See note 55 and accompanying text. 
63. 376 US at 271-72 (citations omitted). Critics of Sullivan (and there are many) do not 
disagree with the basic statement. Rather, the quarrel is whether the scienter standard exceeds any 
proper first amendment need, that is, that at least with respect to commercial publishers including 
newspapers, liability for negligent failure to check for falsity would be the appropriate line for the 
first amendment to draw where the plaintiff carries his or her burden under every other standard 
provided in Sullivan itself. 
64. Dennis v United States, 341 US 494, 510 (1951), citing opinion of Judge Learned Hand in 
United States v Dennis, 183 F2d 20 I, 212 (2d Cir 1950). 
65. Alternatively, implicit in the formula is the suggestion that where for some reason the 
measures taken to avoid the evil fail, but if the test is otherwise satisfied, the law may provide 
appropriate redress for the actual harm that ensued. 
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However, this reading goes too fast and takes too much for granted. One 
must readJudge Hand's statement more carefully. Judge Hand was framing a 
larger, harder question, and he did not say what the answer would necessarily 
be: courts must additionally ask whether X danger of Y evil justifies such 
invasion of free speech as may, admittedly, be necessary to avoid the danger; 
there is no implicit assumption that it necessarily will. 
Moreover, from what we have reviewed thus far, it should now be apparent 
that the answer to Judge Hand's unanswered question turns out to be quite 
complicated under first amendment doctrine today. The short answer is that 
sometimes it will, but sometimes it won't, as the Court's holding in the 
Sullivan case illustrates, as Rutledge's example in Musser implies, and as the 
Brandeis quotation in Whitney declares. The answer is it won't, if the invasion 
leaves freedom of speech "too little space in which to breathe"-too little 
space to enable people to speak passionately for their beliefs or to seek 
through their speech to transfigure society, regardless of the direction they 
would try to take it by the political effects of their ideas and their appeals. In 
the hard law of the first amendment, the central meaning of first amendment 
in the United States today is found in the far greater substantiality of this 
constitutionally sheltered "breathing space" than was once provided. In the 
decades since 1907-1908 and Patterson, 66 constitutional doctrine has moved 
very far (farther than most Americans themselves understand) from the bad 
tendency test. 
E 
As an interlude to our discussion thus far, now that we have a more 
current and different grasp of freedom of speech under the first and 
fourteenth amendments, 5 7 we can easily see how freedom of speech fits some 
fairly standard cases of the sort we already touched upon. We are now in a 
much better position than we were a few pages ago to examine how such cases 
might come out on the merits when reviewed in the Supreme Court since 
these changes occurred. 
An excellent case for such an examination is Pickering v. Board of 
Education, 5 8 our earlier case involving Marvin Pickering, the letter-writing high 
school teacher, which was decided in the Supreme Court just four years after 
New York Times v. Sullivan. Pickering's difficulties, one will recall, arose from 
the critical letter he wrote to a local newspaper, commenting on recent school 
bond measures that had failed despite strong and well-publicized school 
board endorsement and support. 
Pickering's letter identified him as a local teacher, although he declared in 
the letter-albeit complainingly-that he was writing only "as a citizen, 
taxpayer and voter, and not as a teacher, since that freedom has been taken 
66. See note I 0 and accompanying text. 
67. Bearing in mind that, since 1925 the first and 14th amendments have been treated alike in 
respect to free speech. 
68. 391 US 563; see note 44 and accompanying text. 
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away from the teachers by the administration. " 69 His letter harshly criticized 
the board's public representations made to encourage voter support for the 
bond issues; it suggested that some of them were untrue or at least 
misleading. His letter also argued that some past uses of funds were not in 
keeping with their original representation, for example, that more had been 
spent for athletics than for education, contrary to what had been said by the 
board. Overall, moreover, his letter laid a large portion of blame for the 
failure of the bond issues on the board and the school administration itself. 
Some specific statements in his letter (for example, on the cost of school 
cafeteria lunches) were false, although there was no suggestion that Pickering 
either knew or thought them to be inaccurate. 
Previously, we limited our review of Pickering to a single, preliminary point, 
namely, a New Bedford-type claim made by the board in the state court that so 
long as Pickering continued to work as a public employee with notice that he 
did so under the constraint of forbearing from criticizing the schools, he 
could not complain of being terminated once he was shown in a fair hearing 
to have dishonored that condition. Under this view, recall, it was up to 
Pickering to determine the acceptability of the tradeoff; he could quit 
whenever he found it unacceptable, but he could not ignore it and expect to 
be kept on. We already noted the Court's rejection of that proposition under 
the Frost rationale. But we also noted something else: that the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions is often inconclusive of real cases; it begs the 
question of whether some conditions are not necessarily unconstitutional at 
all. Thus, a concrete example-regarding access to classified information-
was furnished in a passing footnote to make the point plain. 70 Noting this 
inconclusiveness, we returned to the main track of first amendment doctrine. 
We return, re-examining Pickering, to see the final result reached under 
substantive first amendment law. 
Pickering's letter identified him as a teacher. Moreover, he wrote about 
matters affecting the public schools about which readers might assume he was 
particularly well informed. In places, his letter was factually inaccurate. It was 
also sarcastic, insinuating, and rude. It was not addressed quietly or internally 
to make helpful or constructive suggestions to the elected members of the 
board. Rather, it was released into the local newspaper for its general 
ventilative effect. To be sure, there was no evidence of its community impact. 
69. Pickering, 391 US at 578. Pickering's complete letter appears in the Appendix of the case, id 
at 575. As to his latter statement, the Supreme Court concluded that he had some factual basis for it 
to the extent that the Teachers Handbook required prior submission to a school principal and 
triplicate copies to a publicity coordinator in advance. Since the letter elsewhere indicated that this 
was the basis for Pickering's claim (that "freedom has been taken from the teachers by the 
administration"), the Court held that readers were merely invited to judge for themselves, that is to 
say, that the statement was clearly offered as Pickering's opinion, rather than as a revelation of false 
facts. ld at 570-71. 
70. See note 49 (Access to highly classified information may be denied on considerations of 
national security, and even one's political affiliations that cannot be forbidden may nonetheless be 
taken into account in granting or withholding such access in certain circumstances, depending upon 
the degree of perceived serious risk.). 
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Nonetheless, were there no suitable grounds for the board to expect 
something better of a teacher in Marvin Pickering's position? In Pickering, the 
Court first held-as we might expect-that a rule forbidding any teacher or 
other school employee to comment publicly on any matter affecting the local 
schools without administrative permission would be an unconstitutional prior 
restraint under the first amendment. Assisted now by Sullivan and our review 
in the preceding section, we can now go much further, however, and see how 
the result for Pickering was substantially more favorable than when weaker 
views of the first amendment prevailed. Specifically, here is how matters 
went. 
The opening emphasis of the opinion is on the public subject matter of 
Pickering's letter: school taxes, referendum bond measures, and popular 
voting at scheduled elections, the stuff of the democratic process itself.7 1 
Such public political speech, the Court insists, is highly protected overall; one 
cannot, as a condition of being a teacher, be forbidden to address such public 
issues publicly on the claim that school interests would be better served by a 
nonpartisan silence. Moreover, the critical, rather than neutral or supportive, 
tone of Pickering's views is "unequivocally reject[ed]" as providing grounds 
for his dismissal;72 the first amendment does not allow the school board to 
require that he speak only favorably or neutrally, whether of itself or the 
alleged need for school bonds, as a condition of speaking at all. 
Next, that Pickering was not merely critical in what he wrote but was also 
unpleasantly insinuating toward the board was treated by the Court as 
insufficient grounds to fire him for his public or professional incivility. "In 
these circumstances," Justice Marshall said, "we conclude that the interest of 
the school administration in limiting teachers' opportunities to contribute to 
public debate is not significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar 
contribution by any member of the general public."73 Thus the board could 
not seize upon Pickering out of frustration that, in their view, his letter did not 
represent them fairly or treat them courteously, though their feeling might 
itselfbe an understandable and even warranted reaction in light of the letter's 
tone. The board's interest in requiring general fairness, or even civility, was 
71. Pickering, 391 US at 564-68. In contrast, a subsequent case, Connick v Myers, 461 US 138 
( 1983), draws a bright-line distinction that puts public employees at risk for voicing internal work-
related grievances principally related to their own status. Under Connick, the employee may be fired, 
without recourse at all under the first amendment, by those of whom or to whom they complain. The 
Court's desire to seek some de minimis limit on "mere internal complaint" cases (as it is inclined to 
call them) is understandable, but the line drawn by Connick is not. The difficulty with Connick is that 
its first amendment line is arbitrary and indifferent to any particularized facts as well as to the severity 
of the restriction at risk (dismissal). Connick's lesson is that public employees who may have a just 
complaint may be fired with impunity by the very person already abusing them simply for speaking 
about the matter, even assuming their complaint is entirely true. Indeed, they may be fired because it 
is true. In respect to academic personnel, moreover, since it is obvious that both general and specific 
"workplace conditions" are constitutive elements of getting work done in a literal sense, academic 
freedom itself implies the protection of some prerogative to speak about such matters. See, for 
example, Matthew W. Finkin, Intramural Speech, Academic Freedom, and the First Amendment, 66 Tex L Rev 
1323, 1335-45 (1988). 
72. Pickering, 391 US at 570. 
73. Id at 573. 
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too insubstantial under the circumstances (that is, as the court noted, "not 
significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any 
member of the general public").74 The connection between the letter and 
Pickering's possible professionalism or lack thereof as a teacher (how he 
conducted himself in the classroom) was wholly speculative. The Court 
likewise noted that Pickering did not personally work for the board itself. 75 
Finally, the Supreme Court protected Pickering despite his factual 
mistakes, pursuant to the Sullivan rationale. As in Sullivan, the Court noted 
some margin of error is inevitable in such matters. The Court held that to cite 
Pickering's mistakes as creating the risk of dismissal when venturing into 
local, public, political debate would provide too little breathing space under 
the first amendment. The board could seek correction of the factual mistakes 
by recourse to the newspaper columns Pickering used. It could not, however, 
dismiss Pickering. In short, Pickering's free speech claim prevailed. 
Pickering is thus an excellent illustration of how things have changed since 
1908, and of how much stronger the first amendment has become in a general 
way. It is now but a very short step to fit academic freedom within the first 
amendment. We turn at once to see how it was done. 
F 
Academic freedom made its first express Supreme Court appearance in a 
dissent by Justice William Douglas, a former academic, in a 1952 case, Adler v. 
Board of Education. 76 With Justice Black concurring in his dissent, Douglas 
invoked "academic freedom" three times, in a specific, first amendment 
usage. He also gave the phrase a distinguishing identity for general legal use. 
At issue in Adler was a New York statute providing for the disqualification 
and removal from public employment of any person espousing the use of 
violence to alter the form of government in the United States. The act (the 
Feinberg Law77) also provided that membership in any listed subversive 
group would constitute prima facie evidence that the person possessed the 
disabling trait. It further provided for disclaimer oaths and other detailed 
inquiries, as well as investigative hearings. 
The majority of the Court sustained the statute from facial attack. In the 
main, it relied on the still-lingering right-privilege distinction, harkening all 
the way back to 1892; for that reason, the majority position was not to last. 
Fifteen years later, the right-privilege rationale no longer sufficed as a prop in 
the Supreme Court, and Adler was substantially overruled. 78 Our interest is, 
correspondingly, limited to the Douglas dissent. 
74. Id. 
75. So the result might have been different had Pickering been an employee of the Board. Later 
cases press this point rather hard. 
76. Adler v Board of Educ. of the City of New York, 342 US 485, 508 ( 1952) (Douglas dissenting). 
77. 1949 Laws of State of New York ch 360. 
78. See Keyishian v Board of Regents, 385 US 589, 605-06 (1967), discussed at notes 107-08 and 
accompanying text. ("[C]onstitutional doctrine which has emerged since [Adler] has rejected its 
major premise. That premise was that public employment, including academic employment, may be 
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Justice Douglas voted to hold the Feinberg law unconstitutional. His 
overall approach was of a piece with Meyer and Bartels, two cases we have 
previously reviewed. 79 In Adler, however, Douglas expressly drew on the first 
amendment to shelter academic freedom. In Meyer, as we noted, the 
protection of academic freedom was merely an incident of substantive due 
process review. The analytic similarities of the cases-the majority opinion in 
Meyer and the Douglas dissent in Adler-are nonetheless striking. 
In Meyer, the Court found fault, not with the stated object sought by 
legislature (to assure English literacy in youngsters regardless of the school in 
which they were enrolled), but with the means. Similarly, Justice Douglas did 
not find fault with the stated object of the Feinberg Law.80 Rather, he argued, 
the fault also lay with the means. In Meyer, the objection was that the device 
used by the legislature to achieve a proper end was unconstitutionally 
excessive. A similar objection, in Douglas's view, was equally applicable in 
Adler. 
Douglas wrote that if the state did not mean to "raise havoc with academic 
freedom," 81 it must confine itself to limiting certain specific acts endangering 
public safety or putting public education at unfair risk. But the Feinberg Law, 
he insisted, was not so confined and was, rather, prejudicially restrictive in 
respect to those it disabled from teaching and excessive in how it would 
necessarily affect others as well. Declaring that "[t]here can be no real 
academic freedom in [the] environment" of exclusion and of teacher fear 
generated by the Feinberg Law,82 Douglas found fault with it in two 
intertwined respects. The first was that the per se employment 
disqualification of persons from academic appointment in any public school 
based on what they might espouse as individuals was inconsistent with one of 
the concerns of academic freedom because it eliminated a nonrandom, 
conditioned upon the surrender of constitutional rights which could not be abridged by direct 
governmental action .... [T]hat theory was expressly rejected in a series of decisions following Adler." 
(citations omitted and emphasis added)). 
79. Meyer, 262 US 390; Bartels, 262 US 404; see notes 24-34 and accompanying text. 
80. The "stated object" is deliberately emphasized because, given the broad manner in which the 
statutes in Meyer and Adler were drawn, the question of what the legislature in each case actually 
meant to do is unclear. In Meyer, as discussed in note 30, there was reason to believe the legislature 
may have been acting only partly in good faith, that is to say, to improve English literacy but also to 
suppress the German language. The statute was efficiently drawn to do both. In Adler, there is the 
same double effect (improve national security but also suppress Communists) and possibly some of 
the same mixed legislative motives as well (in Adler, as in Meyer, the statute seems drawn to do both). 
So the problem in each case, commonplace in civil liberties litigation, is in large part this problem of 
double effects and the corresponding problem of how best for the judiciary to confine legislatures to 
legislate appropriately, limiting their legislation only to constitutionally permissible ends. The 
majority in Meyer and Douglas in Adler confronted this problem directly. But neither Holmes in Meyer 
nor the majority in Adler did. The general judicial approach since Adler is to subject statutes affecting 
first amendment rights to strict scrutiny, with no favoring assumption to the legislature that the 
breadth of the statute was required by the circumstances; rather, the necessity for such breadth must 
itself be shown to the satisfaction of the court. (For an oft-cited reference on the general role of 
judicial review and heightened scrutiny in first amendment cases, see United States v Carotene Products 
Co., 304 US 144, 152 n4 (1938)). 
81. Adler, 342 US at 509 (emphasis added). 
82. Id at 510 (emphasis added). 
Page 79: Summer 1990] ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 107 
ideologically specific cohort from further consideration as teachers in any 
public school.83 So sweeping an exclusion, in Douglas's view, raised a serious 
academic freedom, first amendment concem.84 Additionally, the statute also 
operated as a source of intimidation to other teachers. "[The] system of 
spying and surveillance [provided for by the statute] with its accompanying 
reports and trials cannot go hand in hand with academic freedom," Douglas 
argued, taking into account the full apparatus of the Feinberg Law.85 "It 
produces standardized thought, not the pursuit of truth."86 The problem of 
the Feinberg Law in this view was that it bore down threateningly on all 
teachers in the New York system. It would, in Douglas's view, compel 
teachers within the system to steer a wide course to keep from triggering the 
trip wires of the New York law. It was far different than a statute directed to 
acts of professional misconduct. Its chilling effect, lest one draw attention to 
oneself (for example, by the nature of the subject, the materials one might 
assign, or how one might propose to examine the subject in class), was 
obvious and substantial, in Douglas's view.87 A more narrowly crafted law was 
required to avoid the costs to academic freedom. 
The Douglas dissent in Adler is notable beyond the fact that the phrase 
"academic freedom" appears for the first time in direct first amendment 
usage. Douglas also employed academic freedom as a distinct, identified 
subset of constitutional first amendment concern. He does not dismiss it as 
merely parasitic on a standard free speech claim. Within the framework 
Douglas provides, moreover, there remain almost no problems left to give it 
recognizable shape within standard first amendment law. 
G 
Later in the same term, Justice Felix Frankfurter (like Douglas, also a 
former academic) provided a concurring opinion that nearly completes the 
identification of academic freedom protection as a subset of first amendment 
83. Id at 508-09. 
84. The concern is that the exclusion self-selects all of a certain incidental political disposition 
just as, say, a Soviet exclusion of all individuals holding pro-capitalist attitudes from teaching 
eligibility would do, within their system, in an opposite way. This is an academic wrong, moreover, in 
that it is not merely an alternative way of framing a standard, personal free speech claim. 
85. Adler, 342 US at 510-11 (emphasis added). 
86. Id at 511. 
87. This may, incidentally, be a suitable place to note the connection of the 1940 Statement of 
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure (emphasis added) with Justice Douglas's position in 
Adler. Teachers perpetually subject to nonrenewal, by mere notice that their services are no longer 
required by the institution, may be kept on their toes by the uncertainty of reappointment from year 
to year. But the lack of tenure also undercuts academic freedom in a serious way; as did the law in 
Adler, albeit in a different fashion, the system presses teachers to steer away from any possible trip 
wire that might put them out on the street. Thus, the AAUP regards tenure, following a 
probationary period (up to seven years), with dismissal thereafter for cause as determined in some 
kind of pretermination academic due process hearing, a vital safeguard to academic freedom itself. 
(The alternative, in a manner of speaking, is a system that keeps those who teach on their knees.) See 
William R. Keast, Faculty Tenure (Jossey-Bass, 1973); Fritz Machlup, In Defense of Academic Tenure, 50 
AAUP Bull 112 (1964); William W. Van Alstyne, Tenure: A Summary•, Explanation, and "Defense," 57 
AAUP Bull 328 ( 1971 ); RalphS. Brown &Jordan E. Kurland, Academic Tenure and Academic Freedom, 53 
L & Contemporary Problems 325 (Summer 1990). 
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law. In Wieman v. Updegraff, 88 the Supreme Court reviewed a state statute 
requiring compliance with a broad disclaimer oath as a condition of public 
employment.89 Frankfurter concurred in the decision holding the statute 
unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment, but he wrote separately to 
say why the statute was invalid as applied to teachers in particular, apart from 
its unconstitutional effect on the associational rights of other public 
employees. 
The statute applied to all persons seeking or holding public jobs. The 
particular case before the Supreme Court, however, had been brought on 
appeal by several state college faculty members. Justice Frankfurter held that 
the oath requirement was too broad to be sustained as to them in particular. 
His opinion, with Douglas concurring, marked out tightened boundaries 
limiting state control of public school and university faculty, on a specialized 
rationale. Frankfurter's objections in Wieman were based on vintage academic 
freedom premises, absorbed into first and fourteenth amendment law. 
Closely tracking Douglas's opinion in Adler, Frankfurter used the same 
constitutional analysis to the state law at issue that Douglas had applied to the 
Feinberg Law. Here, as in Adler, the first objection was to the winnowing 
effect of the disclaimer oath on the pool of eligible appointees for public 
school or state university teaching. The oath's exclusion was a coarse means 
of checking legitimate public interests in determining professional 
competence or on-the-job integrity. At the same time, it was bound to have a 
parochializing effect downstream, shaping the scope of academic freedom as a 
practical matter. Related, but equally substantial, in Frankfurter's view, was 
the additional dampening effect of the oath on the remaining (already 
narrowed) field of academic personnel. The point is the same as the one 
Douglas emphasized in Adler: the intimidating effect of the regulation on all 
remaining academic personnel. Both branches of Frankfurter's objection are 
quickly noted in the following few words: 
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment protects all persons, no matter what their calling. But, 
in view of the nature of the teacher's relation to the effective exercise of the rights which are 
safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and by the Fourteenth Amendment, inhibition of freedom of 
thought, and of action upon thought, in the case of teachers brings the safeguards of 
those amendments vividly into operation. Such unwarranted inhibition upon the free 
spirit of teachers affects not only those who, like the appellants, are immediately 
before the Court. It has an unmistakable tendency to chill that free play of the spirit 
which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice.90 
Significantly, Frankfurter added an observation that warrants close attention: 
"The functions of educational institutions in our national life and the 
conditions under which alone they can adequately perform them are at the 
88. 344 us 183 (1952). 
89. The oath eliminated from any public employment any person affiliated with any listed 
subversive organization, whether or not the disqualified person was aware of whatever it was that 
made the organization subversive when he or she joined. The "[i]ndiscriminate classification of 
innocent with knowing activity," the Court held, cut too wide and arbitrary a swath. On that ground 
it was held invalid under the due process clause of the 14th amendment. Id at 191. 
90. Id at 195 (emphasis added) (Frankfurter concurring). 
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basis of these limitations upon State and National power."91 What are "these" 
limitations? Obviously, they are those that he had just addressed: first and 
fourteenth amendment limitations on state and national power to narrow the 
width of academic eligibility or chill the professionalism of public school or 
public university faculty in performing their proper work. 
What underlies these limitations? "The functions of educational 
institutions ... and the conditions under which alone [academic personnel] 
can adequately perform them," Frankfurter insisted.92 What functions? -
"The" functions include critical educational teaching functions, as Frankfurter 
understood those functions, of course. 
Frankfurter's operating premises all sound very familiar by 1952, the date 
of his opinion, in terms of the general case already long since made outside the 
Constitution (till now), to explain the imperatives of academic freedom. But 
in Wieman, Frankfurter concretely linked that case finally into the hard law of 
the first and fourteenth amendments as well. He soundly located in these 
amendments a strong set of constitutional restrictions on state and on 
national power in establishing and operating public educational institutions. 
Frankfurter's position in Wieman was no different with respect to public 
educational institutions than the Holmes dictum in the 1920s and Holmes's 
discussion of the post office.93 The government may give up the post office 
whenever it likes, Holmes had said, but may not presume to run it however it 
pleases, because, while the post operates, its use by each of us on fair first 
amendment terms is virtually as critical as the free use of our tongues. So, 
equally, Frankfurter suggested in Wieman, the government may give up public 
education whenever it likes, yet not conduct it other than according to 
conditions of academic freedom so long as it stays in the business of education. The 
premises of the first amendment require the protection of academic freedom 
in the structuring of state universities and public schools. 
Five years later, Frankfurter reiterated and filled out these thoughts in 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, decided by the Supreme Court in 1957.94 Sweezy 
arose out of investigative hearings conducted by the New Hampshire Attorney 
General pursuant to state legislative directives under the New Hampshire 
Subversive Activities Act.95 It is of a piece with Adler, Wieman, and a dozen 
other cases pulling and hauling at the first amendment during the 1950s when 
disloyalty investigations, oath requirements, and new employment restrictions 
loomed large. 
New Hampshire Attorney General Louis Wyman had subpoenaed Paul 
Sweezy to answer questions including several inquiring into specific lectures 
he had given at the University of New Hampshire. At the hearings, Sweezy 
freely described himself as a "classical Marxist" and a socialist; he also 
91. Id at 197 (emphasis added). 
92. Id. 
93. Burleson, 255 US at 437; see notes 51-54 and accompanying text. 
94. 354 us 234 (1957). 
95. NH Laws 1951 ch 193; now NH Rev Stat Ann, 1955, ch 588, § § 1-16. 
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testified that he had never advocated the use of violence as a means of altering 
any government in the United States. However, Sweezy declined to divulge 
what he had discussed in his lectures at the university. He was cited for 
contempt and jailed until he would comply. 
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court in Sweezy is only of passing 
interest, because it ultimately turned on a rather narrow ground. The Court 
noted that the questions asked of Sweezy skated very close to first amendment 
concerns of free speech and academic freedom (Chief Justice Warren's 
observations were strongly supportive of both kinds of first amendment 
claim).96 Then, however, the opinion moved away from that discussion to 
hold that there was insufficient evidence in the record to sustain the claim that 
the legislature wished the Attorney General to pursue its inquiry in the 
manner he had pressed against Sweezy. That being the case, the Court held, 
Sweezy's refusal to answer was not clearly in contempt of anything the 
legislature might have sought, so treating Sweezy as in contempt was a denial 
of due process of law. Justice Frankfurter (with Justice Harlan joining him) 
concurred in the result, but not in Chief Justice Warren's reasoning. 
Frankfurter's position required that the case turn on the substantive academic 
freedom first amendment claim Sweezy had advanced. Finding the state 
attorney general authorized by the state legislature to have proceeded as he 
did, Frankfurter went directly to the sole remaining question: did the first 
amendment shield Sweezy's refusal to answer questions probing the contents 
of his university lecture? Frankfurter and Harlan held, on first amendment 
academic freedom grounds, that it did. 
The Frankfurter opinion extended his opinion in Wieman on academic 
freedom. In several respects it also anticipated the Sullivan holding about first 
amendment imperatives of adequate "breathing space." His point in Sweezy 
was not that teachers may never be required to account for their teaching; it 
was that the social imperatives of academic freedom operate through the first 
amendment to require close judicial superintendence of such inquiries 
because of their implicitly chilling effects. Thus, he held, only compelling 
need will excuse such an inquiry when it is pursued by political agencies, even 
including authorized committees of the state legislature and even when the 
university is one the state operates and funds. 
The test Frankfurter proposed (and which he held had not been met in this 
case) was as follows: "Political power must abstain from intrusion into this 
96. Chief Justice Warren's opinion did expressly invoke "academic freedom," and he 
distinguished it from general first amendment rights of political expression. "We believe that there 
unquestionably was an invasion of petitioner's liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political 
expression .... " Sweezy, 354 US at 250 (emphasis added). He also declared that "[t]he essentiality 
of freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-evident," and that academic 
freedom has a student, as well as a faculty, aspect: "Teachers and students must always remain free 
to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our 
civilization will stagnate and die." Id. Then, declaring that "[w]e do not now conceive of any 
circumstance wherein a state interest would justify infringement of rights in these fields," Warren 
nonetheless abruptly broke off the discussion ("[b]ut we do not need to reach such fundamental 
questions of state power to decide this case") and moved to another basis to decide. Id at 251. 
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activity of freedom, pursued in the interest of wise government and the 
people's well-being, except for reasons that are exigent and obviously compelling."97 
The phrase, "except for reasons that are exigent and obviously compelling," 
is not the usual standard an inquiring legislative committee need meet under 
the first amendment in order to overcome a first amendment-based refusal by 
a witness properly subpoenaed to respond to its questions.98 Frankfurter's 
standard is significantly more stringent, as he was at pains to acknowledge. 
His justification was a continuation of his concurrence in Wieman. It was 
directed to the social functions of universities and to the first amendment 
corollary of academic freedom that Frankfurter regarded as constraining the 
government when academic freedom is at stake: 
When weighed against the grave harm resulting from governmental intrusion into 
the intellectual life of a university, such justification [as might ordinarily suffice in 
other settings] for compelling a witness to discuss the contents of his lecture appears 
grossly inadequate .... These pages need not be burdened with proof, based on the 
testimony of a cloud of impressive witnesses, of the dependence of a free society on 
free universities. This means the exclusion of governmental intervention in the 
intellectual life of a university. It matters little whether such intervention occurs 
avowedly or through action that inevitably tends to check the ardor and fearlessness of 
scholars.99 
Quoting at the end of his opinion from what, in 195 7, he rightly called 
"perhaps the most poignant" 100 statement on academic freedom yet to 
appear anywhere-a searing Statement of Remonstrance by The Open 
Universities in South Africa against their own government's actions-
Frankfurter added the following: 
A university ceases to be true to its own nature if it becomes the tool of Church or 
State or any sectional interest. A university is characterized by the spirit of free 
inquiry, its ideal being the ideal of Socrates-to follow the argument where it leads ... 
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to 
speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail the 
four essential freedoms of a university-to determine for itself on academic grounds 
who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted 
to study. 101 
Returning to the case at hand, Frankfurter acknowledged that the particular 
intrusions posed by the limited questions Sweezy had been asked might seem 
minor and unthreatening, but insisted they were not. The overall chilling 
effect in the circumstances would be major, even if immeasurable. The 
justification given for the intrusions was neither exigent nor compelling under 
the circumstances. So, he held, considerations of first amendment academic 
freedom precluded Sweezy from being held in contempt. With Justice 
97. ld at 262 (emphasis added). 
98. Compare Sweezy with Braden v United States, 365 US 431 ( 1961) and with Wilkinson v United 
States, 365 US 399 (1961) (contempt convictions for refusing to answer legislative investigative 
committee questions upheld against first amendment objections, the standard of judicial review as 
applied not being as stringent as that required in Sweezy). 
99. Sweezy, 354 US at 262. 
100. Id. 
10 I. Id at 262, 263, quoting The Open Universities in South Africa 10-12 (a statement of a conference 
of senior scholars from the University of Cape Town and the University of Witwatersrand). 
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Harlan, he joined in the reversal of Sweezy's contempt conviction specifically 
on this ground. 
In the dicta of the Chief Justice in Sweezy, and more concretely in the 
passages we have reviewed in Sweezy, Wieman, and Adler, distinct principles of 
academic freedom were linked directly to the protections of the first and 
fourteenth amendments. In academic life, the first amendment had come 
around. 
III 
ELABORATING THE USAGES OF "ACADEMIC FREEDOM" IN THE 
SuPREME CouRT 
A. (1957-1967) 
Within the decade following Sweezy, 1957-1967, a half-dozen decisions in 
the Supreme Court worked at the edges of the Adler, Wieman, and Sweezy 
doctrines expressly relating first amendment developments and academic 
freedom. Five of these cases principally involved public colleges and 
universities. The sixth touched public schools as well. The trend of the cases 
yielded a strengthened first amendment philosophy within the Court. Four of 
the six cases elaborated on academic freedom within the special protection of 
the first amendment. Only the first of these cases, Barenblatt v. United States, 102 
briefly faltered from Frankfurter's strongly stated position in Sweezy, although 
another also substantially bypassed a generalized academic freedom claim 
even while providing relief on an alternative ground. The other four moved 
strongly to verify claims of academic freedom marked out in first amendment 
metes and bounds. 
Barenblatt v. United States, the first of these cases, was decided by a closely 
divided Court, five-to-four, in 1959. In Barenblatt, Justice Harlan wrote for a 
bare majority in sustaining a federal misdemeanor conviction of a former 
University of Michigan teaching fellow who had been prosecuted for 
contempt in refusing to answer questions during a public session of the 
House Committee on Un-American Activities. Several of the questions were 
directed to his possible knowledge of alleged Communist Party activities at 
educational institutions, including some seeking to determine the extent of 
his participation, if any, in Communist Party activities. Unlike Sweezy, none of 
the questions pressed him on any particular teaching or studying in which he 
may have been engaged, and the issue of academic freedom appears hardly to 
have been engaged. 
Justice Harlan, finding the committee duly authorized to investigate the 
general subject, and finding also that the committee had reason to think the 
witness might have information pertinent to the inquiry, sustained the 
demand for answers against Barenblatt's first amendment objection. The 
102. 360 us 109 (1959). 
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majority opinion made no reference to academic freedom except as a footnote 
mention from an amicus brief filed by the AAUP. 103 
The dissent by Justice Black also yielded no useful focused discussion of 
academic freedom. Rather, the Black dissent launched an excoriating first 
amendment attack on the House committee generally. The case was 
adjudicated in generalized free speech terms. 104 Barenblatt proved to be quite 
uneventful in the long run, either to extend Frankfurter's discussion in Sweezy 
or to cut it off. 
Four years later, in Yellin v. United States, 105 a similar contempt conviction 
of a witness who had declined to respond to questions-some of which bore 
on the witness's activities while at the University of Michigan-was overturned 
in the Supreme Court. Even so, the new five-to-four majority on the Court, 
though it held oppositely from Barenblatt, also deflected any academic 
freedom issue even more completely than the Barenblatt Court had done. The 
case overall is probably a better example of the Court still struggling to find 
its feet. The sole mention of "academic freedom" reported in the case went 
largely unaddressed. The case was disposed of in the noncomplying witness's 
favor, but on narrow procedural due process grounds. 106 
In contrast, in 1967, the New York Feinberg Law (previously upheld in the 
Adler case) was struck down on its face on substantive first amendment 
grounds in Keyishian v. Board of Regents. 107 Moreover, the emphasis was not 
only once again centered on the first amendment; but the outcome also 
turned specifically on the professional effects of the law, that is, on its effects 
on teachers. The state law's requirement of an annual subversive-action 
103. Id at 130 n29. The AAUP amicus brief (October Term, 1958, No 35) argued that first 
amendment imperatives of academic freedom do not privilege teachers from accounting for their 
work, but suggested that the standards endorsed by Justice Frankfurter in the Sweezy case had not 
been fulfilled by the Committee, thus, that the contempt sanction ought not be sustained. Justice 
Harlan did not appear to dispute the point as established in Sweezy (he had, after all, joined 
Frankfurter's opinion in Sweezy); rather, his opinion implies that the issue was not necessarily 
engaged by the facts before the Court. 
104. That is, the dissent, like the majority opinion, was occupied with the role of the House 
Committee on Un-American Activities overall and its broad threat to lawful dissent and political 
affiliation generally, rather than with the particular facts of the Barenblatt case. Justice Black did cite 
Sweezy, id at 139-40, as requiring proof of a compelling need before the committee could brush over 
a witness's first amendment interests; and he did conclude that no sufficiently compelling need had 
been established by the committee, but it was a secondary reproach at best. For a fresh view of 
Barenblatt generally, see Harry Kalven, A Worthy Tradition 497-531 (Harper & Row, 1st ed 1988). 
105. 374 us 109 (1963). 
106. Id at 124. In l'ellin, the witness was asked a number of questions in public session 
concerning his activities as a student at the University of Michigan and why he had provided no 
reference to having been at the University when he later applied for a steel-mill job. In declining to 
answer this and several other questions, Yellin read a statement in which he claimed privilege partly 
on grounds of academic freedom, id at 140, but the objection is neither elaborated on nor further 
addressed by the Court. Rather, the majority of the Court held that Yellin could not be held in 
contempt for refusing to answer questions in any public session because a request that he had 
submitted to be heard solely in executive session had not been referred to the whole committee for 
consideration and voted on as provided by the committee's own rules. In short, the Court held that 
such procedural protections of witnesses, such as the Committee Rules, could not be ignored by the 
committee, even assuming the rules could be repealed or revoked at will. 
107. 385 US 589, 609, 610 (discussed in note 78). 
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disclaimer affidavit, the scope of the required affidavit, and the heavy 
accompaniment of enforcement machinery laid in place for proceeding 
against those accused of taking the oath falsely, were held to be 
unconstitutional as applied to state university or public school teachers. 
The analysis of the first amendment academic freedom abridgments of the 
Feinberg Law was undertaken by Justice Brennan in Keyishian. Overall, the 
analysis is of a piece with that of Justice Douglas in Adler, except that now it 
represented a majority position in applying the first amendment. Writing for a 
new majority, moreover, Justice Brennan placed the protection of academic 
freedom within the core of first amendment concerns and not at its margins. 
The paragraph in which he did so would be quoted repeatedly by the Court 
during the next twenty years: 
[A]cademic freedom ... is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the 
teachers concerned. That freedom i.s therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which 
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. . . . The 
classroom is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas. The Nation's future depends upon 
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which 
discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of 
authoritative selection. lOS 
In holding the law invalid as applied to those in public education, Keyishian 
marks an important rite of passage. What New York Times v. Sullivan had meant 
in respect to journalism in the United States-a landmark first amendment 
decision providing professional breathing room for critical journalism-Keyishian 
forcefully represents in respect to academic freedom, including the academic 
freedom of those holding appointment by the state. 
Later in the same term in Whitehill v. Elkins, 109 the Court voided a 
Maryland disclaimer oath on similar grounds. The Maryland act required 
teachers to swear as a condition of public university appointment that the oath 
taker was not engaged "in one way or another" (sic) in acts seeking the 
overthrow of the state or national government by force or violence. 11° False 
swearing was made punishable as perjury. The opinion for the Court holding 
the requirement void was by Justice Douglas. He concluded that the oath act 
(and a section providing for the dismissal of those found on reasonable 
grounds to be subversive 111 ) was too broad to be consistent with the first 
amendment obligations to secure adequate protection of academic freedom in 
public education. 
108. Id at 603 (citations and quotation marks omitted, emphasis added). For examples of the 
steering effect of the Feinberg Law the Court found to conflict with academic freedom, see id at 601 
("The very intricacy of the plan and the uncertainty as to the scope of its proscriptions make it a 
highly efficient in terrorem mechanism. It would be a bold teacher who would not stay as far as 
possible from utterances or acts which might jeopardize his living by enmeshing him in this intricate 
machinery."). The opinion also draws heavily from Frankfurter's concurring opinions in Wieman, 344 
US at 194-98, and Sweezy, 354 US at 255-67, in explaining the full first amendment rationale. 
109. 389 us 54 (1967). 
110. Maryland Subversive Activities Act, Art 85A Md Code Ann §§ 1, 11, 13 (Michie 1969), 
repealed by Acts 1978, ch 257. 
111. Id at§ 14. 
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As in Keyishian, Sweezy, Wieman, and Adler, moreover, Douglas's first 
amendment analysis focused on the law's impact on teachers and 
professors. 112 As an example of the law's objectionable steering effect, 
Douglas observed that a faculty member, once having taken the oath, would 
need to avoid attending any international conference whose auspices were not 
totally known to him, simply from fear of drawing an investigation upon 
himself as having violated his oath. 113 After quoting extensively from Sweezy, 
Douglas framed the dispositive objection this way: 
The continuing surveillance which this type of law places on teachers is hostile to 
academic freedom. . . . The restraints on conscientious teachers are obvious. . . . That 
very threat [posed by the breadth of the disclaimer oath] may deter the flowering of 
academic freedom as much as successive suits for perjury. 114 
And, finding the breadth of the disability unwarranted because any proper 
governmental concerns with security or with professional integrity could be 
composed by more narrowly drawn rules not imposing these in terrorem effects 
on academic freedom, the Court held the Maryland statutes void. 
In Whitehill, Douglas thus employed the reference to academic freedom as 
a reference to an understood, settled first amendment shield against the state 
in its superintendence and control of public education, much in keeping with 
his views dating from Adler, as well as in keeping with Justice Brennan's 
Keyishian opinion in the same term of the Court. The proper fit, identifying 
academic freedom with the first amendment, was made. The measured 
protection of academic freedom from hostile state action had become a 
settled feature of first amendment law. 
Intermediately during this decade (1957 -1967}, moreover, two other cases 
were resolved by the Supreme Court in which "academic freedom" appears, 
although less centrally than in either Keyishian or Elkins. Both cases also 
resulted in holding state statutes invalid on first and fourteenth amendment 
grounds. The more relevant of the two cases, Baggett v. Bullitt, decided in 
1964, 115 had been brought by sixty-four members of the faculty, staff, and 
student body at the University of Washington, who sued for declaratory 
judgment and injunctive relief from two state laws, the first of which applied 
to all public employees, and the other only to teachers. The latter required a 
broad affirmative oath "by precept and example [to] promote respect for the 
112. That is, the objectionable effects are those bearing on the affected persons' professional 
work as teachers (the "academic freedom" effects of the law). The obverse side of the same 
regulatory coin would be the objectionable "free speech" effects of the law, that is, the extent to 
which, insofar as one becomes a teacher subject to the disclaimer oath, one must then steer clear of 
political associations and activities others remain free to pursue. For an elaboration of the 
distinction, see William W. Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the Genera/Issue of 
Civil Liberty, in Edmund Pincoffs, ed, The Concept of Academic Freedom (Univ of Texas, 1972). For an 
example of a federal regulation limiting first amendment rights of public employees but clearly not 
implicating academic freedom, see United States Civil Service Commission v National Ass 'n of Letter Carriers, 
413 US 548 ( 1973) (congressional restriction of civil service employees from certain forms of active 
personal involvement in political campaigns, upheld). 
113. 389 US at 60. 
114. Id at 59 (emphasis added). 
115. 377 us 360 (1964). 
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flag and the institutions of the [United States and the] State." 116 The 
companion statute, applicable to all public employees, imposed a broad 
disclaimer oath denying that the employee was a "subversive person," defined 
as one who knowingly joins or knowingly remains a member of any group that 
"advocates, abets, advises, or teaches any person" seeking to alter the form of 
state or national government by force or violence. 
As neither statute had yet been construed by the state supreme court, 
Justices Harlan and Clark thought the case premature. In their view, the 
statutes were open to a narrow interpretation that might disarm them of any 
undue chilling effects. Writing for seven members of the Court, however, 
Justice White disagreed and held the statutes void in light of their immediate 
impact on those required to take and abide by the oaths. Moreover, the 
examples Justice White gave of the objectionable downstream effects likely to 
be generated by the statutes were examples of professional, anti-academic 
freedom steering effects, 117 as distinct from ordinary anti-free speech effects. 
Significantly, too, in voiding the acts, Justice White noted: 
Since the ground we find dispositive immediately affects the professors ... and the 
interests of the students at the University in academic freedom are fully protected by a 
judgment in favor of the teaching personnel, we have no occasion to pass on the 
standing of the students to bring this suit. 118 
This passing remark merits more than a few words of its own. Students were 
not subject to either of the statutes, that is, students were not subject to any 
oath or other constraint under either statute. Yet students had presumed to 
appear as parties in interest to have both statutes declared void. What was 
their standing to do so? It was certainly not to stand in for the faculty (several 
faculty were already plaintiffs in the case). But the students claimed a separate 
(albeit related) standing because of what they alleged to be the direct effects 
of the laws on their own academic freedom. That is, the students claimed that 
the faculty would be inhibited by in terrorem effects of the oath from giving a 
full professional account of themselves in educational relationships with the 
students. Their claim as students was that it was not constitutionally 
permissible for the State of Washington to attempt to structure their 
education by putting the faculty under duress to compromise their 
professional interaction with students. Taken on its own terms, their claim of 
learning freedom was straightforward and strong. Justice White did not treat 
it as frivolous. To the contrary, his point is that since the academic freedom 
interests of the students were vindicated through the judgment in favor of the 
faculty plaintiffs, it was not necessary to determine whether the students could 
116. 1955 Act, Wash Laws 1955, ch 377, 1931 Act, Wash Laws 1931, ch 103. 
117. 377 US at 369-72 (examples include a faculty editor's reluctance to edit any scholarly journal 
with articles by Communist scholars from apprehension of appearing to act inconsistently with his 
oath; a reluctance to consult with such persons or attend a convention or present a paper with such 
persons present; an inhibition in class on any critical treatment of existing institutions, as 
inconsistent with the separate oath committing one affirmatively to promote respect for such 
institutions by precept and example). 
118. Id at 366 n5. 
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have successfully maintained the action even if no faculty had been willing to 
come forward (perhaps from fear of targeting themselves). 119 
The student academic freedom claim, so identified in Baggett, albeit 
obliquely, is notable. It is not in tension with the claim of academic freedom 
advanced in the same case by the affected faculty. Rather, the two are exactly 
consistent in seeking an educational environment in which the good faith 
critical professional skills of the faculty are not foreclosed by hostile state 
action from being available to the students in the manner of instruction they 
receive and their professional interaction with the faculty. We shall shortly 
see several other cases where the argument is taken up (it might usefully have 
appeared much earlier, for example, in Scopes). The last case we note between 
1957 and 1967, however, was not litigated along such lines. 
At issue in the remaining case of this period, Shelton v. Tucker, 120 decided in 
1960, was an Arkansas statute 121 requiring every teacher in each state-
supported school or college annually to submit a list of all organizations in 
which the teacher had held membership or to which the teacher had 
contributed financially during the preceding five years, as a condition of 
continuing eligibility for (re)appointment each year. A number of 
noncomplying public school teachers and state college faculty members sued 
to have the requirement enjoined. Unlike any of the cases thus far reviewed, 
the requirement assailed in Shelton simply sought the requested information; 
that is, it did not probe the teaching of the faculty, impose any sort of 
disclaimer oath, or render anyone ineligible on grounds of any particular 
affiliation (knowing or otherwise). Nonetheless, on a closely divided (five-to-
four) vote, the Supreme Court struck the statute down on first amendment 
overbreadth grounds. 
Four Justices, including Frankfurter, found nothing facially amiss with the 
state requirement. In certain respects, moreover, the generality of the annual 
reporting requirement was arguably a point in its favor; the requirement did 
not imply that only certain affiliations or some affiliations more than others 
might trigger additional investigation and inquiry. Nor did it steer one away 
from certain groups, causes, parties, or political action groups. 
For Justice Frankfurter (joined by Justices Harlan, Whittaker, and Clark}, 
this was enough to conclude that the suit was premature. In the event that 
any public school or state college faculty members might be able to show 
subsequently that any of them, after complying, were not renewed in the 
course of annual review because of hostile use by school administrators of the 
information disclosed as an incident of the required annual listing, it would be 
119. The claim, in first amendment terms, is entirely as appropriate for the students to assert in 
this kind of setting as an equivalent claim brought on behalf of students to contest the racial 
assignment of teaching staff also affecting the conditions of the education the state chooses to 
provide. For an example of just such a claim, see Rogers v Paul, 382 US 198 (1965). And for an 
insightful general discussion, see Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 Colum L Rev 277, 
297-304 (1984). 
120. 364 us 479 (1960). 
121. Second Extraordinary Session of Ark Gen Assembly of 1958, Act 10. 
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timely then, and not earlier, to check the statute's application on strict first 
amendment grounds. Since, however, the comprehensive disclosure 
requirement was on its face relatable to at least some few uses that might be 
entirely proper (for example, some kinds of organizational affiliations or 
contributions could provide grounds for concern arising from apparent 
conflicts of interest, or at least furnish reason for inquiry), the teachers could 
not claim a first amendment right to associational secrecy. For Justice 
Frankfurter, in brief, the teachers' claims went too far. In defending his 
position, moreover, Frankfurter also made the following observation: "If I 
dissent from the Court's disposition in these cases, it is not because I put a 
low value on academic freedom. . . . It is because that very freedom, in its 
most creative reaches, is dependent in no small part upon the careful and 
discriminating selection of teachers." 122 The majority, in reaching the 
opposite conclusion on the main issue, was not overall at odds with 
Frankfurter's general view. Rather, the majority emphasized that the lack of 
any tenure system under Arkansas law put every teacher at fresh risk each 
year, with no burden on a nonrenewing school to do more than send notice 
that the services of a given teacher were no longer desired without obligation 
to say why. Against the factual background of recent massive resistance to 
desegregation in Arkansas, and the expressed anxiety of the plaintiffs that in 
these circumstances the disclosure laws would intimidate teachers affected by 
them to abandon membership and financial support for certain voluntary 
organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People rather than face the risk of covert retaliatory use of the 
information they would be required to supply, the majority held that the 
state's interests in forced disclosure were insufficient to sustain the 
requirement on its face. They regarded the requirement as too 
indiscriminate. Emphasizing the lack of confidentiality, the lack of procedural 
protections (that is, tenure), and the general atmosphere of public hostility, 
and quoting elaborately from Wieman and from Sweezy, the Court struck down 
the Arkansas statute. Principally, however, the emphasis of the decision is 
more of a piece with the opinion in Pickering, since its stress is on the rights of 
those who teach not to be put under duress to forego ordinary political rights 
of association and citizen speech. Only secondarily is Shelton an academic 
freedom case. 
B. (1968-1978) 
Nine cases in the Supreme Court report usages of "academic freedom" in 
constitutional litigation during the eleven years bounding 1968-1978. As in 
the preceding section, not all are equally germane. But part of what one gains 
from an unhurried review is some clearer sense of what counts as an academic 
freedom interest, as against an ordinary (albeit strong) free speech concern as 
such. So it is not useless to see some instances of the distinction at work, as in 
122. 364 US at 495-96. 
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some measure we already have. As we have already had occasion to notice, 
moreover, there are instances in which both descriptions of the interest at 
issue may be opposite. 123 
Some of the cases decided during this period are separately interesting, 
moreover, in reporting constitutional usages of academic freedom entangled 
with other constitutional clauses and issues. As one example, two cases 
measure the extent to which conditions of academic freedom or the lack 
thereof may limit the extent to which church-affiliated schools and universities 
may or may not receive direct fiscal support disbursed by the state. As a 
different example, the last case we consider here, Board of Regents of The 
University of California v. Bakke, draws on a claim of academic freedom in 
attempting to reconcile a state university admissions policy with the 
fourteenth amendment. The issue addressed by the Court in Bakke is the 
extent to which public universities may use race as a partial determinant of 
who shall attend the state university, claiming the power to do so as a valid 
exercise of academic freedom. But we begin with something much more 
obviously connected to the first amendment, the Court's 1969 decision in 
Tinker v. Des Moines School District. 124 Tinker was a major decision arising under 
the first amendment, importing free speech rights onto the premises of public 
schools in a manner and to an extent not previously secured in any decision 
by the Supreme Court. 
At issue in Tinker was a claim brought on behalf of three public high school 
and junior high school students (respectively sixteen, fifteen, and thirteen 
years old). Through their parents, who warmly supported their children's 
actions, they sued in federal court to forestall school penalties from being 
imposed upon them following their suspension for defiance of a school 
district rule forbidding armbands from being worn on campus. The plaintiffs' 
position was that the rule was an unwarranted restriction on their rights of 
personal and political expression. That the restriction was limited to the 
premises of the school, they insisted, did not mean that it should therefore be 
sustained. Rather, plaintiffs argued, absent some justification more 
compelling than a flat policy preference to disallow such activity on school 
grounds, the rule ought to be seen as an impermissible prior restraint on their 
rights of free speech. By a majority of seven to two (Justices Black and Harlan 
dissenting in separate opinions), the Supreme Court agreed. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Fortas held that the first amendment did 
apply directly to the public school premises, that is, that no cordon sanitaire 
could be thrown up around it forbidding political expression on the premises 
by those in attendance during the school day. This first holding was a major 
step by the Court, quite similar in respect to students, to Sullivan in respect to 
the press. No previous case had gone so far. Then, advancing to the 
particular facts of the case, Justice Fortas held that the activities of the 
students (wearing black armbands on school grounds during the school day as 
123. See, for example, note 112 and accompanying text. 
124. 393 us 503 (1969). 
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a personal, silent expression of reproach of U.S. engagement in Vietnam) 
were not subject to school restriction beyond that reasonably necessary to 
keep them from disrupting the program and activities of the school. Justice 
Fortas concluded that the scanty record did not reveal sufficient evidence of 
anything the school board might have relied on stronger than an 
"undifferentiated" 125 anxiety of adverse reaction to the students' behavior, 
and that this was simply not enough under the circumstances. The lower 
court decision was reversed. 
In practical effect, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs a declaratory 
judgment entitling them to talk politics on their high school or junior high 
school campus-even by wearing armbands-in the absence of identifiable 
clear signs of adverse effects that might justify more tailored restrictions by 
the school administration. 126 In the course of his wide-ranging opinion (two 
Justices concurred only narrowly), moreover, Justice Fortas wrote 
aggressively in criticism of student speech-restrictive public school board 
policies at large. He prefaced his analysis with the following passages, which 
came to be much quoted in other cases: 
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school 
environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that 
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this 
Court for almost 50 years.[ 127] ... In our system, state operated schools may not be 
enclaves of totalitarianism. [S]tudents may not be regarded as dosed-circuit recipients 
of only that which the State chooses to communicate. They maJ not be confined to the 
expression of those sentiments that are officially approved. 12 
Some of the Court's phrases in these passages fit well with strong academic 
freedom claims (for example, "[i]n our system, state-operated schools may not 
be enclaves of totalitarianism ... students may not be regarded as closed-
circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate") .129 
They fit well, that is, with several points we have already derived in relating 
student and faculty academic freedom from Baggett, Keyishian, and cases of a 
like sort. They match up strongly also with other portions of our general 
review: that like the post, the state may give up public education when it 
chooses; but while carrying it on, the state is not sole master of what students 
are free to learn, whether on their own initiative or in interaction with those 
free to teach. 
125. Id at 508. 
126. It is likely that a restriction on carrying one's political insignia into the classroom might well 
have been sustained, though a campuswide ban per se fails. 
127. This was not entirely true. Indeed, Tinker's significance was that it established for the first 
time that, in some measure, public school premises cannot be restricted as a forum for political 
expression by students. Since Tinker there has been some erosion, though Tinker has not been 
overruled. See, for example, Bethel School District No. 403 v Fraser, 478 US 675 (1986) (student 
disciplined for off-color remarks as part of campus campaign speech on behalf of another student; 
Tinker heavily qualified). See also Hazelwood School Districl v Kuhlmeier, 484 US 260 (1988) (principal's 
unilateral and substantial censorship of student-managed, faculty-supervised newspaper sustained, 5 
to 4). 
128. Tinker, 393 US at 506, 511. 
129. Id at 511 (emphasis added). 
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Still, allowing for all this, Tinker is not focused on academic freedom, 130 
certainly not in the profile that has thus far stretched from Adler through 
Keyishian, Whitehill, and Baggett. Rather, Tinker represents a strong first 
amendment judgment by the Court respecting general free speech claims by 
students during hours of compulsory attendance at publicly run schools, 
rather than anything more subtle. It is an example of a strong view of general 
first amendment free speech rights in an open society, but not more. 131 
Four years after Tinker, in 1972, the Court reviewed a related first 
amendment claim by a group of college students in Healy v. james. 132 A 
chapter of Students for a Democratic Society ("SDS") had applied for official 
recognition as a student organization at Central Connecticut State College 
("CCSC") in 1969. That status was sought in order to qualify the 
organization to place announcements of meetings or rallies in the student 
newspaper, to post notices on campus bulletin boards, and "most 
importantly" 133 (to quote Justice Powell), to use campus facilities for holding 
meetings. Recognized groups already included the Young Republicans, 
Young Democrats, Young Americans for Freedom, and the Liberal Party. 
Despite a six-to-two vote by the college Student Affairs Committee (four 
students, three faculty, and the dean of students) recommending approval, 
the college president disapproved the group's application. 
The student organizers sued in federal district court to enjoin, on first 
amendment grounds, the president's refusal. The president defended his 
decision on the basis that a line should be drawn disallowing campus status 
"to any group that 'openly repudiates' the College's dedication to academic 
freedom," 134 which, arguably, SDS did. SDS chapters had been involved in 
episodes of trashing and disruption at some other colleges. In the SDS view, 
colleges as well many other social, economic, and political structures in the 
United States were rigged against the interests of the poor. SDS was itself 
skeptical and contemptuous of the conventional view of academic freedom, a 
view they regarded as protecting the status quo. Influenced strongly by 
Herbert Marcuse's writings (for example, Repressive Tolerance 135), many SDS 
members believed that prevailing first amendment doctrine was itself vicious 
130. The sole actual mention of academic freedom in Tinker is a footnote reference to a law 
review note, Note, Academic Freedom, 81 Harv L Rev 1045 ( 1968) (using the phrase in its title). 393 US 
at 506 n2. 
131. The dissenting opinion by Justice Harlan is useful in elaborating this point. Id at 526. Also, 
in saying that "teachers [do not] shed their constiLUtional rights to freedom of speech ... at the 
schoolhouse gate," id at 506, Justice Fortas is correct in the sense the Pickering case shows. The 
dictum may seem to go further, however, and to imply that public school teachers may also use 
school premises as the students used them, for example, to wear political armbands; but that is 
doubtful (nor would academic freedom necessarily embrace the idea). Rather, it is likely a public 
school rule forbidding teachers to wear political armbands or buttons during working hours on 
school premises or in classrooms would-and should-be sustained. 
132. 408 us 169 (1972). 
133. Id at 176. 
134. Id. 
135. Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr. & Herbert Marcuse, A C1itique of Pure Tolerance 80-
117 (Beacon Press, 1969). 
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because it enabled entrenched elites to exploit others by perpetuating a myth 
of an open marketplace of ideas, which the elites dominated for their own 
ends. SDS did not agree that moral people should tolerate the free 
circulation of evil ideas; rather, moral people should act to disrupt their 
presentation when necessary to prove they were no longer acceptable in the 
classroom or anywhere else. 
Despite all this, however, in seeking recognition at CCSC, the SDS chapter 
had actually filed an unprepossessing statement of educational purposes. 
When pressed for further information as to whether they might engage in 
interrupting classes, they replied only that their action would "be dependent 
upon each issue." 136 The president decided that this was not adequate and 
disapproved their request. After still further campus hearings on the question 
of recognition (hearings mandated by the district court), the president 
renewed his disapproval on grounds that recognition of the SDS chapter 
would be "contrary to ... orderly process[es] of change" and would present a 
"disruptive influence" to the college. 137 The district court sustained the 
president. The court of appeals affirmed the district court. The Supreme 
Court unanimously reversed in an opinion written by Justice Powell. 
In his opinion, Powell quoted Tinker and declared: "At the outset we note 
that state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of 
the First Amendment. [W]e break no new constitutional ground in 
reaffirming this Nation's dedication to safeguarding academic freedom." 138 
Then, after noting that the student organization had complied with the 
college's filing requirements and that the president's adverse decision 
operated as a prior restraint under the circumstances, Justice Powell placed 
the burden of justification on the college and held that it had not been met. 
Any risk of disruption or intimidation was inchoate, not sufficiently clear nor 
present to justify refusing to allow the chapter to form and meet on campus. 
The philosophy of the organization, even assuming it countenanced violence 
and disruption, "affords no reason" for disallowing it to persuade others of 
the truth of its point of view, so long as it in fact operated on campus in an 
orderly fashion, even as the Young Democrats or Young Americans for 
Freedom already did. 139 Powell's statement was exceedingly strong in 
applying the first amendment. It virtually repeated the position Holmes and 
Brandeis had taken a half century earlier as a general first amendment rule: 
"Whether petitioners did in fact advocate a philosophy of 'destruction' [is] 
immaterial. The College, acting here as the instrumentality of the State, may 
not restrict speech or association simply because it finds the views expressed 
by any group to be abhorrent."I 40 
136. Hea()', 408 US at 173. 
137. Id at 179. 
138. Id at 180 (citations omitted). 
139. Id at 187. 
140. Id. 
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Concern with respect to actual acts of disruption or actual acts of 
intimidation, or with respect to acts to deprive others of their opportunity to 
speak or be heard, is entirely proper, Powell declared firmly for the Court. 
But, quoting from Tinker again, Powell held that definite actions, or at least 
discernible threats of such actions, must materialize to warrant sanctions by 
the college, including revocation of recognition. A ban of the organization in 
advance of any untoward activity or any specific threat could not stand, 
consistent with the fourteenth amendment's application of the first 
amendment to the state college. 
At the end, Powell hedged only in one respect. The decisions of the lower 
courts were reversed, but the case was remanded for further proceedings to 
determine whether the SDS group would express a minimal willingness to be 
bound by such campus regulations as the Court had already indicated the 
college might maintain and strictly enforce (against disruption, invasion of 
classrooms, or interference with other speakers, for example). The Court 
thus left the possibility open that the group might be banned if, 
notwithstanding a request to do so, it declined to submit a statement of 
willingness to be bound by the valid rules that the college maintained for the 
protection of academic freedom and for general order on campus. 141 
Healy, even more than Tinker, is an exceptionally strong first amendment 
decision, albeit confined to state colleges (as Tinker is confined to public 
schools). Neither implies that unaffiliated outside groups may willy-nilly 
wedge themselves onto public school or state college premises. On the other 
hand, neither case (certainly, not Healy) permits the college to draw a sharp 
line according to the ideological auspices of student groups free to claim 
campus breathing space of their own up to the point of actual threats, acts of 
intimidation, actual acts of disruption, or interference with the educational 
program or rights of others on campus, as both cases are at pains to say. A 
concurring opinion by Justice Douglas carried the point even farther than did 
that by Justice Powell. Douglas defended the radical heterodoxy of student 
groups as a check even as to the faculty itself: 
141. Extracting such a commitment to observe the rules necessarily puts groups such as SDS 
under a strain. In the circumstances, the act of making such an affirmative expression is inconsistent 
with the group's view that such rules are not entitled to respect (because, in SDS's opinion, they 
constitute a parliamentary fa~ade by means of which dominant classes maintain elite control). It may 
be argued that refusal to express acceptance of such rules may not be sufficient grounds to ban the 
group, though enforcement of the rules would be utterly sound. The problem is akin to a pledge of 
allegiance test. Compare these two statements: 
(a) In applying for recognition on campus, we accept and agree to observe all college rules 
applicable to recognized student organizations; 
(b) In applying for recognition on campus, we acknowledge that the College has a set of 
rules applicable to recognized student organizations, and we understand that we will 
not be regarded by the College as exempt from them. 
The second form effectively records the fact of notice of the rules; it makes clear that recognition 
in no way implies waiver by the college of its rules. The first form, requiring acceptance of the rules, 
however, seeks a concession respecting the accepted legitimacy of the rules; somewhat like a "pledge 
of allegiance," it is more doubtful on that same account. 
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Some [of the faculty] have narrow specialities that are hardly relevant to modern 
times. History has passed others by, leaving them interesting relics of a bygone day. 
More often than not they represent those who withered under the pressures of 
McCarthyism or other forces of conformity and represent but a timid replica of those 
who once brought distinction to the ideal of academic freedom. 142 
At least passingly related to Tinker and to Healy, moreover, is jones v. State 
Board of Education, 143 denied review in the Supreme Court in 1970. At issue in 
the case was a petition for certiorari, brought by a state college student who 
had been suspended by the college. He claimed it was done solely because he 
distributed a campus pamphlet for the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee ("SNCC"), urging a student registration boycott-an activity he 
claimed the first amendment protected. After hearing oral argument, the 
Court dismissed the petition for lack of sufficient evidence in the record 
regarding the actual basis of the student's suspension (it appeared in the 
course of oral argument before the Court that he may have been suspended 
for having lied to the campus disciplinary committee rather than for having 
distributed the pamphlet). So, technically, the case altogether washed out. 
But one Justice, Douglas, filed a dissent. 
Douglas did not relate the student's actions to academic freedom (the 
phrase "academic freedom" actually appears solely in the student's pamphlet, 
reprinted in the case), but his opinion treats those actions as protected by the 
first amendment nevertheless. That the pamphlet statements may have been 
"ill-tempered and in bad taste," or "even strongly abusive," 144 Douglas says, 
may not on those grounds enable the state college to have the pamphleteer 
suspended or dismissed. On the other hand, Douglas insisted, "[t]his does 
not mean that free speech can be used with impunity as an excuse to break up 
classrooms, to destroy the quiet and decorum of convocations, or to bar the 
constitutional privileges of others to meet together in matters of common 
concern." 145 In brief, the Douglas opinion does not break new ground, but it 
does represent a very strong view of student-citizen, on-campus free speech. 
Tinker, Healy, andjones are, in sum, strong first amendment cases. All treat 
students as possessing assertable first amendment rights on campus. All 
involve student engagement in some conspicuous form of personal political 
expression. In many respects, their parallelism to Sullivan and Pickering is 
quite complete: they are animated by a strong first amendment breathing 
space rationale extended in three dimensions at once. 
The first dimension is in the holding that the first amendment disallows 
public authority to cordon off public school or public college premises by any 
strict limitation restricting students in attendance to "educationally germane" 
speech alone; it appears specifically in the Court's express, reiterated 
proposition that students need not leave their involvement in general political 
142. Healy, 408 US at 196-97. 
143. 396 US 817, cert dism, 397 US 31, reh denied 397 US 1018 (1970). 
144. 397 US at 33 (Douglas dissenting). 
145. Id at 33-34. 
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debate at the school gate. 146 The second dimension of the breathing space 
rationale is that the extent to which the first proposition holds true is more 
substantial than one might have supposed, in both a procedural and in a 
substantive sense. So, the cases suggest, procedural limitations (for example, 
those generally concerned with time, place, and manner of on-campus 
expression) must not sweep wider than reasonably warranted in order to 
avoid material kinds of interference with the orderly campus environment. 
Both Tinker and Healy (and certainly Douglas's dissent in jones) strongly so 
suggest. Substantively, the rules may generally not pick and choose 
"acceptable" philosophies to be presented on campus through student on-
campus expression; nor, evidently, may common forum advantages of 
operating on campus (for example, as a recognized student group) be 
withheld because of misgivings associated with a particular group's 
ideological bent or because of strong public disapproval. Third, these 
propositions evidently hold, in some degree, even in respect to quite young 
persons (for example, in Tinker, one of the students was only thirteen). While 
it may be doubtful whether these first amendment beachheads involve student 
academic freedom in any ordinary understanding (that is, compare these cases 
with the academic freedom student claim in Baggett), one may rightly pause in 
thinking the matter through. They do assure students of some right to 
fashion what is in some loose sense a constitutionally protected cocurriculum 
on campus-the teaching agendas and learning experiences of their own 
actions-carried on in a manner that may well influence the official 
curriculum as well. Obliquely, therefore, if not directly, they do secure a kind 
of anarchistic student academic freedom under first amendment auspices one 
might be mistaken to discount or dismiss. 
Two years after the dismissal of certiorari in jones, the Court denied 
certiorari in a case in which Justice Douglas again dissented, President's Council 
v. Community School Board. 147 The case is an inconclusive forerunner to an 
address by the full Court of the same issues in 1982, 148 but Douglas's dissent 
is noteworthy because it bears intimately on his exceptional views in Healy and 
jones. It also virtually completes the twenty-year cycle of Douglas opinions on 
the larger subject, beginning with his seminal dissent in the 1952 Adler case, 
the first explicit use of academic freedom in the Supreme Court. 
President's Council had been commenced in federal district court by a 
combination of plaintiffs: a junior high school principal, a librarian from one 
of the affected schools, and several parents suing for themselves and their 
children. 149 Their object was to secure a mandatory injunction ordering the 
146. Tinker, 393 US 503. 
147. 457 F2d 289 (2d Cir 1972), cert denied, 409 US 998 (1972). 
148. Board of Educ., Island Trees v Pico, 457 US 853 (1982); see notes 237-49 and accompanying 
text. 
149. Had the publisher and author joined the case as plaintiffs, the additional issue would have 
been joined whether their freedom of speech and press interest-to reach willing readers-was 
violated by the state action interposed by the school board's banishment of the book from public 
school library shelves. (To frame the issue in this way is not to imply a certain answer, but it may 
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school board to return a particular book 150 to the school library shelves, from 
which the school board had ordered it removed. 
Noting that the book remained available to those students presenting a 
written request by their parents, the court of appeals (in affirming the district 
court's dismissal of the case) held that the alleged violation of academic 
freedom was no more than "miniscule" (sic), if real at all: the court regarded 
the whole matter to be much too trivial to "elevate this intramural strife to 
first amendment constitutional proportions." 151 Dissenting from the 
Supreme Court's subsequent denial of certiorari, however, Douglas strongly 
disagreed: 
Academic freedom has been upheld against attack on various fronts. . . . The first 
amendment is a preferred right and is of great importance in the schools. . . . Are we 
sending children to school to be educated by the norms of the School Board or are we 
educating our youth to shed the prejudices of the ~ast, to explore all forms of thought, 
and to find solutions to our world's problems? 15 
Douglas left it quite unclear whose academic freedom (presumably that of 
the students?) had been abridged. We shall see later, in the Court's treatment 
of the 1982 Pico decision, what became of this species of dispute when it was 
more fully discussed. The first amendment importance of the dissent is that 
Douglas regarded the school board action as reviewable at least to see 
whether the state was acting through its public school system to restrict the 
availability of ideas out of a community preference for insulating conventional 
wisdom from critical appraisal (albeit in the form of a particular book on the 
library shelf rather than in the form of the remarks of a classroom teacher); it 
is not at all clear that he was wide of the mark in voting to have the Court take 
a closer look at the case. Indeed, his dissent is related in this respect to a 
major Supreme Court case of this same period, Epperson v. Arkansas, 153 
decided in 1968. 
Epperson was a reprise on Scopes; it dealt with a virtually identical state 
criminal statute, adopted in Arkansas the year after the Tennessee court had 
sustained the Tennessee act. Like that act, the Arkansas statute forbade 
any teacher . .. in any University, College, Normal, Public School, or other institution of 
the State, which is supported in whole or in part from public funds ... to teach the 
theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of animals 
[or to use any textbook] that teaches the [same theory or doctrine]. 154 
Notwithstanding this statute, a public school teacher, Susan Epperson, did 
assign such a textbook for use in her high school biology class; she sued in 
state court for a declaratory judgment to determine whether she could use the 
provide an additional first amendment link with the other plaintiffs asserting compatible interests in 
lifting the ban.) 
150. Piri Thomas, Down These Mean Streets (Knopf, 1967). 
151. 457 F2d 289, 292 (2d Cir 1972). 
152. President's Council, 409 US at 999-1000 (Douglas dissenting). 
153. 393 us 97 (1968). 
154. Ark Stat Ann §§ 80-1627 to 1628 (1960 Repl Vol). Note that just as was true of the 
Tennessee statute, the restriction also applied at the university level. That being so, any suggestion 
that the statute merely meant to shield especially young children from emotional conflict (between 
subjects addressed in school and family loyalties) would seem entirely farfetched. 
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textbook without threat of discharge or criminal prosecution. The state 
chancery court, responding to the numerous U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
we have previously canvassed, held that the state could not "restrict the 
freedom to learn, and restrain the freedom to teach" by categorical criminal 
law censorship of this sort, even within its own schools and colleges} 5 5 As it 
was to tum out, however, only the state chancery court's opinion applied first 
amendment-academic freedom as the principal basis for decision; somewhat 
ironically, and altogether anticlimactically, neither the state supreme court 
nor the U.S. Supreme Court did. 
The state supreme court gave the entire case short shrift. In a two-
sentence per curiam reversal of the chancery court, the state supreme court 
treated the state as free to set the terms of teaching and learning in public 
schools and public universities as it wished (just as the Tennessee Supreme 
Court had done in the 1920s); it peremptorily upheld the restriction as "a 
valid exercise of the state's power to specify the curriculum in its public 
schools." 156 In brief, the Arkansas Supreme Court treated the teachers as 
confinable in their classroom coverage exactly as the state legislature 
preferred; correspondingly, the dependent freedom of the students, in their 
interactive learning relationships with the teachers, was implicitly cut off as 
well. Epperson thus went to the Supreme Court as an excellent first 
amendment academic freedom case. The case was as strong-perhaps 
stronger-than that joining the issues we noted in Baggett v. Bullitt, 157 albeit 
drawn in the setting of secondary education, rather than in state colleges and 
universities. 
In the Supreme Court, Justice Fortas (writing for six members of the 
Court) initially addressed the case in strong first amendment, academic 
freedom terms. He invoked Keyishian 158 and Shelton v. Tucker 159 to settle the 
full relevance of the first amendment to the classroom. He likewise referred 
to Meyer, 160 describing it as a case in which "the Court did not hesitate to 
condemn under the Due Process Clause 'arbitrary' restrictions upon the 
freedom of teachers to teach and of students to leam." 161 But, having set up 
the case in these strong, promising terms, Justice Fortas then deflected the 
actual decision into a narrower channel. He concluded that it was not 
necessary to strengthen the constitutional constraint upon the powers of the 
state government to operate public schools and universities as it wished, even 
though the state attorney made virtually no effort to defend the law (he more 
or less desultorily adhered to the state supreme court's view that no defense 
155. 393 US at 100, quoting unreported opinion of Chancery court. 
156. 242 Ark 922, 416 SW2d 322 (1967). 
157. 377 US 360. See note 115 and accompanying text. 
158. 385 us 589 (1967). 
159. 364 us 479 (1960). 
160. 262 us 390 (1923). 
161. Epperson, 393 US at 105. This was, however, slightly careless of Justice Fortas; Meyer, it will 
be remembered, dealt with an effort to restrict German language instruction in private schools, not 
(merely) public schools, as here. 
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was needed-that is, that the state could do as it liked as to its own schools 
and colleges-a view clearly incorrect under pre-existing Supreme Court 
decisions). Rather, Justice Fortas concluded, whatever valid reasons a state 
might adduce in some circumstances, to justify the way it has allocated scarce 
educational resources or has taken into account the age of students (for 
example, the appropriateness of reserving some subjects to higher age 
groups), no such considerations accounted for the categorical, across-the-
board exclusion at issue. Instead, Fortas held, the Arkansas statute had no 
purpose other than to serve the interests of the dominant religious faith of the 
region by forbidding public classroom instruction inconsistent with its 
tenets. 162 A legislative preference merely to protect a dominant religion is 
disallowed as contrary to the first amendment's establishment clause. 
Accordingly, the court struck down the Arkansas statute specifically on that 
ground. 163 
The decision in Epperson, however, was weakened by the surprising 
concurrence filed by Justice Black (surprising because, along with Justice 
Douglas, Black had been most forceful in the long list of academic freedom 
cases and regulations in the 1950s and 1960s). In Justice Black's view, the 
statute was void only because the state supreme court had left it uncertain 
whether a teacher was "forbidden to mention Darwin's theory at all or [was 
forbidden only] from contending that it was true." 164 If the statute meant to 
prohibit any mention, then, while it might be valid as thus understood, the 
state court needed to make clear the extent of the statutory prohibition, in 
order that teachers not be made to guess. For Black, therefore, the vice of the 
162. Id at 107. Note, again, that the statute applied uniformly to public higher education as much 
as to secondary education in Arkansas, thus-on its face-proposing no distinction in respect to 
secondary education, that is, no basis for crediting a rationale applicable to the one level of schools 
vis-a-vis the other, since the legislature made no such distinction at all. The foreclosure of any 
academic presentation respecting evolution of the species (like the equivalent banning of books, 
journals, or other publications containing like material through the mails) should be the easiest kind 
of first amendment case under these circumstances. Of course, to the extent that the restriction was 
also enacted because those having the power to do so wanted the topic and materials suppressed as a 
set of blasphemous ideas, Fortas was not wrong to fault the statute separately under the 
establishment clause. (The case is no different in that regard than the use of state power to forbid 
the publication or republication of Galileo's telescopic evidence tending to confirm Copernican 
astronomy; that the ban is limited to state-supported educational institutions should make no 
difference at all.) For a recent and excellent review of blasphemy and the first amendment, see 
Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 16 Calif 
L Rev 297 (1988). 
163. There is and can be no doubt that the First Amendment does not permit the State to 
require that teaching and learning must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any 
religious sect or dogma. . . . In the present case, there can be no doubt that Arkansas has 
sought to prevent its teachers from discussing the theory of evolution because it is contrary 
to the belief of some that the Book of Genesis must be the exclusive source of doctrine as to 
the origin of man. . . . No suggestion has been made that Arkansas' law may be justified by 
considerations of state policy other than the religious views of some of its citizens .... The 
law's effort was ... an attempt to blot out a particular theory because of its supposed 
conflict with the Biblical account, literally read. 
393 US at 106-09. Justice Fortas's sole usage of "academic freedom" appears in footnote citations of 
law journal titles (id nnlO, 13). 
164. Id at 112 (Black concurring). 
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law was its threat of criminal sanctions against one who might guess wrong; 
putting teachers at risk in that way was unfair-a denial of due process. 
At one point, Justice Black made an unexceptionable observation that 
teachers may not, as a matter of constitutional right, commandeer the 
classroom in whatever way suits their fancy. 165 At another point, however, he 
veered very much in the direction of moving all the way from that undisputed 
basic proposition virtually to the rhetoric of the right-privilege distinction the 
Court had long since rejected: 
I am ... not ready to hold that a person hired to teach school children takes with him 
into the classroom a constitutional right to teach sociological, economic, political, or 
religious subjects that the school's managers do not want discussed. . . . I question 
whether it is absolutely certain, as the Court's opinion indicates, that "academic 
freedom" permits a teacher to breach his contractual agreement to teach only the 
subjects designated by the school authorities who hired him. 166 
As though to underscore the extreme implications of Justice Black's view 
(and to separate himself from them), Justice Stewart authored a separate, one-
page concurring opinion. Stewart distanced himself from Justice Black by 
declaring that he believed it would violate the first amendment's free speech 
clause (not merely the establishment clause) for a state statute to forbid public 
school teachers "so much as to mention the very existence of an entire system 
of respected human thought" (he expressly includes "Darwin's theory"); he 
then wrote that "since Arkansas may, or may not, have done just that, I 
conclude the statute before us is so vague as to be invalid under the 
Fourteenth Amendment." 167 To restate his proposition accurately, had it 
been clear that the statute did forbid any mention of Darwin's theory in the 
treatment of subjects to which it would be relevant, Justice Stewart would 
have held the statute invalid on that account-not for vagueness (Justice 
Black's sole objection) but for unconstitutional overbreadth (an objection Black 
evidently would not have endorsed). And that objection, consistent with the 
pre-existing case law of the Court on academic freedom and the first 
amendment, certainly seems correct. . 
Indeed, in a roundabout but nonetheless instructive fashion, two principal 
cases decided by the Court during this decade strongly confirm Justice 
Stewart's position in Epperson. The earlier case, Tilton v. Richardson, 168 was 
decided in 1971. It reviewed the substantive constitutionality of an act of 
Congress providing for capital construction grants for which private as well as 
public colleges and universities were eligible; the grants were targeted for 
specified kinds of campus buildings and facilities such as classrooms, science 
laboratories, and libraries. The immediate question was whether religiously 
affiliated colleges could participate in these grants despite the first 
amendment provision respecting the separation of church and state. In a 
closely divided vote, five-to-four, the Supreme Court held that they could. 
165. Idat113. 
166. Idat113-14. 
167. Id at 116 (Stewart concurring). 
168. 403 us 672 (1971). 
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Significantly, in sustaining the constitutional eligibility of the particular 
religiously affiliated colleges and universities at risk in the case, Chief Justice 
Burger, writing for the majority, expressly used academic freedom as the 
constitutional litmus test: whether despite the formal governance of certain 
colleges by religious bodies, they were nonetheless "characterized by an 
atmosphere of academic freedom rather than religious indoctrination" such 
that they compared favorably with other eligible institutions in that respect 
and ought not be characterized as primarily agencies of a church. 169 So, at 
various points in his opinion, the Chief Justice noted that non-Catholics were 
admitted as students, 170 that non-Catholics were members of the faculty,• 71 
that the schools "introduced evidence that they made no attempt to 
indoctrinate students or to proselytize," 172 that none required attendance at 
religious services, 173 and that the theology courses "are taught according to 
the academic requirements of the subject matter and the teacher's concept of 
professional standards." 174 In elaborating on these observations, he went on: 
[T]hese four schools subscribe to a well-established set of principles of academic 
freedom and nothing in this record shows that these principles are not in fact 
followed. . . . Although appellants introduced several institutional documents that 
stated certain religious restrictions on what could be taught, other evidence showed 
that these restrictions were not in fact enforced and that the schools were 
characterized by an atmosphere of academic freedom rather than religious 
indoctrination. All four institutions, for example, subscribe to the 1940 Statement of 
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure endorsed by the American Association 
of University Professors and the Association of American Colleges .... Many church-
related colleges and universities are characterized by a high degree of academic 
freedom and seek to evoke free and critical responses from their students. 175 
In the related case decided five years later, Roemer v. Maryland Public Works 
Board, 176 the same requirement was (nominally) applied. The case involved a 
taxpayer challenge to a state funding program under which private colleges 
within the state might apply for state financial aid equal to 15 percent of the 
per-student amount provided to the state college system. Writing for a 
plurality of the Court, Justice Blackmun first observed that more than two-
thirds of the eligible private colleges had no religious affiliation (the point of 
his observation being, presumably, to negative any suggestion that the 
program was but a disguised effort to support religious institutions). Then, as 
to those having such an affiliation, he noted, each was characterized by a 
"high degree of institutional autonomy," none received funds from or 
reported to the Catholic Church, and "[e]ach college subscribe[d] to, and 
abide[d] by, the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom of the 
American Association of University Professors." 177 Again, the proposition 
169. ldat68l. 
170. Id at 686. 
171. Idat687. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id at 686. 
175. Id at 681-82, 686. 
176. 426 us 736 (1976). 
177. Id at 755-56. 
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was that these are appropriate expectations a court or a public agency would 
use to measure the constitutional eligibility for state assistance of private 
colleges and universities. Moreover, no member of the Court in either case 
entertained the proposition that state schools, controlled directly by 
government, could somehow be exempt from these standards of academic 
freedom when private schools seeking public help would not be. Nor is there 
any logical reason to explain why state schools should be exempt. In this 
sense, then, Justice Stewart's view in Epperson also seems entirely sound, even 
treating Epperson as a straightforward academic freedom case. 178 
As in Tilton and Roemer, express reference to the 1940 Joint Statement of 
Principles (or, rather, an interpretative report of the 1940 Statement by 
Committee A) also appeared in an additional Supreme Court case decided 
during this period ( 1968-1978), reviewing a faculty member's first and 
fourteenth amendment claims. The case, Board of Regents v. Roth, 179 was in 
part a reprise of the Pickering case. As in Pickering, the terminated faculty 
member sued for reinstatement on grounds that his termination (at the 
Oshkosh campus of the University of Wisconsin) was prompted by his public 
criticism of the university administration-criticism that, consistent with the 
Court's decision in Pickering, he believed could not be used to affect his 
appointment. The district court concluded that it was unnecessary to reach a 
decision on that question (unlike Pickering, where the basis for the school 
board's action was a matter of record, in Roth the regents did not admit that 
the faculty member's public criticism was a consideration in their decision; the 
burden thus fell on Roth to show that it was). Rather, the court held, Roth's 
status on the faculty as a tenure track appointee sufficiently distinguished him 
from a one year visitor or other kind of ad hoc contract appointee such that 
some kind of intramural procedure prior to his effective termination was 
178. The dissents in Tilton and Roemer did not disagree with the discussion in the text. Rather, the 
dissents took strong exception to the majority's conclusions respecting the evidence used to describe 
the private schools as truly satisfying the Court's own criteria. 403 US at 689 (Douglas dissenting); 
426 US at 769-72 (Brennan dissenting); id at 772-74 (Stewart dissenting). And, at least in Roemer, the 
dissents seem to have the better of the argument by far. For example, in Roemer, Justice Stewart 
noted that in Tilton the Court found from the record positive evidence that "the theology courses 
were taught as academic subjects," id at 773-74 (emphasis added); no such positive evidence was 
produced in Roemer; further, in Roemer, all members of the religion or theology faculty at two of the 
colleges were Catholic clerics-a point making the absence of positive findings (in respect to the 
teaching of those courses) additionally disturbing. As far back as our discussion of the Adler case, see 
notes 76-87 and accompanying text, note was taken of different (albeit often related and synergistic) 
ways in which the state itself might offend the first amendment in respect to faculty staff and 
academic freedom: not merely by direct command, or by chilling rule, as in Epperson on the one 
hand and as in Adler on the other hand, but also by preshaping a faculty that is nominally otherwise 
fully protected in its academic freedom. Stewart correctly identifies this issue, in Roemer, in this way: 
"Recognition of the academic freedom of these instructors does not necessarily lead to a conclusion 
that courses in the religion or theology departments at the five defendant [institutions] have no 
overtones of indoctrination." Id at 774. The point is the obvious one, that is, the staffing criteria of 
the college may already have done their work. 
179. 408 US 564 (1972). See also Perry v Sindermann, 408 US 593 (1972) (Roth applied, faculty 
member's aprofessional speech activities held to be protected by the first amendment, and case 
remanded to determine whether quasi-tenure status was sufficient to trigger 14th amendment fair 
hearing pretermination due process rights). In Roth, the express, favorable reference to the 
Committee A Report appears at 408 US 579 nl7. 
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required in order to protect his academic freedom. The case advanced to the 
Supreme Court to consider the procedural issue separately. The Supreme 
Court then divided in three ways at once: one Justice (Douglas) agreed with 
the district judge's reasoning and result; two (Brennan and Marshall) would 
have gone even further to require hearings; and five voted, instead, to reverse. 
In substantially agreeing with the district court, Justice Douglas reached a 
set of conclusions urged in an amicus brief the AAUP filed in the case. 180 The 
brief's emphasis was essentially in two parts. The first part noted the hazard 
to academic freedom implicit in any peremptory power of the Wisconsin 
regents to nonrenew a faculty member's appointment without explanation. 
The second part noted that while tenure track appointees are necessarily at 
risk in some ways that tenured faculty are not at risk, they are also unlike one-
year visitors or fixed-term contract appointees. Appointment on a tenure track 
implies a more ongoing relationship than a simple term contract. The vast 
majority of tenure track first-year appointment contracts are routinely 
renewed precisely because the relationship is at this stage usually still 
ongoing; it would be odd if tenure track appointees typically were 
nonrenewed after a single year. This pattern held within the University of 
Wisconsin system-almost no one other than Roth on tenure track 
appointment was nonrenewed as early as he. The AAUP contended that the 
protection of the academic freedom of these faculty members required that 
before their tenure track status was ended, some procedural protection 
should be available, just as the district court had held. 181 The Douglas 
opinion agreed. His own emphasis,' moreover, was explicitly keyed to 
substantive first amendment academic freedom concerns. 182 But the majority 
reversed the district court, and remanded the case for retrial. 183 
To be sure, the majority in Roth cast no retrospective doubt on its long 
line of cases protecting academic freedom as a subset of first amendment 
rights. Nor did it retract anything from its Pickering (free speech) line of cases. 
Even though Roth's speech may have been more involved with citizen-interest 
speech than with his teaching, research, or professional participation within 
the university, the Court left no doubt that insofar as his nonrenewal was 
improperly based on either sort of consideration, he could prevail in his 
action, once he proved his claim. But the Court detached that means of 
protecting his academic freedom-by suing and by proving affirmatively in 
court the improper basis of the regents' action-from the claim that his tenure 
track status entitled him to something more from the university than an 
180. AAUP's Brief as Amicus Curiae, Board of Regents v Roth, 408 US 564 (1972) (No 71-162). 
181. See Procedural Standards in the Renewal or Nonrenewal of Faculty Appointments, 56 AAUP 
Bull 21 (Spring 1970). See also Roth v Board of Regents, 310 F Supp 972, 979-80 (WD Wis 1970) 
("Substantive constitutional protection for a university professor against non-retention in violation 
of his First Amendment rights ... is useless without procedural safeguards."). (The AAUP position 
was that such substantive constitutional protection was not "useless," but that it was nonetheless 
incomplete under the circumstances.) 
182. 408 US at 579-84 (Douglas dissenting). 
183. ld at 579. 
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unexplained pink slip, if academic freedom was not to be put unfairly at risk 
for persons in his position. Despite the AAUP's firm agreement with Roth, 
the Court held that this claim came up short as a matter of fourteenth 
amendment due process law. Effectively, the Court chose to regard Roth as 
though he had been a one-year or other term appointee and not on the tenure 
track at all, who had simply not been asked to stay on, despite the AAUP view 
that this kind of comparison elides an essential difference and falsifies a 
critical distinction in status and expectations. 184 
Given the Court's approach in Roth, however, this particular subject 
remains a significant area of professional concern; the Constitution has come 
around less than one might have hoped. 185 Procedurally speaking, academic 
freedom remains caught in a crevice of vulnerability. To the extent that 
public sentiment prefers that those who teach shall be appointed only 
pursuant to an indefinite series of closed-end contracts, each (in theory) 
entirely new and terminal unto itself, without doubt the effect is necessarily 
one of inhibiting any professional departure from uncontroversial methods 
and substance, lest one find oneself out on the street with only a problematic 
right to sue. Roth, in recognizing no distinction between such appointees and 
tenure track faculty, widened that crevice even more. Given the common-
sense basis on which such faculty might have been distinguished from strict 
term appointees (from whom they are in fact substantively distinguished in 
general educational practice), and given also the Court's general express 
emphasis on academic freedom as a core first amendment concern, Roth 
184. In the AAUP view, tenure track appointees are by category and definition differently situated 
as an ordinary legal matter than closed-term appointees, visitors, or, indeed, faculty at institutions 
having no tenure system at all (for example, faculty all of whom never have anything more than each 
annual dead-end contract, regardless of how many such previous dead-end contracts each might 
already have had). Specifically, one who is appointed to a tenure track position in an institution 
embracing a tenure system is receiving assurance by the appointment that, absent some perceived 
deficiency in his or her professional performance, the expectation of appointment renewal and 
eventual review for tenure is objectively reasonable. This, ordinarily, is what appointment to the full 
time faculty on the tenure track means. (Exceptions qualifying that understanding are ordinarily few 
in number, for example, institutionwide financial exigency or a serious decline of enrollment in the 
department or discipline of one's specialty such that nonrenewal could occur though one's own work 
was considered to have gone very well.) 
185. Despite Roth, moreover, the Court has not applied its logic uniformly since 1972. See, for 
example, Cleveland Board of Educ. v Loudermill, 470 US 532 (1985); Arnett v Kennedy, 416 US 134 (1974). 
(Both cases are, as noted by the dissents in each, indistinguishable from Roth; the status furnished the 
public employee was described conterminously with the procedures laid out in advance for ending 
that status, which procedures the public employer sedulously followed, exactly as in Roth. 
Nevertheless, in Loudermill and in Arnett, the Court declined to treat the due process clause as self-
referentially limited. It held, rather, that whatever due process the due process clause itself would 
require would have to be provided even if it was more than the state had promised.) Perhaps part of 
the problem in Roth was the apparent failure of the AAUP adequately to stress to the Court the 
substantial difference between tenure track and simple term contract academic appointees. Even so, 
the total case law in this area is simply not consistent, even within itself, since Roth. (For four 
different discussions, see Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of 
Consent, 102 Harv L Rev 4, 70-73 (1988); Stephen F. Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of 
Government Benefits, 12J Legal Stud 3, 27 (1983); William W. Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": 
Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 Cornell L Rev 445 ( 1977); Frank I. Michaelman, 
Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, inJ. Roland Pennock &John W. Chapman, eds, 
Nomos XVIII 126 (New York Univ Press, 1977)). 
134 LAw AND CoNTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 53: No. 3 
remains an anomalous exception in the sweep of the cases we have reviewed. 
One reasonably could have expected it to come out the other way, even as the 
district court supposed. 
In contrast with Roth and its concern with academic freedom and due 
process where an individual faculty member's position was in question is 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 186 a highly publicized case decided 
in 1978. It is also the last case within the 1968-1978 period of review in which 
an express usage of "academic freedom" appears. The judgment in the Bakke 
case was determined by a single Justice, Lewis Powell, in an opinion in which 
no other member of the Court joined. 187 At issue in Bakke was an admissions 
policy at the medical school of the University of California at Davis. Bakke 
had applied and been refused admission in 1973 and 1974, though his 
academic qualifications were substantially greater in every objective category 
than those averaged by thirty-two other students who had been admitted but 
with whom Bakke was never compared. 188 Under the policy approved by the 
medical school faculty, he was not permitted to be compared with any of them 
for admission only because he was not American Indian, Asian, chicano, or 
black. The reason for disallowing such direct comparison, moreover, 
proceeded from the same baseline explanation: few, if any, of those insulated 
from comparison with Bakke might have been deemed more qualified than he, 
had direct comparison been made. Since the faculty deemed it unacceptable 
for Bakke to be considered more qualified, no such direct comparison was to 
take place. In the faculty's view, it would have undermined its affirmative 
186. 438 us 265 (1978). 
187. Four members of the Court voted to affirm the entire state supreme court judgment for 
Bakke and also forbidding the university to consider race or ethnicity in admitting students, under 
Tide VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 USC§ 2000a-3 (1988). Four other members would have 
reversed the entire judgment rendered in the California Supreme Court, excluding Bakke from being 
admitted. Justice Powell alone found that the judgment below was half correct and half incorrect, a 
position that thus put him in charge of the actual outcome of the case, pursuant to an opinion in 
which he wrote for no one except himself. (For another rare instance of a 4-1-4 vote, in which the 
opinion written by the Justice who announced the judgment for the Court also received no 
concurring votes, see Oregon u Mitchell, 400 US 112 ( 1970) (sustaining an act of Congress insofar as it 
set the minimum voting age for federal elections at 18, but not sustaining it as applied to eligibility to 
vote in state or local elections).) (Oregon v Mitchell is separately notable for another reason; it is the 
only Supreme Court case since 1936 holding an act of Congress unconstitutional for lack of 
substantive constitutional enacting power, which has not yet been overruled by some other case.) 
188. Bakke's science grade-point average ("CPA") was 3.44 and his overall CPA was 3.46. For 
1973, the average science CPA of 16 other students was 2.62 and their overall CPA average was 2.88; 
for 1974, the second year of Bakke's application, the science and overall CPA average of the new 
group of 16 was even lower, respectively, 2.42 and 2.62. The disparities in the four categories of 
MCAT scores were still more dramatic: on the verbal component of the MCAT, Bakke was in the 
96th percentile, the average for the 16 was in the 46th (1973) and 34th (1974); on the quantitative 
component, Bakke was in the 94th percentile, the average of the group was in the 24th (1973) and 
30th (1974); on the science component, Bakke was in the 97th percentile, the average of the group 
was in the 35th (1973) and 37th (1974). Bakke did least well on the general information component 
of the MCAT, placing in the 72nd percentile. But the average of the group was, in respect to the 
same general information component of the same MCAT each year far below that (the 33rd 
percentile in 1973, the 18th percentile for 1974). These figures are all taken from a table presented 
in the Powell opinion in the case. 438 US at 277 n7. 
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action plan for Bakke to have been evaluated on the same terms with the other 
thirty-two students. 
Four Justices concluded that this scheme violated Bakke's federal statutory 
right to equal consideration without regard to race, a statutory right 
applicable to admission to any program funded in whole in or in part by 
federal funds. 189 The fifth, critical, vote was cast by Justice Powell. Unlike the 
other four Justices, however, Powell rested his decision squarely on the 
fourteenth amendment and not on the act of Congress alone. Noting that the 
fourteenth amendment applied directly to the Davis medical school (a state 
institution), Powell found none of the university's explanations satisfactory to 
justify its separate racial dual-track admissions practices as against the 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws. Accordingly, on that 
fourteenth amendment basis, he concurred with the four Justices who 
affirmed the judgment Bakke had received in the California Supreme Court. 
Allan Bakke's own overall comparative qualifications could not be dismissed 
by a racially closed system that put so substantial an admissions premium on 
not being white. The fourteenth amendment would not countenance closed 
racial reserves. 190 
Even so, in Justice Powell's view, to the extent that the medical school 
faculty's policy on admissions might rest on a good faith judgment of a 
professional sort, reflecting the same kind of academic judgment pursuant to 
which a faculty member might determine how most usefully to address a given 
subject, or what line of attack to take on a research project, or even which 
textbook to use, then some judicial deference might, on that ground, be due. 
In elaborating on his suggestion, Justice Powell's usage of "academic 
freedom" in the Bakke case was not at all strained; in fact, it was consistent 
with the Court's own prior usages of academic freedom. 191 And he developed 
his point both strongly and well. 
Concretely, Justice Powell suggested, if the ethnicity (or the race) of 
candidates for admission were in the faculty's professional opinion relevant 
189. USC §§ 2000a-3. (The Act generally forbids racial discrimination in programs assisted by 
federal funds.) 
190. All applicants were eligible for eighty-four places within the regular admissions process 
under the Davis plan. Assuming, however, one were unsuccessful within that nondiscriminatory pool 
of applicants, one might nonetheless be eligible for any of sixteen set-aside places, but only if one 
qualified by a specified racial trait. Within the latter (racially restricted) pool, one would then be 
compared only with others likewise eligible and not with persons like Bakke. The comparative 
qualifications of applicants like Bakke would matter only if, once the special, racially restricted 
process of admission were concluded, one or more of the sixteen places had still not been filled 
(because too few minimally qualified persons had been within that pool in a given year). Then the 
other, left-out applicants (such as Bakke) might have some possible second chance. In Powell's view, 
this racially exclusionary admissions track could not be justified insofar as it discounted Bakke's 
qualifications down to zero vis-a-vis those considered within that track, though Powell did not hold 
that race could play no role at all. In the latter respect, he differed from the four Justices who ruled 
strictly on the basis of Title VI. His reasons for differing, bearing on academic freedom as they do, 
are provided in the text. See notes 195-99 and accompanying text. 
191. The phrase is employed three times in the Powell opinion; the most relevant discussion 
appears at 438 US at 311-15, citing and relying on Sweezy and Keyishian as the judicial precedents 
most forcefully on point. 
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simply in the same manner as, say, their place of residence or their difference 
in undergraduate academic major-as attributes relevant to consider in the 
dehomogenization of what would otherwise constitute an unduly "look-alike, 
think-alike" cohort of first-year medical students-its consideration might not 
be excluded from the admissions process. Indeed, in Powell's view, its unique 
exclusion as having no constitutionally permissible relevance for academic 
admission would unnecessarily frustrate a good faith professional resolve to 
construct a learning, teaching, and research environment in which useful 
Lehrfreiheit and Lemfreiheit are expected to occur. 192 Finding no absolute 
fourteenth amendment requirement for its nonconsideration for any purpose 
whatever, Powell voted to reverse that portion of the state supreme court's 
judgment that held that race must be ignored by any public or publicly 
supported university. Because, on the other hand, Bakke never received any 
consideration in respect to his comparative attributes, talents, skills, and 
background vis-a-vis those who were favored by the Davis racial set-aside 
plan,Justice Powell also voted to affirm that part of the judgment holding that 
Bakke had been unfairly excluded from such opportunity for comparative 
consideration. 193 A proper program "treats each applicant as an individual," 
consistent with the equal protection clause, Powell insisted, even when it 
allows proper institutional academic freedom judgments to be g1ven 
breathing room on their own account: 
[An integrated program] treats each applicant as an individual in the admissions 
process. [Within such an integrated program, t]he applicant who loses out on the last 
available seat to another candidate receiving a "plus" on the basis of ethnic 
background will not have been foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply 
because he was not the right color or had the wrong surname. It would mean only that 
his combined qualifications, which may have included similar nonobjective factors, did 
not outweigh those of the other applicant. His qualifications would have been 
weighed fairly and competitively, and he would have no basis to complain of unequal 
treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment. 194 
192. The argument is similar to (but more carefully developed than) that submitted by the AAUP 
in its amicus brief in the case, which is summarized as follows: 
Many institutions of higher education, especially graduate and professional schools, receive 
more applications from candidates who are qualified, i.e., able to successfully complete the 
course of study, than the institution can admit. [Under these circumstances] an institution 
may validly conclude that the quality of the educational experience for all students is 
enhanced by considering as one factor in the admission process the racial diversity of the 
class selected. Accordingly, the AAUP will suggest that a faculty, in exercising its 
experienced judgment, may identify a nontrivial number of qualified minority students for 
admission to assure the optimal educational experience for the entire class selected. 
AAUP's Brief as Amicus Curiae at 2-3, Regents of the University of California v Bakke, 438 US 265 (1978) 
(No 76-811). 
193. Since, moreover, the university was unable to show that Bakke would have failed of 
admission even had he not been disqualified from comparison with all sixteen of the favored students 
both in 1973 and in 1974, pursuant to a proper integrated admissions program (which in Powell's 
view the Davis plan clearly was not), the state court judgment enjoining the school from refusing to 
enroll him was entirely proper in Justice Powell's view of the case. Accordingly, he voted to affirm 
this part of what the state supreme court had done. In brief, Bakke prevailed individually and the 
plan was enjoined. 
194. Bakke, 438 US at 318. 
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That the point was a serious point, and not a specious or lightly conceived 
suggestion, was attested by the strong footnote he added: 
The denial to respondent of this right to individualized consideration without 
regard to his race is the principal evil of petitioner's special admissions program. 
Nowhere in the opinion of [the four justices voting to sustain the program as it was] is 
this denial even addressed. 195 
Powell's use of "academic freedom" in Bakke, and his quotation of the 
dictum by Justice Frankfurter from the Sweezy case, 196 represent no departure 
from the usages of academic freedom we have examined. When Powell writes 
of academic freedom as "long ... viewed as a special concern of the First 
Amendment," 197 his emphasis remains constant at all times. To gain 
purchase through the first amendment, the decision in any academic freedom 
case, whether individual or institutional, must still rest-as Frankfurter 
noted-on academic and not on some other grounds. It is all the same, 
moreover, whether the decision pertains to "who may be admitted to study" 
rather than to "who may teach," or "what may be taught," or "how." 
So, for instance, suppose the selection of a given textbook were made by a 
given teacher or university professor because of a desire to befriend the 
particular publisher whose text one concedes to be poorer than that provided 
by other publishers, but whom one nonetheless felt a passionate desire to 
befriend. 198 This is not a selection made on academic grounds. Accordingly, 
it should receive no first amendment academic freedom deference. Rather, 
one will need a reason of a different sort to defend a given textbook 
selection 199 on academic freedom grounds, for example, that one believes the 
text is superior in some respect over alternative choices (whether or not 
others agree), or that its presentation is more lucid than that of alternative 
books (again, whether or not others agree), or, though not necessarily 
"better" in either of these respects abstractly, its perspective is more 
illuminating and best fits one's design for the course. Implicitly, Powell is 
saying all the same things in Bakke. He voted to reverse that part of the state 
court judgment disallowing any consideration of race in state university 
admissions practices; he did so on limited first amendment, academic freedom 
grounds. In limiting the decision, and in tightly circumscribing the 
university's procedures, he also sought to take due account of Bakke's equal 
195. Id at 318 n52. 
196. " 'It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to 
speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail "the four essential 
freedoms" of a university-to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be 
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.' " Id at 312, quoting Sweezy, 354 
US at 263 (emphasis added) (see note 101 and accompanying text). 
197. Bakke, 438 US at 312. 
198. Perhaps because the publisher had opposed the war in Vietnam and the faculty, or a majority 
of the faculty, also opposed the war in Vietnam. Perhaps because the publisher had contributed 
money to a prolife organization or, conversely, to Planned Parenthood, and, again, the faculty also 
favored that social cause. Perhaps because the author is one's nephew-or niece. The range of 
nonprofessional (and also of unprofessional) reasons is nearly inexhaustible. 
199. -Whether the defense (that is, the explanation) one means to provide is to the institution, 
to one's students, or, indeed, to the author or publisher of an alternative book. 
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protection claims. Whether one thinks the opinion ultimately correct or not, 
the Powell opinion in Bakke remains to this day one of the most well-disposed 
treatments of "academic freedom" one can find in the cases that have 
adverted to that freedom in the Supreme Court. 
C. ( 1979-1989) 
In the first of the dozen cases reporting a usage of "academic freedom" in 
the most recent decade of Supreme Court adjudications, Cannon v. University of 
Chicago, 200 the reference to academic freedom also appears in an opinion by 
Justice Powell. In marked contrast to Bakke, however, Cannon presented no 
constitutional issue. Rather, the case turned on differences of attitude toward 
academic freedom in matters of statutory construction and the extent to which 
concerns for academic freedom may influence the interpretation of a law. 
In enacting Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Congress 
provided that no person could on the basis of sex be "subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance."201 The act provided expressly for agency enforcement 
of this provision. It did not, however, create private causes of action. 
Nonetheless, a majority of the Court held that such actions, though not given 
explicit congressional authorization, would be deemed authorized by Title IX. 
It was on this point that the case had gone to the Supreme Court. 
In dissent, Justice White took issue with the majority. In his view, 
Congress had deliberately chosen not to provide for such private suits but 
only to require that recipient institutions answer to the appropriate disbursing 
agency.202 Justices Blackmon and Powell joined in Justice White's dissent. 
Justice Powell, however, wrote an additional thirty-page dissent to underscore 
the extent of his disagreement with the majority's view, and his dissent 
expressed concern for academic freedom. 203 In Powell's view, insofar as 
universities would now need not only to satisfy government agencies of their 
compliance with the act (as Congress had intended) but would need also to 
take care not to invite private suits, they would be under duress to alter 
standards, not because the standards were inappropriate, but simply in order 
to forestall such suits. To be sure, Powell did not doubt Congress's power to 
authorize such suits. However, absent a clear expression from Congress, the 
Court itself ought not "revise the balance of interests struck by the 
legislation."204 To do so was to ignore the costs to academic freedom, for 
example, by hindering a university's ability to set academic standards in good 
professional faith, uncompromised by an additional anxiety of threatening 
suits.205 
200. 441 us 677 (1979). 
201. 20 USC§ 168l(a) (1988); see generally 20 USC§§ 1681 to 1683 (1988). 
202. Cannon, 441 US at 718 (White dissenting). 
203. Id at 730 (Powell dissenting). 
204. Id at 748 n 19. 
205. May fear of private suits adversely affect one's decisions on the merits of things? Justice 
Stevens briefly considered and dismissed this concern as "speculation." Id at 709. Compare the 
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Powell's concern for academic freedom in Cannon was of a piece with 
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire. 206 An individual 
teacher (as in Sweezy) or an institution (as in Cannon) can be substantially 
compromised at the margin of professional judgment when the alternative is 
to risk an encounter with a very high-voltage fence. If one's sole concern is 
that the fence stimulate a suitably strong aversive reflex, of course, one will 
not mind; indeed, one may be inclined to say, "the higher the voltage, the 
better this fence!" In Powell's view, this was pretty much the majority's 
approach in Cannon. 207 But, for Powell, it is just this reasoning that also made 
the decision even more obviously incorrect. The higher the voltage, the 
greater the fear and so the greater the loss of the margin of the useful field 
now newly abandoned nearby the fence. The majority of the Court might see 
that loss as of little consequence. But so to suppose, and so to decide the case 
absent a clear congressional requirement to do so was in a larger sense 
seriously inconsistent with the Court's own prior decisions since 1957. 
Unavailing in Cannon, Powell's opinion was nevertheless well within the 
tradition Frankfurter marked out beginning with Sweezy, and influential with 
the Court in cases such as Keyishian and Bakke as well. 
In contrast with Cannon, the issue in Regents of University of Michigan v. 
Ewing 208 concerned the substantive due process claim of a student dropped in 
his sixth year from the University of Michigan Medical School and refused 
readmission on academic grounds after failing a major written examination-
a two-day test administered by the National Board of Medical Examiners, 
successful completion of which was required to receive his degree. The 
student, Scott Ewing, did not dispute the requirement of the examination nor 
the requirement of its successful completion to secure a degree. He did not 
deny that he had failed to achieve the university's minimum passing score for 
the test. But he observed that others who had failed the same examination 
general reflections of Judge Learned Hand: ''After now some dozen years of experience I must say 
that ... I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of sickness and death." Learned 
Hand, 3 Lectures on Legal Topics, Association of the Bar of the City of New York I 06 (Macmillan, 1926). 
Academics, like others, may do a great deal to avoid sickness or death, nor are they known to be 
braver than Learned Hand in feanng a lawsuit. 
206. Indeed, in his discussion of academic freedom, Powell explicitly drew from and relied upon 
Frankfurter's opinion in Sweezy. 441 US at 747-48, citing Frankfurter in Sweezy, 354 US 234; see also 
text accompanying notes 94-10 I. 
207. Ten years after Cannon, in University of Pennsylvania v EEOC, Ill S Ct 577 (1990), the Court 
also rejected any claim of qualified confidentiality of tenure review files under subpoena demand of 
the EEOC. The AAUP filed an amicus brief endorsing a qualified privilege, akin to that generally 
recognized when grand juries subpoena a reporter's notes, and relying on Sweezy. AAUP's Brief as 
Amicus Curiae, University of Pennsylvania v EEOC, I 10 S Ct 577(1990) (No 88-493). Two federal 
courts of appeal had agreed (although two others had not), and each had directed federal district 
courts to review EEOC subpoenas of academic tenure review files of confidential peer review 
materials by standards of scrutiny derived from Frankfurter's opinion in Sweezy. Purporting to 
distinguish Sweezy on the basis that the inquiry in that case went to the content of Leaching, whereas 
here it went Lo the determination of professional qualification (though why that difference should be 
thought to matter is nowhere explained), the Court rejected the claim. University of Pennsylvania, II 0 
S Ct at 585-87. The tenor and decision in University of Pmnsylvania are more at odds with Sweezy than 
any other single case Lo come from the Supreme Court during the past thirty-five years. 
208. 474 us 214 (1985). 
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had been permitted to retake the examination rather than being dropped. 
Indeed, it appeared that he was the first student ever to be dropped rather 
than being permitted to try again. To be sure, his scores were the lowest in 
the history of the program, and the medical school had provided a hearing 
that reviewed his whole academic career and not simply his examination 
score. (From any point of view, therefore, procedural due process was easily 
satisfied in the medical school's handling of his case.209) But in Ewing's 
view-and in the view of the federal court of appeals that reviewed the trial 
record of the case in the district court-there was nothing in the record that 
provided any reasonable basis for the apparent harshness of discontinuing 
Ewing's medical school career. On that basis, the court of appeals had 
reversed the district court's dismissal of his case.210 
The Supreme Court unanimously disagreed with this disposition. In 
respect to substantive academic judgments within universities, the Court 
declared: 
When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision 
... they may not override it unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted 
academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or comminee responsible did not 
actually exercise professional judgment . . . . Added to our concern for lack of 
standards (there are none obviously provided by the Constitution or elsewhere 
according to which judges or juries can say what norms of academic competence are 
suitable or unsuitable for any university as such) is a reluctance to trench on the 
prerogatives of ... educational institutions and our responsibililJ' to safeguard their 
academic freedom, "a special concern of the First Amendment." 11 
Only where the faculty can be shown to have abdicated its responsibility to 
make judgments on academic grounds (that is, only when it does "not actually 
exercise professional judgment") does it forfeit the protection the first 
amendment provides.212 Ewing, with Keyishian, Frankfurter's opinion in 
209. Whether the school might have been faulted had it not provided such a hearing incident to a 
student's dismissal for academic (rather than disciplinary) reasons was thus not at issue in Ewing. In 
all likelihood, however, no particular kind of intramural review of the kind provided Scott Ewing 
would be held to be required as a matter of constitutional right. (In an earlier case, the Supreme 
Court expressed substantial reservations on the point. See Board of Curators, Univenity of JHissouri v 
Horowitz, 435 US 78 ( 1978).) Where, in contrast, a student's standing in a public university is put in 
jeopardy because of an infraction of the rules (such as stealing, harassment. drinking, plagiarism, or 
campus disruption), predecisional intramural procedural due process is much more likely to be 
deemed constitutionally required. See, for example, Dixon v Alabama State Board of Educ, 294 F2d 150 
(5th Cir 1961). 
210. In conventional 14th amendment constitutional terms, Ewing's complaint was one of 
substantive due process, that is, the alleged lack of any sufficient substantive reason for depriving him 
of his "property" interest in his status as a student in good standing in a state university. Of course, 
the case may also be seen as one affecting a student's substantive academic freedom in the same 
sense as discussed in Baggett v Bullitt, 377 US 360, that is, the continuing freedom of one within the 
university to continue to study, to learn, and to interact with the faculty, assuming satisfactory work 
as determined in good professional faith. See, for example, 1967 Statement at 142; Appendix C. 53 
L & Contemp Probs at 412 (cited in note 7) ("Student performance should be evaluated solely on an 
academic basis, not on opinions or conduct in matters unrelated to academic standards."). 
211. Ewing, 4 74 US at 225-26. The standard adopted and applied by the Court in Ewing was put 
forward in virtuallv the same terms in the amicus brief of the AAUP. AAUP's Brief as Amicus Curiae, 
Regents of Cniversit)· of Michigan v Ewing. 4 74 US 214 (1985) (No 84-1273). 
212. See also Justice Powell's strongly supportive view adopting essentially the same standard on 
matters of evaluating persons for appointment or tenure, in Hishon 11 King & Spalding, 467 US 69, 80 
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Sweezy, and Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, is among the Court's strongest 
first amendment-based decisions articulating the meaning of academic 
freedom in higher education. 
With two exceptions, both addressed to the scope of academic freedom in 
public secondary education, the balance of decisions reporting a usage of 
"academic freedom" in the Supreme Court during this most recent decade 
are but slight refinements on earlier themes. 
Such a refinement is furnished by Widmar v. Vincent,213 decided by the 
Court in 1981. Widmar provided a reprise on Healy v.James 214 and raised anew 
the scope of constitutional protection afforded student groups on public 
university campuses. Unlike Healy, however, Widmar did not involve a refusal 
to "recognize" a particular student organization, such as a refusal to permit it 
to meet on campus, post notices, solicit members, and have the same on-
campus privileges as any other student organization could claim. At issue, 
rather, was a board of curators rule forbidding a particular use of university 
buildings or university grounds regardless of what group might be involved. 
The use of such buildings or grounds for "religious worship or religious 
teaching" was forbidden, and the board of curators believed this restriction 
was required by a clause of the Missouri Constitution. 215 Cornerstone, a 
student organization of evangelical Christian students from various 
denominational backgrounds at the University of Missouri at Kansas City, 
found itself altogether frustrated by this use restriction. Effectively, the 
restriction denied them any use of university buildings for the very sort of 
meetings and activities they were most committed to provide as a group. 216 
Lacking any other recourse against the rule, Clark Vincent and other student 
n4 (1983) ("Courts of Appeals generally have acknowledged that respect for academic freedom 
requires some deference to the judgment of schools and universities as to the qualifications of 
professors, particularly those considered for tenured positions."). See generally Judith Jarvis 
Thomson, Ideology and Faculty Selection, 53 L & Contemp Probs 155 (Summer 1990). 
213. 454 us 263 (1981). 
214. 408 us 169. 
215. Widmar, 454 US at 263. The Missouri constitutional provision was worded similarly to, but 
somewhat more far-reachingly than, the provision in the first amendment that forbids any act of 
Congress "respecting an establishment of religion." Mo Const, Art I §§ 6, 7; Art IX § 8. In 
McCollum v Board of Educ., 333 US 203 ( 1948), the Supreme Court had held that this clause in the first 
amendment was equally applicable to the states through the 14th amendment and was violated by a 
religious "released-time program" in a public school, which co-ordinated religious instruction by 
religious teachers using school classrooms during the regular school hours. (The fact that students 
were nominally not compelled to attend, but might instead remain in a regular classroom while the 
released-time religious classes met. was held to be of insufficient significance.) Compare Zorach v 
Clauson, 343 US 306 (1952) (similar plan sustained, five-to-four, when the released students met 
religious classes off school premises, even if those not opting into the program were kept in a study 
hall at the public school). In lf'idmar. even supposing that the 14th amendment might not bar a state 
university from permitting sectarian religious activities on campus when sponsored by a student 
group permitted use of campus facilities on the same terms as every other student group, the board 
of curators believed that the Missouri Constitution nonetheless forbade such use of public facilities. 
454 US at 265. 
216. "A typical Cornerstone meeting included prayer. hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion 
of religious views and experiences." Id at 265 n2. The meetings were also generally open to other 
students to attend. part of the purpose being to win adherents to Cornerstone's religious 
commitments. Id. 
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members of Cornerstone sued to enjoin Gary Widmar (the dean of students) 
and the university's board of curators from enforcing the rule against them. 
In the Supreme Court, as well as in the court of appeals, their claim prevailed 
on first amendment grounds. Justice Powell, writing for the Court in Widmar, 
said that even supposing that Cornerstone sought "to win ... converts"217 in 
its meetings on campus (as well as to realize its members' shared religious 
enthusiasms}, the point provided no sensible distinction from what the Court 
had already decided in Healy and Tinker. Common rules of time, place, and 
manner governing on-campus facilities, consistent with standards reviewed in 
Healy, would apply to Cornerstone as to any other on-campus group,218 but 
not a content-censoring restriction, which, in the Court's view, the curator's 
rule, even if adopted under requirement of the state Constitution, obviously 
was. Widmar, moreover, is not reasoned on the basis of the free exercise 
clause but on more generalized freedom of speech principles. Widmar is thus 
of a piece with the strong holding in Tinker, Powell's holding in Healy, and 
Justice Douglas' opinion injones v. Board of Education.219 
A concurring opinion in Widmar by Justice Stevens220 makes a point not in 
disagreement with Powell's majority opinion, but qualifying it in a manner 
anticipating his own applied usage of "academic freedom" in Ewing. Stevens 
expressly referred to "academic freedom" to disallow intrusive judicial review 
of institutional procedures for handling disputes in allocating university 
space. In Stevens' view, the first amendment may shelter on-campus free 
speech and meeting rights of students at public institutions. Even so, he 
insisted, where such groups seek use of facilities, the first amendment does 
not require suspension of institutional opinion respecting their relative 
academic worthiness-at least in mediating competing demands, if not in 
judging their general "right" to be on campus. Rather, the first amendment 
specifically protects academic value judgments reflected in institutional 
mechanisms established to determine priorities of use where not all requests 
can simultaneously be granted. In Stevens' view, institutional discretion of 
this sort is not different in kind than the sort Powell embraced for the Court in 
the Bakke case. It is correspondingly entitled to a strong measure of academic 
freedom respect in the courts. 
Stevens offered an example: suppose one group requests use of a room to 
show Disney films, and another requests its use to present Hamlet. Must the 
conflict be resolved by, say, flipping a coin or by some other equally 
217. Id at 269-70 n6. 
218. See id at 276. An additional cautionary note is sounded in regard to student activities 
otherwise protected by the first amendment when conducted in ways that "substantially interfere 
with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education." Id at 277. But allowable regulations 
of this sort are themselves merely an example of uniform rules of time, place, and manf)er (for 
example, rules suitably drawn to avoid harassment of others by regulating the time, place, and 
manner of holding one's meetings or otherwise seeking to win support for one's general views), and 
not a han based on the unwelcomeness of certain ideas. 
219. Jones, 397 US 31. See also 1967 Statement at Part IV; Appendix C, 53 L & Contemp Probs at 
413-15 (cited in note 7). 
220. 454 us 277. 278-80. 
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impersonal mechanism, lest some other basis be thought to infringe on the 
first amendment claims of both groups? Stevens suggests not. If the decision 
is to prefer Disney to Hamlet (Stevens uses this contrast deliberately), and for 
the reason that Hamlet is already well covered in standard courses whereas 
"the genius of Walt Disney" has not previously been given any airing at all, 
then, though the decision is made on this basis of comparative academic 
worth rather than some other more "neutral" basis (for example, as to who 
applied first), the first amendment shifts its center of gravity to protect the 
decision from intrusive judicial review. 221 In this respect, the usage of 
"academic freedom" reflected in Stevens' concurrence in Widmar is of a piece 
with the position he reflected in Ewing as well.222 
In a case arising between Widmar and Ewing, involving faculty rather than 
students,223 a different usage of "academic freedom" appears. A Minnesota 
law imposed an obligation on the state board governing the state community 
college system to "meet and confer" from time to time with faculty on matters 
of educational policy. It imposed a similar obligation equally on the 
administration of each college. At the same time, however, the same law also 
forbade either the state board or any community college administration to 
permit any faculty member to appear in such meetings other than as a 
designee of whatever professional association (that is, union) had gained 
exclusive · representation rights for collective bargaining purposes, even 
though these meetings were in no sense collective bargaining sessions but 
were meant to address other kinds of issues. The effect of the law, combined 
with the practice of the faculty union, was altogether to exclude nonunion 
221. See id at 278-79 (Stevens concurring) ('judgments of this kind should be made by 
academicians, not by federal judges .... "),citing Sweezy, 354 US at 261 (Frankfurter concurring), and 
Bakke, 438 US at 312, and repeating the quotation that "[a]cademic freedom, though not a 
specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First 
Amendment." 454 US at 279. 
222. Yet despite Justice Stevens' insightful and supportive endorsement of academic freedom in 
this usage, that is, protecting such allocative decisions from judicial review, one may doubt that the 
analogy to Bakke or Ewing properly holds in cases of this sort. Why? Because in respect to these 
groups, each involving no institutional endorsement or sponsorship (Widmar and Cornerstone is an 
example), their presence on campus owes nothing to judgments of academic connection: 
accordingly, neither should their requests about times and places to meet. Consider a case similar to 
that which Justice Stevens proposed. Suppose it is not a case where a student group rehearsal of 
Hamlet (for its own amusement) competes for reservation of an unused room with a student group 
request to reserve the same room to view Disney films (for its own amusement). Rather, a 
reservation request by the Federalist Society is followed later the same day by a competing request 
for the same room at the same time by the Student Gay-Lesbian Alliance. On Justice Stevens' view, 
the latter request, though second-arriving, may be given priority if done on the basis of an academic 
(rather than a political) judgment. What would such a judgment consist of? Presumably it might be 
merely a judgment of just the kind Stevens used: federalism perspectives are already well covered in 
the standard curriculum, whereas gay-lesbian perspectives have not been equally featured. From the 
decision-maker's position, this may seem reasonable enough. From the perspective of the rejected 
group, however, it seems supererogatory (as well as suspect). Losing the room on such grounds to 
some university event or university sponsored activity is one thing. Losing it to another group no 
different from itself (in that it is equally an unsponsored group and, like this group, merely pursuing 
its own agenda on campus) on some notion of superior academic timeliness about the other group's 
agenda, is another. It puts the university's thumb on a scale where arguably it does not belong at all. 
223. .\Iinnesnta Stall' Bom·d for Community Colleges v Knight, 465 US 271 (1984). 
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faculty members who wished also to be heard on matters of educational policy 
(for example, what should be taught). Such faculty might still attempt to 
communicate their views informally-by writing personalletters224-but they 
were barred from speaking in the only formally required regular meetings. 
Several of the adversely affected faculty sued to enjoin this restriction on first 
amendment grounds. The federal district court held that this restriction, 
running as it did to these overall "meet and confer" meetings and not more 
narrowly (for example, to specific collective bargaining negotiations alone), 
unfairly curtailed the first amendment academic freedom of those faculty 
members not electing to be union members to be heard on matters of equal 
professional concern to them as academics.225 However, the Supreme Court 
reversed, albeit in a closely divided vote. 
Writing for the Court over a dissent by Justices Powell, Stevens, and 
Brennan, and a partial dissent by Justice Marshall, Justice O'Connor put the 
decision reversing the lower court principally on the basis that, had there 
been no state law requiring such meet and confer sessions, plaintiffs could not 
have compelled the holding of such meetings. This being so, in her view, they 
had no better basis for complaint here. Insofar as the state wished to provide 
for such meetings by way of an extended opportunity for the union to 
communicate its concerns on general matters (leaving others to the informal 
recourse they already enjoyed), there could be no sensible constitutional 
objection. Going beyond the needs of the immediate case, however, 
O'Connor also added the following passages, at once both clear and bleak in 
rejecting an entire category of professional academic freedom first 
amendment claims: 
To be sure, there is a strong, if not universal or uniform, tradition of faculty 
participation in school governance, and there are numerous policy arguments to 
support such participation. See American Association of Higher Education-National 
Education Association, Faculty Participation in Academic Governance (1967); Brieffor 
American Association of University Professors as Amicus Curiae 3-10. But this Court 
has never recognized a constitutional right of faculty to participate in policymaking in 
academic institutions. . . . Even assuming that speech rights guaranteed by the First 
Amendment take on a special meaning in an academic setting . . . there is no 
constitutional right to participate in academic governance.226 
Though concurring in the particular judgment in the case, Justice Marshall 
expressly disassociated himself from this part of the Court's majority 
op~nion.227 Writing separately in dissent, Brennan explained for himself, 
224. Id at 277 n4. 
225. Knight v Minnesota Community College Faculty Ass'n, 571 F Supp I, 7-12 (D Minn 1982). In an 
amicus brief, the AAUP agreed with this view. AAUP's Brief as Amicus Curiae, Minnesota State Board 
for Community Colleges v Knight, 465 US 271 (1984) (Nos 82-898 and 82-977). See also Madison joint 
School Dis/. v Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 US 167 (1976) (holding that a state law 
effectively forbidding a nonunion teacher to address an elected school board in a general meeting of 
the school board open to the public. without the union's permission to do so, violated the silenced 
teacher's personal first amendment rights; AAUP amicus b1·ief supporting the claim on first 
amendment-academic freedom grounds). 
226. Knight, 465 US at 287-88. 
227. Id at 293 (Marshall concurring) ("Such participation is . . . essential if our academic 
institutions are to fulfill their dual responsibility to advance the frontiers of knowledge through 
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"why, irrespective of other grounds, principles of academic freedom require 
affirmance of the District Court's holding,"228 namely that in his view: 
[The f]irsl amendment freedom to explore novel or controversial ideas in the 
classroom is closely linked to the freedom of faculty members to express their views to 
the administration concerning mauers of academic governance .... The freedom to 
leach without inhibition may be jeopardized just as gravely by a restriction on the 
faculty's ability to speak out on such mauers as by the more direct restrictions struck 
down in Keyishian and in Epperson. In my view, therefore, a direct prohibition of some 
identified faculty group from submiuing their views concerning academic policy 
questions for consideration by college administrators would plainly violate the 
principles of academic freedom enshrined in the First Amendmenl.229 
An additional dissent separately added by Stevens (and joined by Justices 
Brennan and Powell) strongly endorsed Brennan's perspective. As a 
consequence, the contrast within the Supreme Court in Knight could not have 
been more pronounced. The majority saw the case as simply a matter of 
meetings that need not have been provided for in any event, and insofar as 
they were provided they furnished an opportunity for substantial faculty 
representation albeit limited to designees of the faculty's own professional 
group. The dissent viewed the same statute, however, as working a serious 
and unwarranted restriction on some faculty members' opportunities to be 
heard on matters of academic substance as part and parcel of their own 
academic freedom, disadvantaging them solely on the basis of their individual 
decisions not to become union members although still obliged to pay full 
dues. Unaffected by the Court's decision in Knight are such meetings as are 
required to be held for general public purposes. 230 Unaffected, too, may be 
the assurance that faculty submitting professional concerns through 
correspondence and other channels may still claim a strong measure of first 
amendment academic freedom protection. Still, the majority's dicta as well as 
its holding in Knight significantly diminish a university faculty because of the 
distinctly managerial view of academic institutions to which the O'Connor 
opinion strongly yields. Among decisions of the past decade, Knight is one of 
two231 that have leaned against the course Justice Frankfurter originally set 
for the Court in Sweezy, three decades ago. 
Knight is nonetheless also a useful transitional case in moving to the last 
three decisions completing this unhurried review of usages of academic 
freedom and the first amendment in the Supreme Court. What makes it so is 
the character of the colleges engaged in the litigation. Knight concerned two-
year community colleges, which are not quite four-year public baccalaureate 
degree institutions nor advanced degree research universities on the one 
hand, nor public pnmary or secondary schools on the other. We have not 
unfettered inquiry and debate ... and to produce a citizenry willing and able to involve itself in the 
governance of the politv .... ") (citation omitted). 
228. Id at 295 (Brennan dissenting). 
229. Id at 296-97. 
230. See .\!adisonjoint Srhool /Jist .. 429 US 167. 
231. The other is c:niuersity of Pmnsylvania, 110 S Ct 577. 
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hitherto noticed a great deal turning on such matters, 232 but the distinction 
becomes more important as our review nears its end.233 
Some of "the functions of educational institutions in our national life" to 
which Justice Frankfurter made reference in Wieman v. Updegraff 234 are of a 
sort more easily associated with universities than with public schools, for 
example, functions of critical scholarship and research. The tasks of primary 
and secondary schools are at once much more mixed and substantially more 
instrumental than those of colleges or universities. The age of the student, 
the requirement of attendance, the standardization of teacher credentialing, 
the structured inculcation of basic skills, and other factors describe a very 
different milieu. The importance of these schools is not diminished by these 
observations. Far from it.235 They nonetheless serve in a cautionary fashion, 
distancing the environment of public schools from universities. Academic 
freedom plays out somewhat differently in the milieu of primary and 
secondary public education.236 It is drawn in principally as a constitutional 
check against state tendencies to misuse powers of educational command to 
censor materials or instruction, but it plays out much more ambiguously and 
without the same breadth of reach. 
An example of the difference is offered by the 1982 decision of the 
Supreme Court in Board of Education v Pico 237 The case arose after a local 
232. For example, although Sweezy involved a state university (rather than a community college or 
a local public school), the strong statement by Frankfurter emphasized "the nature of the teacher's 
role" and the importance of disallowing "unwarranted inhibition upon the free spirit of teachers" 
(that is, it was not limited to "professors" or to those with doctorates). Moreover, several of the 
more significant cases were public school rather than higher education cases (for example, Adler 
(disqualification from public school teaching of persons with certain political affiliations), Pickering 
(public expression by teachers), Scopes (public school course content restrictions) and Epperson 
(same)). 
233. See, for example, DiBona v Matthews, 220 Cal App 3d 1329, 269 Cal Rptr 882 (1990), cert 
denied, 59 USLW 3402 (1990) (community college administration's cancellation of drama class held 
to violate first amendment, suit brought by the drama instructor and an enrolled student; court 
rejected the comparison of community college with high schools in measuring the protected range of 
drama instructor's professional discretion to determine course content, locating it more closely in 
keeping with the fuller range of academic freedom in colleges (than in high schools) and noting: 
"Defendants have cited no authority-and we are aware of none-which would allow a college or 
university to censor instructor-selected curriculum materials because they contain 'indecent' 
language or deal with 'offensive' topics." Id at 1346-47, 269 Cal Rptr at 893). 
234. 344 US at 197; see notes 88-92 and accompanying text. 
235. Indeed, it is primary and secondary education (not universities) that was the immediate 
reference of the Warren Court when it noted: "In these days, it is doubtful that any child may 
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education." The 
quotation is, of course, from Brown v Board of Educ., 34 7 US 483, 493 ( 1954). 
236. In West Virginia State Board of Educ. v Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943), the Supreme Court struck 
down a state law requiring public school children to participate in daily pledges of allegiance to the 
American flag. It did so on the ground that such compulsory expression of political belief under 
state direction was inconsistent with the broad protection afforded by the first amendment from 
forced recitation of political beliefs one may not share, and that even grade school children may 
constitutionally resist such exercises despite the ambitions of the state (including a democratic state) 
to inculcate patriotism by this means. Id at 634-42. Perhaps surprisingly, Justice Frankfurter 
dissented. Id at 646. Plainly, his views on the "functions" of public schools, and his views of the 
"functions" of universities, were not all the same. For a recent thoughtful review of such matters 
more generally, see Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton Univ Press, 1987). 
237. Board of Educ.. Island Trees v Pica, 457 US 853 (1982). 
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elected school board in Island Trees, New York, ordered the removal of nine 
specified books from all high school and junior high school libraries in the 
district. Suit was brought in federal district court on behalf of several 
students. On first amendment grounds they sought an injunction against the 
school board's removal decree insofar as it affected the libraries at the schools 
in which they were enrolled. But the constitutional basis for their suit was far 
from compelling.238 Some of the books were seriously controversial; their 
suitability for youngsters (in comparison with university students239 or 
community college students) was by no means obvious. Nor could it easily be 
argued that, even so, they might well serve to cultivate values of tolerance and 
a mutual appreciation of positive differences in a free democratic society-
themes the Court had stressed as consistent with the proper educational 
function of public schools. To the contrary, the books might be thought to 
convey destructive images and crude, offensive stereotypes.240 To be sure, 
the first amendment might well not permit a general ban on the availability of 
such books to minors merely on that account, but no restriction on what these 
students could buy, read at home, or borrow from a public library was 
involved here. Nonetheless, the students prevailed, at least partially. On first 
238. Since only students were suing (no teacher, librarian, book publisher, or author claimed 
ground for relief), the case shaped up quite unpromisingly, as a claim asserted by public school 
students to have their first amendment view of material suitable for a school library prevail in 
opposition to the view of the school board of the district in which they resided. Viewed this way, the 
case seemed weak. The district court granted summary judgment to the school board. 474 F Supp 
387 (ED NY 1979). Fortunately for the plaintiffs, however, the board had acted against 
recommendations of its own appointed parent-teacher book review committee in respect to seven of 
the nine books it ordered removed. In rejecting the committee's recommendations, moreover, the 
board had declined even to say why. Portions of the plurality opinion for the Supreme Court 
substantially relied on these facts in determining what deference was due the judgment of the school 
board. 457 U.S. at 874-75. Additionally, as the case proceeded in the courts, the action seeking 
reinstatement, or reshelving, of the books was strongly supported in amicus briefs filed on behalf of 
the National Education Association, the American Library Association, the Authors League of 
America, and P.E.N. American Center. See id at 855. So the actual array of interested parties in 
securing first amendment limits on school library book-removal practices by politicized school 
boards was in fact very substantial, putting the case in a stronger light. 
239. A critical first amendment distinction of this kind is made in the dissent illustrating the 
constitutional difference (of role and function) members of the Court tend to attribute to universities 
as distinct from public schools. See id at 915 (Rehnquist dissenting) (expressly distinguishing 
universities from public schools in just this way). See also note 236 (views of Justice Frankfurter on 
the same point). 
240. By way of example, Justice Powell provided seven pages of excerpts from some of the books 
as an Appendix to his dissent, 457 US at 897-904. They included such passages as these: "There are 
white men who will pay you to fuck their wives. They approach you and say, 'How would you like to 
fuck a white woman?' 'What is this?' you ask. 'On the up-and-up,' he assures you. 'It's all right. 
She's my wife. She needs black rod, is all. She has to have it. It's like a medicine or drug to her. I'll 
pay you.' " Eldridge Cleaver, Soul on Ice (quoted at id at 897); "What do you think goes on in the 
wagon at night: Are the drivers on their knees fucking their mothers? .... 'Who else would do anything 
like that but a mother-fucking Zhid?' .... 'No more noise out of you or I'll shoot your Jew cock off.' 
. . . 'You cocksucker Zhid, I ought to make you lick it up off the floor.' " Bernard Malmud, The Fixer 
(id at 898-99); "'I wonder if sex without acid could be so exciting, so wonderful, so indescribable.' 
... 'Another day, another blow job .... If I don't give Big Ass a blow he'll cut off my supply.'" 
Anonymous, Go Ask Alice (id at 899). 
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amendment grounds, albeit on a close five-to-four vote,241 the Court granted 
them an opportunity to put the school board's actions on trial in federal 
district court, with a fair possibility of getting some of the books put back. 
The success of the case essentially turned on evidence in the record that at 
least some of the books242 had been removed because of a desire to suppress 
information and perspectives reflected in these books not supportive of 
political and social doctrines the board members and their most active 
constituents sought personally to advance through their control of public 
schools. Removal of the books from all of the district's public school libraries 
may have been ordered, in short, " 'not in the interests of the children's well-
being' " but rather for the purpose of establishing those political views " 'as 
the correct and orthodox ones for all purposes in the particular 
community.' " 243 The strategy was to "contract the spectrum of available 
knowledge"244 by banning books presenting views other than those the board 
members wanted to prevail in the larger community.245 There being evidence 
of this design in the record of the case, then, as the court of appeals had held, 
the plaintiffs " 'should have ... been offered an opportunity to persuade a 
241. The case utterly divided the Supreme Court, producing seven separate opinions, and a 
majority on no opinion. Id at 899. See the description provided in the Supreme Court Reporter's 
remarkable headnote to the case: 
BRENNAN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which 
MARSHALL and STEVENS,JJ.,joined and in all but Part II-A(l) of which BLACKMUN,J., 
joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment, post, p. 875. WHITE,]., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 883. 
BURGER, CJ., filed a dissenting opinion, in which POWELL, REHNQUIST, and 
O'CONNOR, JJ ., joined, post, p. 885. POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 893. 
REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, CJ., and POWELL, J., 
joined, post, p. 904. O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 921. 
Id at 854-55. 
242. Among the nine books targeted for removal from the high school library were Kurt 
Vonnegut, Jr.'s Slaughterhouse-Five, Desmond Morris's The Naked Ape, and Langston Hughes, ed, Best 
Short Stories of Negro Writers. Id at 856 n3. All have figured prominently in pubiic school book-
banning litigation. See, for example, Parducci v Rutland, 316 F Supp 352 (MD Ala 1970) (reinstating a 
high school II th grade English teacher after dismissal for insubordination in refusing to discontinue 
use of Vonnegut's Welcome to the Monkey House). This case is especially noteworthy insofar as the 
federal judge, Frank Johnson, wrote explicitly that the teacher's professional interest was that of 
"academic freedom," as a first amendment-protected freedom, and held that the action of the school 
principal and school board "constituted an unwarranted invasion of her First Amendment right to 
academic freedom.'' Id at 356. 
243. Pico, 457 US at 860-61 nl6, quoting opinion of Judge Sifton, 638 F2d 404,417 (2d Cir 1980) 
(reversing the grant of summary judgment in favor of the board). By way of example, the Court 
quoted from statements made by several board members such as this: " 'I am basically a conservative 
in my general philosophy .... I feel that it ism)' duty to apply my consen,ative principles to the decision[ sf . .. 
in which I am involved as a board membn· and I have done so with regard to . .. curriculum formation and content 
and other educational matters.'" Id at 872-73 n24 (emphasis added). A deposition of another board 
member acknowledged that he voted to remove one of the books because of its "anti-Americanism," 
such as the failure of the book to omit mention that George Washington was a slaveholder. ld at 873 
n25. "That [including mention that Washington did own slaves] is one example of what I would 
consider anti-American," the board member said. ld. 
244. Id at 866, quoting Justice Douglas in Griswold v Connectiwt, 381 US 4 79, 482 ( 1965). 
245. See discussion and examples in notes 240, 243. 
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finder of fact that the ostensible justifications for [the school board's] actions 
... were simply pretexts.' " 246 
Pico was, by any fair judgment, an important first amendment (and 
academic freedom247) decision, albeit perhaps less so for the decision it 
reached than for the decision it avoided. Decided on the grounds identified 
by the Court, it stands for an orthodox general first amendment principle, in 
no way peculiar to public education: public agencies, local school boards not 
excepted, may not attempt to "contract the spectrum of available knowledge" 
when the object to be served is to try to restrict freedom of information just 
because the information is of a kind others might draw upon to question or to 
dissent from the views that that public agency248 thinks it best for the public, 
or some subset of the public, to entertain. Understood this way, there is really 
nothing extraordinary here. Justice Robert Jackson put the basic relevant 
proposition quite well half a century ago, and probably no one has much 
improved upon it since: 
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen 
against the State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of Education not excepted. 
These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but 
none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are 
educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of 
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its 
source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere 
platitudes. 249 
Indeed, not the worst way of testing Pico's own limited holding is to ask what 
one would say had the Court decided the case in favor of the school board. 
Were a school board to be regarded as unreviewable in designating only such 
books as it approved as "suitable" for public school library use, how could 
246. 457 US at 860, quoting (with approval) the approach reflected in the court of appeals, 638 
F2d at 417. Pico thus had a strong, direct link to Ewing, reviewed in the text accompanying notes 208-
12. Here, in contrast to Ewing, there was strong evidence that the board was not actually exercising a 
good faith judgment at all. Moreover, so far as there had been a review of the particular books on 
general grounds of educational suitability (a review that appeared to have been made in good faith), 
that review had reached much different conclusions as to most of the books. See note 238. 
247. And Pico is an "academic freedom" case, reaching (as it does) the conditions inside 
educational institutions, the contents of their libraries, student opportunity of access, and 
professional staff judgment in their selection and use, albeit decided on limited first amendment 
grounds. In Pico itself, moreover, faculty academic freedom was also implicated directly and not 
merely indirectly by the school board's directive ordering removal of the books, especially since the 
directive also forbade any curricular use of the same books. See Pico, 457 US at 858 ("As a result [of 
the board's actions], the nine removed books could not be assigned or suggested to students in 
connection with school work."). Among the plaintiffs' complaints in the case was a complaint quite 
the same as that which we examined originally in Baggett, 377 US at 360, that the school board action 
infringed on the range of the student's own educational interaction, because the restrictions on those 
who taught affected as well those who wished to learn. See Pico, 457 US at 862 nl8 (describing the 
board actions as "restrictions upon [the teachers'] ability to function as teachers in violation of 
principles of academic freedom."). 
248. Or, rather, those politically able to dominate that agency, which must then merely stimulate 
competition among community groups, in turn, as to whose views shall control. Compare the 
opinion of Justice Jackson in Barnette, 3 I 9 US at 641: "It seems trite but necessary to say that the 
First Amendment to our Constitution was designed to avoid these ends by avoiding these 
beginnings." 
249. Idat637. 
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one reconcile that rule of law with the first amendment or with any genuine 
academic freedom in public schools, and what kind of rule of law would such a 
rule be? This is, however, roughly the alternative the m~ority of the Court in 
Pico believed it was confronted with, given evidence in the record of the 
assumptions the school board entertained of its prerogatives as well as how it 
acted on those assumptions. There is little reason to suggest that the Court 
was anything other than correct. 
Although Pico dealt with a removal of books from public school libraries, it 
is strongly of a piece with cases such as Epperson v. Arkansas and Scopes v. 
Tennessee, though Epperson and Scopes were instances of classroom rather than 
library censorship. In each, political decisions were at work deliberately to 
"contract the spectrum of available knowledge" within the public school. In 
each instance, the restriction was sought in order to insulate the ideological 
status quo from the distress that is always at risk when academic freedom is 
tolerated at any level of education, whether it is applied to certain subjects, to 
certain books, or to certain teachers. Scopes and Epperson merely furnished 
clear examples. But Pico was also, as the Court properly reviewed it, 
essentially the same sort of restriction one step removed. 
Scopes and Epperson had dealt with efforts not to ban academic access to 
books by modern social anti-establishmentarians such as Kurt Vonnegut or 
Langston Hughes, but rather to suppress teaching of Charles Darwin's work-
even a century after his original field studies had taken place. And, quite 
remarkably, soon after Pico the Supreme Court made still another return to 
Charles Darwin and academic freedom in public schools. It did so in 1987, a 
date coincidentally marking the bicentennial of the Constitution, twenty years 
after Epperson, decided in 1968. The case providing the occasion for a further 
review of this seemingly endless feud between science and religion is Edwards 
v. Aguillard.250 With Scopes having served as the beginning of our unhurried 
review, it is altogether fitting that Edwards v. Aguillard should itself serve as our 
end.251 
250. 482 us 578 (1987). 
251. For the sake of completeness (that is, in reporting usages of "academic freedom" in the 
Supreme Court), however, mention should be made of one other case in the Supreme Court 
adverting to academic freedom during this most recent decade, Memphis Community School Dist. v 
Stachura, 477 US 299 (1986). Stachura was a private civil action brought in federal court by a public 
school teacher of life sciences after she was suspended by a local school board without a hearing 
(albeit with pay). The board had suspended her in hasty response to a local uproar based on 
inaccurate reports about two films she had used in her seventh-grade class on human growth and 
sexuality. Both films in fact had been provided by the local health department and approved by the 
high school principal; so, as it happened-unsurprisingly when due process is ignored-the teacher 
was suspended even while conducting her class altogether unexceptionably, that is, exactly in the 
manner she was authorized to do. Stachura was hastily reinstated the following fall semester albeit 
only after she had filed suit against the school board and its members. Though reinstatement was 
thus no longer at issue, she pressed forward with claims for money damages and fared quite well at 
trial; the jury awarded her $275,000 in compensatory damages and $46,000 in punitive damages. 
Significantly for our purposes, in sustaining her claims as stating proper causes of action, the federal 
district court described her first claim as a claim seeking damages for the violation of her right to 
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The original legislative anathematizing of Darwin from all of public 
education in Tennessee, we recall, was sustained in 1927 on the master-
servant view of teachers in public schools. Indeed, in Scopes, the Tennessee 
Supreme Court held that in respect to tax-supported publicly administered 
schools and universities252 the state was simply "unhampered" by the 
fourteenth amendment in deciding what was to be taught by those whom it 
paid. By 1968 and Epperson, however, as we have already noted, the decisional 
law of th"e first amendment had dramatically changed. The strong protection 
of professional academic freedom within public universities and also in some 
measure in ordinary public schools had come to be accepted in the Court, 
reported in its own usages of academic freedom beginning in the 1950s, in the 
course of holding invalid a large number of state restrictions chilling 
professional teaching and research. Epperson itself vindicated that freedom in 
assuring a high school biology teacher that she could address Darwin in her 
classroom, despite the state's legislated ban.253 
Even so, despite the Court's decision in Epperson, the ancient contest had 
not yet run its course. In 1982, the Louisiana legislature enacted a true 
Hobson's choice. If natural science were taught, then the teacher must teach 
"creation-science"254 as well. Teachers could be relieved of the duty to 
"academic freedom." (Her other claim sought damages for a violation of her right to due process, 
that is, for failure to provide a fair hearing before the complaints against her were acted upon.) The 
court of appeals agreed and likewise described the school board's action as one violating her 
"academic freedom." Stachura v Truszkowski, 763 F2d 211,215 (6th Cir 1985). It is just this point 
that makes the case appropriately mentionable here: the Supreme Court also used the same term 
unexceptionably in describing her right. See, for example, id at 302, 309 (use of the term "academic 
freedom"). Stachura is thus a helpful case, marking the identification of teaching freedom-academic 
freedom-in first amendment law. 
But the matter is not dwelt upon here, because the case was accepted for review in the Supreme 
Court only to consider a different point: not to decide whether Stachura's academic freedom was 
protected by the first amendment, but, granting that it was, to determine how damages were to be 
measured when it is violated by a local school board and its members. The Court agreed that every 
form of damage to Stachura (including mental anguish, damage to reputation, lost income and/or 
lost teaching opportunities) could figure in the jury's award, including punitive damages as well. It 
rejected the idea, however, that additional damages could be awarded on some jury divination of the 
intrinsic money worth of a constitutional right per se, an award the district court had allowed. The 
case, though a fair argument can be made that such an award is not inappropriate, is nonetheless 
unremarkable in its treatment of that feature of claiming damages. 
252. Recall that the Tennessee statute involved in Scopes and the Arkansas statute involved in 
Epperson applied to all public colleges and state supported universities as well as to public schools. 
See notes 14-18 and accompanying text. 
253. As we observed, see notes 153-67 and accompanying text, the Court held that insofar as the 
banishment of Darwin from the public school (or university) was done to serve interests of a 
dominant religion, it was invalid under the first amendment on that account. Nevertheless, Epperson 
also stood for a stronger rationale. The concurring opinion by Justice Stewart, as we noted, was not 
restricted to a limited establishment clause rationale. In Pico, moreover, Epperson was identified with 
Keyishian and other academic freedom cases in the Supreme Court. See, for example, 457 US at 853. 
Justice Brennan also described Epperson as a case affirming the duty of courts to intervene where 
"essential to safeguard the fundamental values of freedom of speech and inquiry." Pico, id at 870, 
quoting Epperson, 393 US at 104. 
254. "Creation-science" was defined in the statute itself as a belief regarding origins, whether of 
chemical elements, galaxies, organisms, species (including man) and all else, that they "were created 
ex nihilo and fixed by God." See Creationism Act, La Rev Stat Ann§ 17:286.1-286.7 (West 1982). 
See also Aguillard, 482 US at 596 ("[T]he largest proportion of superintendents interpreted creation 
science, as defined by the Act, to mean the literal interpretation of the Book of Genesis."). 
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provide instruction in "creation-science," that is, only by abstaining from 
teaching what the legislature called "evolution-science." The choice, 
therefore, was to teach each with the same vigor and attention as the other, or 
to teach neither. 
The case challenging the Louisiana act was brought in federal district 
court by a coalition of teachers, parents, and students. That court, as well as 
the court of appeals, meticulously reviewed the legislation, and both 
concluded that the actual point of the act was to regulate public school 
curricula strictly in behalf of religious interests. The act plainly meant to 
compel teachers either to stay away from discussing evolution255 or, failing 
that, to offer Bible explanations (called "creationism") as part of ordinary 
science, to be inculcated as of equal validity. The court of appeals struck the 
act on the same basis as the Arkansas statute had been held invalid in Epperson, 
that is, as a violation of the establishment clause. The Supreme Court 
agreed.256 In doing so, it added that nothing in its decision should be taken 
to "imply that a legislature could never require that scientific critiques of 
prevailing scientific theories be taught. " 257 But it also registered its firm 
agreement with the lower courts that this act was not an act of that permissible 
sort. 
In deciding Aguillard as it did, moreover, the Court also expressly 
addressed the meaning of academic freedom in public education. It 
undertook to do so because the Louisiana act purported on its face to have 
been enacted not to restrict but rather to protect academic freedom-the 
academic freedom of students.258 In response, noting how the act was meant 
to work concretely, and agreeing with the elaborate court of appeals' review of 
the very question of how academic freedom would in fact be affected, Justice 
Brennan quite unremarkably concluded: "The Act actually serves to diminish 
academic freedom by removing the flexibility to teach evolution without also 
teaching creation-science even if teachers determine that such curriculum 
255. The principal sponsor of the law expressly stated as his own strong preference that teachers 
say nothing, thus achieving the effect of the law that was invalidated in Epperson. See references and 
quotations at 482 US at 587. 
256. Aguillard v Treen, 634 F Supp 426, 428 (ED La 1985) alld, Aguillard v Edwards, 765 F2d 1251, 
1257-58 (5th Cir 1985); see 482 US at 593-94 (discussion by Justice Brennan). See also 482 US at 
602 (Powell concurring, noting that the material expected to be used in teaching "creation-science" 
was expected to come essentially from the Bible as the written word of God, and from materials 
supplied by "research" centers in which membership itself, however, required that "a member must 
accept 'that the account of origins in Genesis is a factual presentation of simple historical truth.'"); id 
at 609 (White concurring) ("[T]he teaching of evolution was conditioned on the teaching of a 
religious belief. Both courts concluded that the state legislature's primary purpose was to advance 
religion and that the statute was therefore unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause."). 
257. Id at 593. 
258. The effort of the Louisiana legislature to describe the act in these terms, moreover, is itself 
extremely instructive of the extent to which the legislature was aware how much conditions had 
changed since Scopes. Sixty years earlier, there would have been no need at all to explain or to 
account for whatever the legislature decided on such matters. (That, after all, was the essence of 
Scopes.) Now, however, given the changes in constitutional doctrine and the virtual certainly of a first 
amendment challenge, there was felt need to say something to put a proper face on the matter at 
hand. Choosing the explanation of solicitude for "student academic freedom" (learning freedom) 
was the best thought the legislature had. 
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results in less effective and comprehensive science instruction. " 259 The court 
of appeals had taken the same approach, namely that "[a]cademic freedom 
embodies the principal that individual instructors are at liberty to teach that 
which they deem to be appropriate in the exercise of their professional 
judgment. . . . Although states may prescribe public school curriculum 
concerning science instruction ... the compulsion inherent in the Balanced 
Treatment Act is, on its face, inconsistent with the idea of academic freedom 
as it is universally understood. " 260 The Act, in brief, actually denied one kind 
of academic freedom to students insofar as it denied them learning freedom 
in the specific sense of access to and the benefit of each teacher's best professional, 
good faith judgment, understanding, and skills. It operated in its own way as the Act 
reviewed and held invalid in Baggett v. Bullitt.261 It also operated in the same 
manner here as another statute would operate were it to require that one 
teaching astronomy either propose no science descriptions at all or propose 
Ptolemaic (earth-centered) models as viable science alternatives to 
Copernican ideas, that is, to require "balanced treatment" of earth-centered 
astronomy for the same reason as "creation-science" was required here (to 
confirm "God's plan" according to the Bible). 
To be sure, Aguillard was not unanimous and it did divide the Supreme 
Court, albeit not by any very close vote. What is more useful about Aguillard, 
as a fair way of completing this unhurried review of academic freedom and the 
first amendment, however, is not anything in the division of the Court.262 Nor 
is it anything that separates it or its useful observations on the meaning and 
content of academic freedom from its discussion and decisions in Sweezy, 
Baggett, Keyishian, Ewing, Pico and others that lend strong encouragement and 
support to academic freedom, whether in universities or in public schools. It 
is useful, rather, because overall its treatment of that freedom is in keeping 
with these other cases and because it, too, tends to report a far better 
understanding of the first amendment imperatives for academic freedom than 
characterized the empty doctrines of American constitutional law when 
Scopes was a teacher in Tennessee. Today, on the 50th anniversary of the 
Joint Statement of Principles and the 200th anniversary of the Bill of Rights, 
despite Aguillard, it would still be quite incorrect to suggest that the protection 
of academic freedom is now reasonably secure. Assuredly it is not. Still, a 
259. 482 US at 586 n6. See also discussion, id at 588-89. The court of appeals had taken the 
same approach, namely, that 
[a]cademic freedom embodies the principle that individual instructors are at liberty to teach 
that which they deem to be appropriate in the exercise of their professional judgment. .. . 
Although states may prescribe public school curriculum concerning science instruction .. . 
the compulsion inherent in the Balanced Treatment Act is, on its face, inconsistent with the 
idea of academic freedom as it is universally understood. 
765 F2d at 1257. 
260. 765 F2d at 1257. 
261. 377 US 360; see notes 115-19 and accompanying text. 
262. The case came into court untested in actual application, enabling Scalia (for himself and 
Chief Justice Rehnquist) to suggest possibilities of legislative face-saving interpretation, that is, 
interpretations as might not impose more than trivially upon those subject to its "balanced 
treatment" provisions, according to which it could then be sustained. 
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number of things have come out nearly right, and the jurisprudence of the 
first amendment is vastly better than it once was. 
